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I. TITLE I-GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. Chapter 100-APPLICABILITY AND CITATION
Rule 1-101-App'cablty
Rule 1-101 delineates the scope of the new rules and simplifies For-
mer Rule 1. The rules, adopted on April 6, 1984, by the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland, are divided into titles, each title having its own
scope. Title 1, General Provisions, applies to all Maryland courts, in-
cluding the District Court. The former general provisions were inappli-
cable to the District Court;' the Rules of the District Court were
1. See Former Md. R.P. I a 1.
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separate and distinct from the procedural rules of the other courts.2 The
new rules thus reflect the Committee's intent to consolidate all rules gov-
erning Maryland practice into a single set.3
Title 2, because it applies only to civil matters in the circuit courts,
recognizes that a separate set of rules will be necessary for civil matters
in the District Court. The separate rules are needed to retain the infor-
mal character of the District Court, to provide an expedited and inex-
pensive means of resolving disputes of less complexity than those within
the circuit courts' subject matter jurisdiction.4 Instead of appearing in a
separate volume, as is presently the case, the Maryland District Rules
for Civil Practice appear in Title 3 of the new rules.' Consistent with
the elimination of the distinction between pleadings in law and in eq-
uity,6 the rules dispense with procedural rules based on that difference.7
Another result of the Committee's intent to consolidate all rules is that
Title 4 governs all criminal matters, post-conviction procedures, and ex-
pungement of records in both the circuit and District courts."
Rule 1-102- Circuit and Local Rules
Rule 1-102 is derived from Former Rule 1 f and preserves the effect
of circuit and local rules regulating certain procedures, provided the lo-
cal rules are not inconsistent with the new rules. Following the former
rule, this rule prohibits the adoption of circuit and local rules dealing
with matters not specifically listed in the rule.
Rule 1-103--Method of Citation
Rule 1-103 changes the permissive method of citation of the rules.
Former Rule 3 d provided that the rules be cited as "Maryland Rules";
this rule provides that the rules may be cited as "Md. Rules." In addi-
tion, the new rule specifies that a specific rule may be cited as, e.g., Rule
1-102. The old rule did not specify any method of referring to a rule
individually.
2. See MD. DIST. RULES.
3. Proposed Rule 1-101 reporter's note.
4. C. BROWN, INTRODUCTION TO MARYLAND CIVIL LITIGATION 225-26 (1982).
5. See Proposed District Court Rules, MD. ADMIN. REG., Dec. 9, 1983.
6. See infra notes 354-62 and accompanying text.
7. Proposed Rule 1-102 reporter's note.
8. See Proposed Criminal Rules, MD. ADMIN. REG., Dec. 9, 1983.
[VOL. 43:669
MARYLAND RULES
B. Chapter 200- CONSTRUCTION INTERPRETATION, AND
DEFINITIONS
Rule 1-201-Rules of Construction
Rule 1-201 draws its general statement of policy from both the fed-
eral and Maryland rules and modifies several former Maryland rules.
The first sentence of section (a), consistent with Federal Rule 1 and al-
most verbatim from Former Rule 701, states the general policy that all
of the rules "shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fair-
ness in administration, and elimination of unjustifiable expense and de-
lay." To secure these objectives, section (a) contains new provisions
regarding the consequences of noncompliance with the rules. Compli-
ance with both mandatory and prohibitory provisions is to be compelled
through the measures prescribed by the rules or by statute. If the rules
do not establish any particular enforcement procedure, the court may
compel compliance or determine the consequences of noncompliance
"in light of the totality of the circumstances and the purpose of the
rule." One member of the Committee stated that this provision, despite
its lack of any clear direction, was intended to guide the court's discre-
tion in imposing sanctions.' Challenging this assertion, another member
recommended that the Committee try to minimize abuse by inserting
restrictions on the exercise of judicial discretion.' ° The Committee did
limit the amount of discretion available to a judge in criminal and in
juvenile cases by adding a clause stating that a court may dismiss a
charging document only if the state's noncompliance results in a viola-
tion of the defendant's constitutional rights. This addition was de-
scribed by one member as intending to serve a dual purpose. On the
one hand, it prevents the defendant's arbitrary dismissal due to the
state's excusable or unintentional noncompliance with a mandatory
rule." On the other hand, it discourages the state's callous or cavalier
disregard of time limitations. 12
The rest of Rule 1-201 does not change Maryland procedure. Sec-
tion (b) consolidates Former Rule 1 h and 1 i. The new rule eliminates
9. Comments of Mr. Niemeyer, Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 42 ("this provision is
designed to provide some guidance to the court in deciding what sanction to impose where
none is expressly provided in the rules"). See also Proposed Rule 1-201 reporter's note, stat-
ing that the last two sentences of the rule were added in response to concerns of the Commit-
tee and the judiciary regarding court interpretation of mandatory language in the rules. The
added language is intended to provide necessary guidelines so that the rules will not be inter-
preted in such a way as to cause unintended effects.
10. Comments of Judge Proctor, Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 42, 44.
11. Comments of Senator Connell, i. at 43.
12. Id.
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the reference in Former Rule 1 i to law and equity, in accordance with
the new rules' consolidation of the forms of action. The only other
changes are changes in style. Section (c) is derived from Former Rules 1
g and 701, and provides that rules or omissions do not repeal the com-
mon law or statute unless the common law or statute is inconsistent with
the rules. This rule does not represent a change in Maryland procedure,
but merely rewords the former rule to modify its confusing language.'
3
Section (d) carries forward Former Rule 2 c almost verbatim and re-
flects the Committee's intent that the rules operate in a sex-neutral man-
ner.14 The wording adopted parallels that in the prior rule and states
that "words in any gender include all genders except as necessary imphca-
tion requires. 155
The Committee discussed two other possible means of advancing
their goal of sex-neutrality. 6 The first alternative provided that "words
in any gender include all genders unless specifically provided otherwise."' 7
This alternative was originally considered because a Maryland delegate
expressed dissatisfaction with the wording of the rule as adopted.' 8 Crit-
icisms of this second proposal included comments by one member that it
would place undue emphasis on gender, giving rise to unintended infer-
ences and requiring that each sex-specific term be accompanied by ex-
planatory language. 9 The Committee also considered having no
exceptions to a general rule that applies all gender-oriented words to
both sexes.2" But the Committee apparently rejected both of these alter-
natives, eventually leaving the exception the same as in the former
rules.2 '
Section (e) carries forward Former Rule 2 b (Headings Not Rules)
and, provides that the headings, subheadings, cross references, commit-
tee notes, source references, and annotations are not part of the rules.
13. See Minutes, Oct. 13-14, 1978, at 6 (where the Committee referred this section back to
the Style Subcommittee because it felt its wording was confusing).
14. See Minutes, Jan. 4, 1980, at 13 (announcement of the Chairman discussing the Com-
mittee's decision to draft on the basis of sex-neutrality).
15. MD. R.P. 1-201(d) (emphasis added).
16. Minutes, Sept. 14, 1979, at 3-5.
17. Id. at 4.
18. Id. at 3. According to the Committee minutes, Delegate Maurer was dissatisfied with
the Committee's version and favored this alternative, which paralleled that in H.B. 1298, Acts
of 1979, ch. 185, a bill she had introduced to replace MD. ANN. CODE art. 1, § 7. H.B. 1298
stated: "Unless the General Assembly specifically provides otherwise in a particular statute,
all words in the Code imparting one gender include and apply to the other gender as well."
19. Comments of Mr. Sykes, Minutes, Sept. 14, 1979, at 4.
20. Comments of Mr. (now Judge) Rodowsky, i.
21. The Committee agreed to draft, in response to Delegate Maurer's concerns, an alter-
native rule to propose along with that chosen by the Committee. Minutes, Jan. 4, 1980, at 14.
No such rule was ever proposed.
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Rule 1-202-Definzons
The definitions section, Rule 1-202, generally adopts the former
definitional section, Rule 5, with very few substantive changes. Many of
the changes in, and additions to, the definitions are the result of changes
in practice and therefore will be discussed later in the context of those
changes. Some of the more important changes, however, should be
noted here. Section (a) changes the definition of the word "action" as
used in the rules. Former Rule 5 a defined "action" as referring only to
the steps of a civil action and specifically excluding criminal proceed-
ings; the new rule defines the term to include the steps of both civil and
criminal proceedings. Although the change does not affect practice, sev-
eral rules that used the word "action" to designate only civil proceedings
had to be changed to conform with the new definition of the word.2 2
Section (b) is derived from Former Rule 5 c and eliminates refer-
ence to the old notions of oath, verification, and affidavit, thus eliminat-
ing confusion caused by references to these three different terms.23 With
this deletion, the new rule combines the use of these terms in the rules
under the common definition of affidavit and thus achieves a clearer
definition of the concept of affidavit. 24 The deletion effects no substan-
tive change. Consistent with prior practice, when an affidavit is re-
quired, the affiant must make a written statement and affirm the
statement to be true. The section merely clarifies the practice mandat-
ing personal knowledge only where expressly required. 25 Also, the affir-
mation must be reflected within the statement, either by the affiant's
signing of an oath or by a notary's attesting that the affiant has so
sworn. 26
Section (c) adds to the definitional section the meaning of the term
"body attachment." Previously set out separately in Former Rules 114
d for body attachment of a witness who fails to obey a summons in a
civil action, 742 e for body attachment of a witness who fails to obey a
summons in a criminal cause, and 743 c for body attachment of a mate-
rial witness in a criminal cause, the new rule provides one uniform defi-
nition to be applied in three situations: (1) a witness who fails to obey a
subpoena, pursuant to Rule 2-510(h), (2) a material witness in a crimi-
22. See, e.g., MD. R.P. 1-341, 1-401.
23. Minutes, Oct. 13-14, 1978, at 7. See also Niemeyer, The Maryland Rules-A Tmefor
Overhaul, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 1, 9-11 (1979) (discussing the clarity of style and concept being
sought by the reorganization project, and using as an example the proposed changes to the
definitions of affidavit, oath, and verification).
24. Minutes, Oct. 13-14, 1978, at 7.
25. Proposed Rule 1-2 02(c) reporter's note (now MD. R.P. 1-202(b)).
26. Minutes, Oct. 13-14, 1978, at 7. See also MD. R.P. 1-304 (Form of Affidavit).
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nal action, and (3) a party to a civil action who fails to obey an order of
court. This third application is not represented in the former rules, and
therefore represents a change from existing practice.
Section (d), defining "certified mail," is derived from Former Rule
5 aa. This definition is intended to include both certified and registered
mail, although the latter is rarely used because of the expense.2 7 Section
(n) is new and defines "levy" to refer to any act by a sheriff to bring
property under the control of the court to satisfy a money judgment.
The Committee felt that this definition was necessary because of the
extensive use of the term in the rules governing enforcement of money
judgments.2" In defining the term "levy," the Committee noted that it
is not used with enforcement proceedings that do not involve the sheriff,
such as garnishment proceedings pursuant to Rule 2-668.29
Section (p) extends the term "person" to include expressly "the
State, its agencies or political subdivisions, or any other governmental
entity."3 This should clear up past confusion over whether a govern-
mental entity was to be considered a person.3 Section (q) defines
"pleading" and greatly simplifies the definition in Former Rule 5 v.
The change is intended to coordinate the Maryland concept of pleading
with that of federal practice set forth in Federal Rule 7(a),3" and thus
limits the definition of a pleading to the particular list set forth in the
rule.3 3 Former Rule 5 v provided no limiting language; thus almost any
paper filed in an action fell under the definition of a pleading.3 4 That
definition included several papers that will no longer be referred to as
pleadings, specifically motions and preliminary objections. Although
27. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Mar. 13, 1982, at 2.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Compare MD. R.P. 1-202(p) (specifically including government entities within the defi-
nition of person), with Former Md. R.P. 5 q (defining person as "any natural person, partner-
ship, joint stock company, unincorporated association, or society, or municipal or other
corporation of any character whatsoever").
31. See, e.g., United States v. Coumantaros, 165 F. Supp. 695 (D. Md. 1958) (holding that
United States is "person" under Former Md. R.P. 5 q).
32. Compare the papers considered a "pleading" under MD. R.P. 1-2 0 2(q) with those
under FED. R. Civ. P. 7(a).
33. MD. R.P. 1-2 02 (q) includes the following as pleadings: a complaint, a counterclaim, a
cross-claim, a third-party complaint, an answer, an answer to a counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party complaint, a reply to an answer, or a charging document as used in Title 3.
34. Former Md. R.P. 5 v defined a pleading to include
any paper filed in an action, setting forth a cause of action or ground of defense, or
filed with the object of bringing an action to issue or trial or obtaining any decision
or act by the court including, but not limited to a declaration, bill of complaint,
petition, demurrer, dilatory plea, plea in bar, answer, demand for particulars, bill of
particulars, exception, replication and an order of court requiring a reply.
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the change would seem to warrant a new section defining "motion," the
Committee considered the necessity of such a provision (especially to
clarify what kinds of paper a third-party plaintiff would have to provide
to a third-party defendant),35 but no such definition was adopted.
Section (v) defines "sheriff" in a manner similar to the definition in
Former Rule 5 cc, but amends the definition to include District Court
constables and elisors who perform the duties of the sheriff." Former
Rule 5 ee included a subpoena under the definition of "summons," but
the terms are distinguished in the new rules." Under new Rule 1-202 a
summons can issue only to notify the person named therein that an ac-
tion has been filed against that person, and that failure to answer a civil
complaint may result in entry of judgment against that person, or fail-
ure to attend in a criminal action may result in issuance of a warrant for
that person's arrest. Section (w) essentially adopts the definition of sum-
mons set forth in Former Rule 5 ee, and defines a subpoena as a written
order used to compel a person's attendance. Therefore, under the new
rules the subpoena has broader application than the summons. The def-
inition of "process" in section (s) also has been changed to reflect the
distinction between summons and subpoena by including both terms.
Rule 1-203--Time
Rule 1-203 preserves prior practice for computation of time, and
adds a new provision from the federal rules. Sections (a) and (b) explain
the method of computing a period of time prescribed by the rules, by
order of court, or by statute, particularly by explaining when weekend
days and holidays are or are not included in the time period. These two
sections follow Former Rule 8 a and b with only minor stylistic changes.
Section (c) adopts Federal Rule 6(e) almost verbatim and adds
three days to the prescribed period to respond when a notice or paper is
served by mail. Thus, although it may be more convenient to mail no-
tice to the opposing party, a party desiring to move the case forward as
quickly as possible should personally serve the opposing party, when the
opposing party is required to do some act or take some proceeding
35. Minutes, Mar. 8, 1980, at 39 ("During the course of the discussion of [Proposed Rule
2-331] it became clear that there needed to be included in Rule 1-202 (Definitions) a defini-
tion of the term 'motion.' This definition would, among other things, clarify what kinds of
papers the third-party plaintiff would have to provide to the third-party defendant.").
36. Minutes, Jan. 5, 1979, at 16-17. The Committee thought that this definition might
depend on the constable rules, and agreed that on completion of the proposed rules they
should examine this definition to see if it could be simplified or eliminated. Id at 17.
37. Minutes, Oct. 13-14, 1978, at 10-11. Compare Former Md. R.P. 5 ee, stating that
summons' shall include 'subpoena,'" with MD. R.P. 1-202(w), (x), where these terms are
defined differently.
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within a prescribed period after service."8 The mere fact that notice
must be mailed to a party, however, does not extend the time for doing
an act if the prescribed time within which the act must be done is con-
trolled not by the date of notice but by some other act.3 9 For example,
the time for an appeal begins to run from entry of the judgment and not
from service of the notice; therefore, this new rule will not extend the
time in which the party must appeal.4 This lack of effect on time peri-
ods that are not governed by the date of notice is similar to practice in
federal courts, where Federal Rule 6(e) has been found inapplicable in
determining whether timely filing has been made of a petition to review
an order of a bankruptcy referee, 4 a motion to vacate summary judg-
ment,42 and a petition for removal.4"
Rule 1-204-Motion to Shorten or Extend Time Requirements
Rule 1-204(a) is derived from Federal Rule 6(b) and Former Rule
309 and establishes the standard for determining whether to shorten or
expand time requirements. Following both the federal rule and the for-
mer rule, Rule 1-204(a) requires that a party show cause for a change in
time limits.44 Unlike Former Rule 309, but following Federal Rule 6(b),
the new rule distinguishes between filing a motion to extend time before
the expiration of time to act, and filing a motion after such time:45 If
the time period has expired, the court may extend the time to act only if
the failure to act resulted from "excusable neglect." Although one Com-
mittee member felt that Rule 1-204(a) will drastically change Maryland
practice by allowing an extension of time in certain cases of excusable
neglect,4 6 the new rule is not significantly different from Former Rule
309 b, which, although never thoroughly interpreted by case law, pro-
vided that a court, "[f]or good cause shown" and "at any time," might
38. 2 J. MOORE, W. TAGGERT & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 5.07, at
1357 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE], states:
While mailing is a convenient method of making service, a party who desires to
push his case and to avoid the delay of even a few days may find it advisable to
make personal service upon an opposing party, if the opposing party is required to
do some act or take some proceeding within a prescribed period after the service of
the pleading or other paper.
39. Id. 6.12, at 1500.209-.210.
40. Id
41. See Goff v. Pfau, 418 F.2d 649, 654 (8th Cir. 1969).
42. See Sonnenblick-Goldman Corp. v. Nowalk, 420 F.2d 858, 860 (3d Cir. 1970).
43. Youngson v. Lusk, 96 F. Supp. 285, 289 (D. Neb. 1951).
44. See FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b); Former Md. R.P. 309.
45. Compare Former Md. R.P. 309 a with FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b) and MD. R.P. 1-204(a).
46. Comments of Judge McAuliffe, Minutes, Oct. 13-14, 1978, at 12 (This section results
in "a drastic change from prior practice in that it allows an extension of time where a person
neglected to act during the time prescribed.").
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order a time requirement shortened or extended.4 '
The true change instituted by the rule is the imposition of explicit
requirements for changing a time period; Maryland practice now must
conform to federal practice. The rule balances the Committee's reluc-
tance to allow extensions based on culpable neglect and its desire to
allow extensions in "certain compelling circumstances" when the time
to act has expired.4" The Committee rejected a suggestion to allow an
extension for "excusable failure" rather than "excusable neglect."149 The
Committee decided to use "excusable neglect," because this language
tracks that of Federal Rule 6(b), and thus should be interpreted in ac-
cordance with federal case law.5" In order to work substantial justice,
federal courts have generally given Federal Rule 6(b) a liberal construc-
tion, but have refused to condone carelessness and laxity.5 The burden
of proving that the failure was the result of excusable neglect falls on the
moving party,5 2 and absent that showing the court cannot grant relief.5"
In order to prevent overuse of the provision, the Committee decided
that, like Federal Rule 6(b), the rule should include several situations in
which no extensions should be permitted.54 Essentially following the
federal rule, Rule 1-204(a) provides that the court may not shorten or
extend the time for filing a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, a motion for new trial, a motion to alter or amend judgment, a
motion addressed to the revisory power of the court, or a notice of
appeal. 55
Although generally following Federal Rule 6(b), the rule does di-
verge from the federal rule in several respects. Unlike Federal Rule
6(b), which provides only for the extensi'on of time requirements, Rule 1-
47. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Somerset County Sanitary Comm'n, 231 Md. 242, 245, 189
A.2d 601, 602-03 (1963) (affirming a trial court's shortening of the defendant's time to plead
following notice by publication on grounds that good cause was shown and no actual preju-
dice was alleged).
48. Minutes, Oct. 13-14, 1978, at 12-13. The Committee agreed with a suggestion by Mr.
Nilson that the rule should provide for extensions of time in certain compelling circum-
stances, but also felt that they should make sure that this section include all situations where
no extensions should be allowed. Id. at 12.
49. Id. Judge McAuliffe, supporting Judge Proctor's recommendation to change "ne-
glect" to "failure," noted that "neglect" connotes culpability, and no extension should be
granted for culpable failure to file. Id.
50. Id. Dean Kelly supported the use of "neglect" specifically because it would track FED.
R. Civ. P. 6(b), and thereby give Maryland courts the benefit of federal case law. Id.
51. 2 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 38, 6.08, at 1500.72-.73.
52. Id. at 1500.70.
53. Id. at 1500.70 n.5.
54. Minutes, Oct. 13-14, 1978, at 12.
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b) provides that the court may not extend the time for acting under
FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d), (e), and 60(b).
1984]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
204(a), consistent with Former Rule 309, allows a Maryland court to
shorten or extend time requirements. Furthermore, although Rule 1-
204(a) does not specifically require notice to the opposing party, such
requirement can be implied because Rule 1-204(b) sets forth specific re-
quirements to be met before such motion can be made ex pare.5 6 Fed-
eral Rule 6(b)(l) on the other hand, specifically provides that if the
request is made before the expiration of the period, the court may order
an enlargement with or without notice. Finally Federal Rule 6(b) al-
lows a court to extend time "with or without motion," but Rule 1-204(a)
restricts the courts' extensions to those made upon a party's motion.57
Section (b) of Rule 1-204 is new and incorporates the prior practice
of counsel informally seeking a change in time requirements. 5 The rule
allows the court to enter an ex pare order to shorten or extend the time
period under two circumstances. First, under Rule 1-204(b)(1), an order
can be entered if the court is satisfied that the moving party has notified
the opposing parties of the time and place that the moving party intends
to confer with the court and that the moving party attempted, but was
unable, to reach an agreement with the opposing party. Second, under
Rule 1-204(b) (2) the court may enter an ex parte order if satisfied that
the moving party "would be prejudiced" if required to comply with 1-
204(b)(1).
Rule 1-204(c) is also new and provides that an order shorten'ng the
time to respond to original process must be served in the same manner
as the original process, which is governed by Rules 2-121 through 2-
126." 9 All other orders should be served in accordance with Rule 1-321,
which describes the method of service for pleadings and papers other
than original pleadings.' The rule states: "Otherwise [having estab-
lished the method for serving an order shortening the time for a response
to original process], it shall be served in the manner provided by Rule 1-
321." "Otherwise" could be interpreted restrictively to refer only to or-
ders extending the time for responding to original process. But a more
reasonable interpretation is that the sentence refers to all other orders
concerning extensions or shortenings of time requirements. This new
rule has no counterpart in the federal rules or in the former Maryland
rules. 6'
56. See also MD. R.P. 1-321 (requiring service of every pleading and other paper filed).
57. Proposed Rule 1-204(a) reporter's note ("This section modifies the federal rule by
requiring a motion.").
58. Proposed Rule 1-204(b) reporter's note ("This section . . . incorporates into the rule
the current informal practice of counsel seeking delayed or expedited action.").
59. See bifra notes 232-60 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
61. Proposed Rule 1-204(c) reporter's note.
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C Chapter 300-GENERAL PROVISIONS
Rule 1-301-Form of Court Papers
Rule 1-301 combines provisions from federal and Maryland prac-
tice, and adds several innovations. Section (a) draws from Federal
Rules 10(a) and 7(b)(2) as well as Former Rule 301 e and h. Like the
federal rules, the provisons of section (a) specifically apply to "[e]very
pleading and paper filed," which presumably includes motions.62 This
section requires a caption setting forth the parties (or matter), the
court's name, the docket reference, and a brief descriptive title.6 3 Both
Former Rule 301 e and Rule 1-301(a) require an original pleading to
contain either the parties' names and addresses or a statement that they
are unknown. The rule expressly states that the name of the first party
for both sides is sufficient for other pleadings and papers, thus making
clear what was implicit in Former Rule 301 e.
Unlike Former Rule 301 e, the new rule does not expressly require
the party against whom relief is sought to include in his first pleading
the name and address of any party omitted from, or incorrectly stated
in, the previous pleadings. But the rule requires that a party's original
pleading contain, if known, the names and addresses of all parties to the
action. This requirement arguably applies to the first pleading of either
party and thus should be construed to mean the correct name and
address if stated incorrectly or omitted from the other party's original
pleading.
Section (b) is new, simplifies Maryland practice, and is consistent
with the elimination of law-equity pleading distinctions.6 4 Under sub-
section (b)(1) of the new rule, regardless of the nature of the action, the
party bringing the action is the "plaintiff" (except in criminal cases
where the party will be the state) and the party against whom the action
is brought is the "defendant." This rule takes the place of Former Rule
5 j and s, and eliminates the references in those definitions to the equita-
ble labels of respondent, complainant, and petitioner. Subsection (b) (2)
applies this scheme to subsequent claims, i.e., cross-claims, counter-
claims, and third-party claims.
Subsection (b)(3) was added to provide uniformity in the designa-
62. Although motions are not included in the MD. R.P. 1-20 2 (q) definition of pleading,
MD. R.P. 2-311 mandates that every motion, unless made during a hearing or trial, be made
in writing.
63. See Proposed Rule 1-301(a) reporter's note ("This section enlarges the rule to make
provision for situations where a matter, in lieu of parties, is captioned and to require inclusion
of any assigned docket reference.").
64. Proposed Rule 1-301(b) reporter's note.
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tion of parties to appeals from the District Court. 65 After extensive dis-
cussion over whether the designation plaintiff/defendant or the
designation appellant/appellee would help clarify the referent on ap-
peal, the Committee decided that the former would be better and pro-
vided in subsection (b)(3) that parties are to retain their original
designation in appeals to a circuit court.66 Subsection (b)(4) provides
that the member of the bar who appears for a party will be called an
attorney, regardless of the nature of the action. This provision appar-
ently replaces Former Rule 5 d, but eliminates reference to the term
solicitor, formerly used to identify counsel in an action in equity.
In an effort to promote uniformity, practicality, and economy, the
Committee approved section (c), which declares that all papers filed
henceforth must not exceed eight and a half by eleven inches in size.67
The Committee was surprisingly resistant to this practical change.6"
Members favoring the change cited the ease and reduced cost of han-
dling of the files by the clerks; those opposed relied on the fact that this
was a radical change from present practice and that some papers, such
as FNMA mortgages and deeds, would still have to be on legal size pa-
per.69 Also contrary to current practice, the new rule specifically pro-
hibits backs and covers.
Section (d) represents the Committee's effort to eliminate copies
which are difficult to read or which self-destruct,7" and states that the
paper and writing must be legible and of permanent quality. An earlier
draft contained a provision that required typewritten papers to be
double-spaced.71 Although consistent with several current rules,72 the
provision was deleted. Section (e) excepts existing documents filed as
exhibits (but not those prepared as exhibits) from the requirements of
65. Minutes, Jan. 5, 1979, at 17-19.
66. Id.
67. This rule is derived from Former Md. R.P. 1217 b, and, consistent with Former Md.
R.P. 811 a 2, 831 a, and 1031 a, reduces the maximum length from 13 inches to II inches.
Proposed Rule 1-301 (c) reporter's note. The restriction on paper size, however, is not sched-
uled to go into effect until January 1, 1985. Order, Court of Appeals of Maryland, Apr. 6,
1984.
68. See Minutes, Oct. 13-14, 1978, at 16-17; id., Jan. 5, 1979, at 19.
69. Minutes, Oct. 13-14, 1978 at 16-17.
70. Id. at 15-16; see also Proposed Rule 1-304(d) reporter's note ("This section is consistent
with Rules 811 a 2, 831 a and 1031 a, enlarged to cover durability of the paper and writing
and narrowed by not allowing reproduction on both sides of the paper.").
71. Section (d) of an earlier draft stated: "A paper shall be legible. A typewritten paper
shall be double spaced. The paper and the writing must be of permanent quality."
72. See Former Md. R.P. 811 a 2,831 a, and 1031 a, which require a typewritten paper to
be double-spaced.
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sections (a), (c), and (d).73 Finally, section (f) consolidates Former Rules
301 k and 303 a which eliminated, except where expressly required, the
requirements of verification of pleadings and papers by affidavit and the
corporate seal for pleadings or papers filed by a corporation."4
Rule 1-302-Forms
Rule 1-302 is derived from Former Rule 301 1, and applies to the
Appendix of Forms. The new rule expressly states that the forms are not
mandatory and does not change the former rule in this regard.75
Rule 1-303--Form of Oath & Rule 1-304-Form of Affidavit
Rules 1-303 and 1-304 preserve the practice under Former Rules 5
c and 21. Although effectuating no substantive change, the rules distin-
guish between an oath and an affidavit. Former Rule 5 c defined "affi-
davit" in terms of an "oath," something not done under the new
definition of affidavit in Rule 1-202(b).7 6 The Committee changed the
definition because it thought that "affidavit" should refer only to writ-
ten materials.77 Thus the rules modify the former rules to reflect the
prevailing practice. Rule 1-304 expressly requires an indication in writ-
ing of the fact that an oath was taken, either by an authorized person's
written certification that the oath has been administered to the affiant,
or by the affiant signing an affirmation that is prescribed by the rule.7"
Rule 1-304 also diverges from Former Rule 5 e by providing two
methods of affirming a written statement, one by swearing that the con-
tents are true to the best of the affiant's knowledge, information, and
belief, the other by affirming that upon personal knowledge the affiant
knows the contents to be true. Former Rule 5 c only provided for one
form of affirmation: that the information is true and correct. The Com-
73. See Minutes, Jan. 5, 1979, at 19. This exception is consistent with prior practice under
Former Md. R.P. 828 and 1028. Proposed Rule 1-301(e) reporter's note.
74. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 11 ("Except where otherwise specifically provided by rule or
statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit.").
75. Proposed Rule 1-302 reporter's note ("This Rule is derived from Rule 30e, with the
additional proviso clarifying that, unless specifically required, usage of the forms is not
mandatory."). The rule thus conforms to Maryland case law, which holds that it is the sub-
stance rather than the form of the pleading that controls. See, e.g., Lapp v. Santon, 116 Md.
197, 199, 81 A. 675, 676 (1911); Gott v. State, 44 Md. 319, 336 (1876).
76. See MD. R.P. 1-202(b), which consolidates the former definitions of oath, verification,
and affidavit. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. The Committee intended that
MD. R.P. 1-304 be consistent with the merger of these concepts. Proposed Rule 1-304 re-
porter's note.
77. See Minutes, Oct. 13-14, 1978, at 7 ("The decision was 10 to 2 to have the affidavit
apply only to written materials.").
78. Id.
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mittee Note to this rule expressly states that the rule is not intended to
abrogate the additional affirmation requirements that are set forth in
other rules such as those required in a motion for summary judgment
under Rule 2-501.
79
Rule 1-311--Signing of Pleadings and Other Papers
Rule 1-311 combines sections of the former rules with Federal Rule
11; the result is very similar to the federal rule. Section (a) (Require-
ment), combines Former Rules 301 f and 302 a with Federal Rule 11,
and changes Maryland practice to coincide with federal practice by re-
quiring that every pleading or paper filed with the court, not just the
initial pleading as required in Former Rule 301 f, contain the address
and telephone number of the attorney (if the pleading or paper is filed
by an attorney) or of the party (if the pleading or paper is filed by the
party). The section also requires that each pleading or paper be signed
by either an attorney, consistent with Former Rule 302 a, or by the
party if unrepresented.
One difference in wording is that under Former Rule 301 f the ad-
dress and telephone number of the attorney contained in the pleading
must be that of his office. Rule 1-311 has no such requirement."0
Although this difference appears insignificant at first glance, it is inter-
esting because Former Rule 301 f originally required only that the
pleading filed by an attorney contain "his address immediately below
his signature, followed by his telephone number, if any."8 " That lan-
guage was interpreted by the Court of Appeals as "impl[ying] that the
address need not be that of a law office,' 8 2 and the rule was subse-
quently amended to require the attorney to give an office address.8 3
The Committee notes do not indicate whether the change was pur-
poseful or simply an unintentional consequence of redrafting. Therefore
it is impossible to determine whether the change should be construed as
actually effectuating a change or whether the case law should be
followed.
Section (b) carries forward prior practice under Former Rule 302 b,
but rewords the requirement to essentially follow Federal Rule 11. The
new rule, however, follows the former version of Federal Rule 11, not
79. Proposed Rule 1-304 reporter's note.
80. MD. R.P. 1-311(a) states: "Every pleading or paper filed shall contain the address
and telephone number of the person by whom it is signed," without specifying whether the
address given by the attorney must be that of his office.
81. Former Md. R.P. 301 f, Md. Code Ann. (1963) (superseded).
82. Bastian v. Watkins, 230 Md. 325, 331, 187 A.2d 304, 307 (1962).
83. Former Md. R.P. 302.
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the recently amended form., 4 The Maryland rule provides that an at-
torney's signature constitutes a certification that: (1) the attorney has
read the pleading or paper; (2) to the best of his knowledge, informa-
tion, and belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not inter-
posed for improper purpose or delay.
Section (c) is new, and is derived from Federal Rule 11. It allows
the court to strike unsigned pleadings or papers, or those signed with
intent to defeat the rule's purpose. Consistent with the recent amend-
ments to Federal Rule 11, the rule states that the court may not strike a
pleading or paper that has been inadvertently unsigned, if the omission
is promptly corrected. 5 The rule also provides that an attorney who
willfully violates the rule will be subject to appropriate disciplinary
action.
In its effort to keep the rule simple, the Committee apparently left
several important procedural questions unanswered. First, the new rule
does not establish guidelines for determining when a correction is
"prompt," nor does it require or provide for notification of the person
who has filed but inadvertently failed to sign. Because this option has
recently been added to the federal rule, interpretation of Federal Rule
11 by federal courts will be instructive for interpreting Rule 1-31 1 (c).8 6
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 previously read: "The signature of an attorney constitutes a certif-
icate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay." MD.
R.P. 1-311 (b) adopts this form almost verbatim. As recently amended, FED. R. Civ. P. I I
reads:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has
read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, infor-
mation, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation.
85. FED. R. Civ. P. I I now states: "If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it
shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the
pleader or movant."
86. The previous version of FED. R. Civ. P. 1I did not provide a remedy for a pleading
inadvertently unsigned, but federal courts had treated its provision for striking pleadings as
discretionary, holding that an inadvertent failure to sign was merely a technical defect that
did not invalidate the pleading. See, e.g., Holly Coal Co. v. Glove Indem. Co., 186 F.2d 291,
295 (4th Cir. 1950); Burak v. Pennsylvania, 339 F. Supp. 534, 535 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1972); In re
Legion, 85 F. Supp. 946, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). But where there are multiple parties and not
all have signed the pleading, courts will generally strike the pleadings as to those parties who
have not signed in order to make certain that the named parties are actually in assent to the
filing of the action. See, e.g., Scarella v. Midwest Fed. Sav. & Loan, 536 F.2d 1207, 1209 (8th
Cir. 1976); People ex rel. Snead v. Kirkland, 462 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Huffman v.
Nebraska Bureau of Vital Statistics, 320 F. Supp. 154, 156 (D. Neb. 1970).
Ultimately, federal courts have relied on the rule's purpose of preventing sham and
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The rule does not provide for a hearing before the court strikes a plead-
ing that is not signed as required, and does not supply any indication as
to what disciplinary action would be appropriate for an attorney's
willfull violation of the rule. As recently amended, Federal Rule 11 per-
mits the court to impose attorneys' fees on the violating attorney, the
represented party, or both." Although Rule 1-311 (c) does not provide
for recovery of attorneys' fees, Rule 1-341 incorporates this provision
from the federal rule88 and allows the court to impose attorneys' fees on
"the offending party or the attorney advising the conduct or both of
them" whenever the court finds that party's conduct was "in bad faith
or without substantial justification."8 9 Prior to awarding fees, the court
would be required to hold a hearing. Furthermore, if the sanction is
disbarment, at least one federal court has held that there must be notice
and an opportunity to be heard.'
Rule 1-312-Requirements of Signing Attorney
Rule 1-312 is derived from Former Rule 302 c, but has been
changed significantly. Subsection 1-312(a)(1) requires a signing attor-
ney to maintain an office for the practice of law in the United States, a
change from Former Rule 302 c's requirement that the signing attor-
ney's office be either in Maryland or in a city or county "adjoining the
false claims, and have decided to strike a pleading only in compelling situations. See, e.g.,
Incomco v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 558 F.2d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1974); Lau Ah Yew v.
Dulles, 236 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir. 1956); American Auto. Ass'n v. Rothman, 104 F. Supp.
655, 656 (E.D.N.Y. 1952); Muchison v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 14, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
87. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Prior to this change, there was confusion in the federal courts
as to whether Federal Rule 11 provided a basis for imposition of attorneys' fees on either the
attorney or the party represented.
The Supreme Court has held that a federal court may "award counsel fees to a suc-
cessful party when his opponent has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppres-
sive reasons." F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129
(1974); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973). Some federal courts have interpreted this as al-
lowing recovery of attorneys' fees under Rule 11. See, e.g., Ellingson v. Burlington Northern,
Inc., 653 F.2d 1327, 1332 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Rule 11 in affirming an award of attorneys'
fees); Misegades, Douglas & Levy v. Sonnenberg, 22 F.R. Serv. 2d 578, 579 (E.D. Va. 1976).
Other courts have denied an award of attorneys' fees under Rule 11 where there is no show-
ing of bad faith. See Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980). Still other courts
have recognized that Rule 11 does not authorize the imposition of attorneys' fees. See United
States v. Standard Oil Co., 603 F.2d 100, 103 n.2 (9th Cir. 1979); Orenstein v. Compusamp,
Inc., 19 F.R. Serv. 2d 466, 469 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
88. MD. R.P. 1-341 permits recovery of attorneys' fees for proceedings in bad faith or
without substantial justification. MD. R.P. 1-311, however, refers to pleadings or papers
signed "for improper purpose or delay." Presumably these standards will be found to exist at
the same time, so that the new rules will have the same result as FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
89. For a discussion of MD. R.P. 1-341, see tnfa notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
90. See In re Los Angeles County Pioneer Soc'y, 217 F.2d 190, 194 (9th Cir. 1954).
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county in which the court is situated."" This change will allow mem-
bers of the Maryland Bar who maintain an office for the practice of law
anywhere in the United States to sign pleadings filed in any court of the
state. Originally, a much more limited change was made in the rule by
the Committee.92 The Court of Appeals, however, then changed the
rule to its present form.9 3
The Subcommittee pointed out that Former Rule 302 c was aimed
primarily at District of Columbia attorneys who practiced part-time in
Maryland.94 When Former Rule 302 c was adopted, Maryland resi-
dency was a prerequisite to admission to the Maryland Bar; therefore it
was improbable that many members of the Maryland Bar were practic-
ing in a county not abutting the state.95 Because the domicile require-
ments have been deleted from the Rules Governing Admission, there
may be out-of-state practitioners who do not practice within an abutting
county. For the first time, these practitioners will be permitted to sign
pleadings filed in Maryland courts.
Despite the change, Rule 1-312 retains the discrimination in For-
mer Rule 302 c against part-time lawyers. Proponents of the rule be-
lieved that it would promote the expedient handling of cases and ensure
the court's and opposing counsel's access to the attorney, especially for
the inevitable last minute phone calls.96 One member of the Committee
noted that Former Rule 302 c was designed to apply to "moonlighters"
as well as non-residents;97 a part-time attorney practicing out of his or
her residence may be inaccessible during business hours98 and may have
no answering service.99 In effect, the rule appears to require a full-time
attorney to sign for a "moonlighter." This would not circumvent the
rule, because the full-time attorney would provide "one responsible
91. See Former Md. R.P. 302 c 2 iii, c 4.
92. The version ofMD. R.P. 1-312 submitted to members of the Bar during the comment
period allowed an attorney to sign a pleading if the attorney maintained an office for the
practice of law in Maryland or in a city or county adjoining the state. The practical effect of
this change would have been to "expand the perimeter of this state by the width of one
county all around for the purpose of permitting members of the Maryland Bar who maintain
offices for the practice of law to sign pleadings in any court of this State." Letter from the
Hon. John F. McAuliffe, Chairman of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, to the Judges of the Court of Appeals of Maryland (Sept. 22, 1983) [hereinafter
cited as McAuliffe letter (Sept. 22, 1983)].
93. Conversation with Julie Friet, Research Assistant for Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure, May, 1984.
94. See Explanatory Note, Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 45.
95. Id. at 46.
96. Comments of Judge McAuliffe, i. at 48.
97. Comments of Mr. Ryan, id. at 47.
98. Id at 48.
99. Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 49.
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point of contact."'0 0
One member questioned the competence of part-time practitioners
who litigate infrequently, suggesting that the "minimal amount of over-
sight by a full-time practitioner now provided by the rules" would be
helpful in preventing malpractice."0" Assuming, however, that the es-
tablished measure of a lawyer's competence is successful completion of
law school and admission to the Bar, this rule treats part-time attorneys,
who have earned their credentials in the same manner as their full-time
colleagues, unfairly. In practice, noncompliance by part-time practi-
tioners with a Maryland address is less obvious than that of their out-of-
state counterparts and is rarely challenged.'0 2 The Subcommittee ob-
served that in the unlikely event that opposing counsel discovers the
noncompliance and seeks enforcement, this action may be motivated
more by a desire to harass the opposition than by an interest in securing
a more accessible and proficient adversary.
0 3
Rule I-313---Certification by Signing Attorney With Out-of-State Ofjce
Rule 1-313 carries forward Former Rule 301 g with only stylistic
changes and requires that the signing attorney with an out-of-state office
provide with the first pleading or paper filed a signed certificate of ad-
mission to the Maryland Bar. The requirements in Former Rule 301 g
that the signing out-of-state attorney provide his office and home ad-
dress and telephone number in the first pleading or paper have not been
included in Rule 1-313, but new Rule 1-311 now provides that every
pleading or paper filed by an attorney contain his address or telephone
number. Rule 1-311 does not differentiate between an attorney's office
and home, requiring simply the signing person's "address and telephone
number," but this would presumably be interpreted as the signer's office
address and telephone number, if the signer has one, in order to foster
the rule's purpose of availability. This rule will, however, relieve the
signing attorney with an out-of-state office from providing both his office
and his home address and telephone number.
Rule I-321--Service of Pleadings and Papers Other Than Original Pleadngs
Rule 1-321 combines provisions of Federal Rule 5 and Former Rule
306, and thereby simplifies the procedures for serving parties with filed
papers other than original pleadings. Section (a) follows Federal Rule
100. Comments of Mr. Jones, id. at 48.
101. Comments of Judge McAuliffe, id. at 49.
102. Explanatory Note, id. at 45.
103. Id.
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5(a) in requiring that every paper filed must be served on each party
unless the rules or the court provide otherwise. The new rule's approach
is opposite from that taken in Former Rule 306 c, which mandated ser-
vice only of those papers that the rules required to be served.10 4 But this
change is unlikely to effect any change in practice. Next, consistent with
both Federal Rule 5(b) and Former Rule 306 c, section (a) states that
service is to be made upon the party's attorney unless service upon the
party himself is ordered by the court.
Section (a) then lists the methods by which service of non-original
pleadings and papers may be accomplished, namely, delivery or mail-
ing. Unlike Former Rule 306, the new rule allows parties to be served in
the same manner as attorneys.'0 5 In defining service by delivery, the
new rule borrows almost verbatim from the provision in Federal Rule
5(b), and makes available new methods for delivering service. For ex-
ample, both attorneys and parties can be served by delivering the paper
to the person's office and leaving it in a conspicuous place, if there is no
one in charge. Additionally, if the office is closed, the attorney or party
may be served at home.
Service by mailing under section (a) provoked Committee de-
bate.'0 6 One point of discussion concerned the time at which service is
to be deemed complete. The Committee decided to key the time of ser-
vice to the date of mailing, and therefore added the clause: "Service by
mail is complete upon mailing."' 7 This provision is identical with the
provision in Federal Rule 5(b), but will allow Maryland practitioners
additional time to serve over that allowed by Former Rule 306 c 3,
under which service by mail was not complete until "one day after the
day of mailing, if in the same city or county, and one day additional for
each 500 miles or fraction thereof between the place of mailing and the
place of address." The new rule simplifies practice by instituting a uni-
form time for date of service by mail, by eliminating the need to com-
pute the appropriate date of mailing necessary under Former Rule 306 c
3 and by making the new rule conform with the federal requirement.
Accordingly, the date of service will be the date of mailing, with Rule 1-
203(c) providing a three-day cushion for response to papers served by
mail, identical to the cushion provided by Federal Rule 6(e). Addition-
104. Compare Former Md. R.P. 306 c (applying whenever service of a pleading or paper
was required), with MD. R.P. 1-321(a) (every pleading or paper filed must be served "[e]xcept
as otherwise provided").
105. See Former Md. R.P. 306 c (providing different methods for service on an attorney
and service on a party).
106. See Minutes, Oct. 13-14, 1978, at 14-16.
107. Comments of Mr. Brauh, id. at 14.
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ally, after discussion the Committee amended a draft of section (a) to
allow a person to mail papers to the last known address if no address has
been stated in a previous pleading or paper.'0 8
Section (b) follows Former Rule 306 b, as well as Federal Rule 5(a),
and provides that no paper need be served on a party in default for
failure to appear. This section preserves the exception in Former Rule
306 b that a pleading asserting a new or additional claim against a de-
faulting party must be served, but parallels the federal requirement by
specifically providing that the pleading asserting the new or additional
claim be served in accordance with the requirements for service of origi-
nal process found in new Rules 2-121 through 2-126. Former Rule 306
b did not state the manner in which such a pleading was to be served.
Section (c) is new, and excepts from service requests directed to the clerk
for the issuance of process or any writ.
Rule 1-322-Filing of Pleadings and Other Papers
Rule 1-322 is new and incorporates Federal Rule 5(e). It defines
filing with the court to mean filing with the clerk of the court, but allows
the judge, at his discretion, to accept the papers for filing. This may be
necessary for the protection of parties, for example, where the delay oc-
casioned by first filing with the clerk would cause irreparable harm.'0 9
Rule 1-323--Proof of Service
Rule 1-323 consolidates and streamlines the provisions of Former
Rule 306 a 2 and d, without major substantive changes. One minor
change was instituted by including in the new rule a provision that al-
lows the clerk to accept a paper for filing, even though it has not been
served, if it is accompanied by a waiver of service. 1 ° Hence, a clerk
may accept a pleading or other paper, other than an original pleading,
only if it is accompanied by an admission or waiver of service by the
party to be served, or by a signed certificate that service has been made.
108. Comments of Mr. Niemeyer, id. at 14-15.
109. See IBM Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 46 (2d Cir. 1975) ("Filing directly with the
Court may be necessary for the protection of the parties where, for example, the delay occa-
sioned by first filing with the clerk will cause irreparable harm."); Application of President &
Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1006-07 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (judge ac-
cepted application from hospital and signed order allowing hospital to administer blood
transfusions to woman who refused to consent based on religious beliefs); 2 MOORE's FED-
ERAL PRACTICE, supra note 38, 5.11 ("[U]nder this provision when it is necessary for a party
to obtain immediate court action which would be delayed by first filing papers with the clerk,
a party may file his papers with the judge, if the latter permits such filing, and obtain such
order as the judge deems proper.").
110. Minutes, Oct. 13-14, 1978, at 18.
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As under the existing rule, a certificate of service constitutes prima facie
proof of service.
Rule 1-324-Notice of Orders
Rule 1-324 is derived from Former Rule 1219 and presents no sub-
stantive changes to the rule. The rule requires the clerk, upon entry in
the docket of any order or ruling of the court not made in the course of a
hearing or trial, except for show cause orders, to send a copy of such
order or ruling to all parties entitled to service under Rule 1-321, unless
the record shows that such service has already been made.
Rule 1-325--Prepayment of Filhng Fees- Waiver
Rule 1-325 is derived from the Maryland Code, Courts Article, sec-
tion 7-201.. and Maryland District Rule 102, and effects significant
changes in the manner in which the court may waive the prepayment of
filing fees. The prior district court rule required only that the court
satisfy itself that the party was unable by reason of poverty to pay the
filing fees. 11 2 The code provision, governing the circuit courts, requires
in addition to the court's determination that the party is unable to pay,
that if the petitioner is represented by an attorney, the attorney certify
that the suit, appeal, or writ is meritorious.13 The new rule requires the
party, whether or not he is represented by an attorney, to file with the
request for waiver an affidavit verifying the facts set forth in the plead-
ing, order for appeal, or request for process, and stating the grounds for
requesting the waiver. 4 The court must review the party's affidavit
and the attorney's certification, and satisfy itself not only that the peti-
tioner is unable to pay, but also that the claim, appeal, or request for
process is not "manifestly frivolous." This requirement was included in
response to concerns of the District Court Subcommittee that the state
should not have to bear the cost of the filing of a pleading or other paper
that is manifestly defective and subject to dismissal as soon as it is
111. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 7-201 (1984) (governing the prepayment of
filing fees and providing for waiver in case of indigency in the circuit courts).
112. Former Md. Dist. R. 102.
113. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 7-201(b)(1984). The prepayment of filing fees
has been held to serve a twofold purpose: "the discouraging of frivolous litigation and assur-
ing payment of at least a part of the costs should the plaintiff be the losing party." Glanville
v. David Hairstylist, 249 Md. 162, 166, 238 A.2d 917, 920 (1968); Wigginton v. Wigginton, 16
Md. App. 329, 331, 295 A.2d 889, 891 (1972). Furthermore, the determination of whether a
person is indigent is within the discretion of the court. Wiggltton, 16 Md. App. at 333-34, 295
A.2d at 892.
114. For a discussion of the new rules governing the affidavit requirements, see supra notes
76-79 and accompanying text.
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filed.' 15 Although the Committee did not provide a definition of "mani-
festly frivolous," it did supply as an example the situation in which a
petition for judicial review of an inmate grievance is filed by a petitioner
who has not exhausted all of his other available remedies.'
16
Rule 1-331-Attorney May Act for Party
Rule 1-331 carries forward Former Rule 3 a with minor stylistic
changes. The only addition is that under the new rule the attorney may
perform "any act required or permitted" by the rules, whereas the for-
mer rule applied to any rule under which "a party may act." It is un-
likely, however, that this addition will effect any substantive change.
Additionally, the new rule, in order to make clear what an attorney may
do, retains the language of the old rule that whenever notice is to be
given by or to a party, the notice may be given by or to the attorney for
that party.7
Rule 1-341-Bad Faith-Unjustified Proceedings
Rule 1-341 is derived from Former Rule 604 b, but contains several
important changes. The dominant purpose of the rule remains the
same: Under the new rule the court shall assess costs, including attor-
neys' fees, against parties whose conduct in maintaining or defending
any proceeding is in bad faith or without substantial justification. The
first difference between Rule 1-341 and Former Rule 604 b is that lan-
guage in the rule has been removed which allowed a party to recover
costs resulting from a proceeding brought "for purposes of delay.""' 8
This eliminates one of the three factors that Maryland courts have rec-
ognized as permitting them to award costs." 9 The purpose of this
change is unclear, and judicial interpretation will be necessary to clarify
its practical effect. If the courts interpret the omission as a conscious
determination not to allow recovery of costs for actions taken for pur-
poses of delay, recovery will be denied. On the other hand, actions
designed solely to delay a proceeding are unlikely to be either in good
faith or with substantial justification. A better interpretation is that the
115. McAuliffe letter (Sept. 22, 1983), supra note 92.
116. Id.
117. Minutes, Oct. 13-14, 1978, at 18.
118. See Former Md. R.P. 604 b (requiring court to award costs whenever it "finds that
any proceeding was had (1) in bad faith, (2) without substantial justification, or (3) for pur-
poses of delay").
119. See, e.g., Colonial Carpets, Inc. v. Carpet Fair, Inc., 36 Md. App. 583, 591, 374 A.2d
419, 424 (1977); Hess v. Chalmers, 33 Md. App. 541, 545, 365 A.2d 294, 296 (1976).
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third factor was removed because it was redundant, and courts should
allow petitioners to recover under one of the other two factors.
The second change in Rule 1-341 concerns the party against whom
such action for costs can be maintained. Former Rule 604 b was vague,
allowing recovery when the court found that "any proceeding was had"
in violation of the rule. Apparently in an effort to clarify the rule and to
show that both a plaintiff or a defendant can be required to pay costs,
Rule 1-341 allows recovery where the court finds that "the conduct of
any party in maintaining or defending any proceeding was" in violation
of the rule.
The third change in the rule, and probably the most significant,
authorizes the court to compel the offending party's attorney to pay costs.
This change is consistent with Federal Rule 11 as recently amended,
1 20
as well as new Rule 2-433, which allows recovery of costs for bad faith
discovery proceedings.' 2 ' The language in the rule instructing that the
court "shall require" the payment of costs where one of the factors is
found indicates that the mandatory nature of the rule will remain in-
tact. 12 2 But because the rule provides no instructions as to when the
offending party should pay or when his attorney should be liable, this
decision apparently is in the discretion of the trial judge. 123 Therefore,
if a judge finds that a proceeding was maintained or defended in bad
faith or without substantial justification, the judge must assess costs
against the offender, but has discretion whether to charge them to the
party, to his attorney, or to both. A fourth change in the rule, one
which will have no practical effect, is a change in the language designat-
ing the cases in which the rule will apply from "actions" to "civil ac-
tions." The alteration was necessary because the new definition of
"action" in Rule 1-202(a), includes criminal proceedings.12 4
Rule 1-351-Order Upon Ex Parte Application Prohibited-Exceptions
Rule 1-351 is new and establishes a general requirement that all ex
parle proceedings are prohibited except when expressly provided for "by
these rules or other law," or when the moving party certifies that he has
given notice or has made "specified efforts commensurate with the cir-
120. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
121. See infia notes 699-701 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Waters v. Smith, 277 Md. 189, 193, 352 A.2d 793, 797 (1976); Singer v.
Steven Kokes, Inc., 39 Md. App. 180, 186, 384 A.2d 463, 467 (1978); Colonial Carpets, Inc. v.
Carpet Fair, Inc., 36 Md. App. 583, 591, 374 A.2d 419, 424 (1977).
123. Because this rule is similar to the recently amended form of FED. R. Civ. P. 11, devel-
oping federal case law will be instructive in interpreting the new Maryland rule.
124. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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cumstances" to give notice. The purpose of this rule is to render unnec-
essary an express reference to requirements for notice and an
opportunity to be heard, which would otherwise be needed in several
rules.' 25 As the source note appended to Rule 1-351 indicates, this rule
is consistent with EC 7-35 and DR 7-110(B) of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, adopted into the Maryland Rules pursuant to Rule
1230, which prohibit an attorney's private communication with a judge
without notice to opposing counsel. 26 In addition, it is consistent with
Canon XVI of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which precludes a judge
from granting exparte communications except where provided by law. '
27
D. Chapter 400-BOND
Rule I-401-Appcabzhty & Rule 1-402-Fling and Approval
Rule 1-401 states the scope of the rules pertaining to bonds, and is
the same as its predecessor, Former Rule H 1.128 Rule 1-402 incorporates
with little change several provisions from Former Rules H2, H3, H4,
and H7. Section (a) reproduces the filing provision of Former Rule H2
a, and leaves the recording provision for 1-402(f); section (f) now re-
quires that only approved bonds be recorded. Section (b) clarifies the
approval provisions of Former Rule H2 b and retains the provision that
the clerk approve all bonds as to form, amount, and surety, and adds the
possibility of approval by the court. Under the former rule, the court
decided whether to approve a bond whenever the clerk refused to ap-
prove the bond or an adverse party objected in writing to a bond that
had been filed with the clerk.129 In addition to these two circumstances,
section (b) states that the court must decide "if a rule requires that the
court approve the bond."' 3 ° Although no explanation for this change
was provided, it apparently reflects an attempt to coordinate this section
with other sections of the rule which allow the court to approve bonds of
125. Minutes, Oct. 13-14, 1978, at 18; Proposed Rule 1-351 reporter's note.
126. MD. R.P. 1230 adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility, as set out in Appen-
dix F of the Maryland Rules.
127. See MD. R.P. 1231 (Canons and Rules of Judicial Ethics).
128. The term denoting the applicability of the bond rules was changed from "actions" in
Former Md. R.P. HI to "civil actions" in MD. R.P. 1-401. This change coincides with the
change in the definition of "action" to include criminal proceedings as well as civil proceed-
ings. See MD. R.P. 1-202(a); supra note 22 and accompanying text.
129. See Former Md. R.P. H2 b 2 which states, "In case of the clerk's refusal to approve
any bond submitted to him, or in case an adversary party objects in writing to a bond which
has been filed with the clerk, the issue of whether or not such bond should be approved shall
be determined by the court."
130. See Proposed Rule 1-402(b) reporter's note ("This section is derived from Rule H2 b 1
and 2 with additional proviso for court approval where required by a rule.").
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a specific type, such as a bond in the name of the state when the obligees
on the bond are numerous, under Rule 1-402(c).
Section (c) combines Former Rule H7 a and b and allows bonds in
the name of the state but omits the catch-all phrase "or for other good
excuse shown." The rule thus limits the availability of bonds in the
name of the state to situations where the obligees "are numerous." The
new rule, however, does not define this term; presumably this will be
decided on a case-by-case basis. Section (d) consolidates Former Rule
H4 a and b, and allows the court to change the face amount of a bond.
The only change from the former rule is the substitution of the term
"face amount" for "penalty." Section (e) combines Former Rule H3 a 2
and b, and changes the rule to provide uniform treatment of all bonds.
Under the former rule, a deposit in lieu of sureties on a supersedeas
bond must have equaled the amount of the bond; other types of security
could be accepted only on bonds other than supersedeas bonds.' 3 ' The
new rule eliminates the reference to supersedeas bonds, providing simply
that "[i]nstead of surety on a bond, the court may accept other security
for the performance of a bond." In addition, the examples of "other
security" listed in Former Rule H3 a 2, including a deposit of money, a
pledge of securities, and a mortgage of land, have been deleted. Thus,
money is no longer the exclusive alternative security for a supersedeas
bond.
Rule I- 403--Re/'ef to Surety and Interested Persons
Rule 1-403 consolidates the various provisions of Former Rule H6
into two sections. Section (a) incorporates the rules concerning relief to
a surety, and contains one major change. Under Former Rule H6 c 1, if
a surety requested countersecurity or relief from further liability for fu-
ture acts or omissions of the principal, the court was required to grant
relief. According to the new rule, however, the decision whether to
grant relief is discretionary, providing that the court "may grant the
motion for good cause shown." This change will make it more difficult
for the surety to obtain relief, because he must meet a burden of demon-
strating good cause. Section (b) governs relief to an interested person
other than a surety, but effects no substantive changes from prior prac-
tice. The section also requires the court to make a finding of good cause
before granting relief; unlike relief for sureties, relief was discretionary
under the old rule.
There are minor changes in the rule, applicable to both section (a)
131. Under MD. R.P. 1017, a supersedeas bond is used to stay the execution of a civil
judgment from which an appeal is being taken.
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and section (b), that should be noted. First, the new rule requires the
surety or other interested person seeking relief to make a motion,
whereas the former rule required him to file a petition. 32 Second, the
new rule eliminates the court's authority in the former rule for granting
an exparte injunction. Therefore, notice to the principal will be required
under Rule 1-351 unless such notice cannot be effected despite "special
efforts commensurate with the circumstances.' 1 33 The former rule also
has been simplified by making a more general reference to injunctive
relief and periodic accountings, eliminating unnecessary language pres-
ent in the former rule.1
34
Rule 1-404-Proceeding Against Surey
Rule 1-404 is the only new provision in this chapter and provides
the procedural mechanism by which the surety's liability on the bond is
established. Essentially a restatement of Federal Rule 65. 1, the rule first
provides that a surety submits to the court's jurisdiction and irrevocably
appoints the clerk as agent for the receipt of papers affecting liability.
In addition, filing an independent action to enforce the surety's liability
is unnecessary; "[t]he liability of a surety may be enforced on motion
.... " The motion can be served on the clerk, who must promptly
notify the surety by mail. The only distinction between Rule 1-404 and
Federal Rule 65.1 is a provision in the Maryland rule authorizing the
court, in its discretion, to provide for additional notice to the surety.
Rule 1-105--Judgment on Bond
Rule 1-405 is derived from Former Rule H8, and in addition to
carrying forward Former Rule H8's statement that judgment shall be
for the amount due, adds a clause that limits any judgment to the face
amount of the bond. The addition, however, represents a clarification
of, rather than a change from, present practice. Former Rule H8 itself
was intended to change preexisting practice; prior to 1962, Maryland
Code article 75, section 40135 provided that judgment was to be entered
for the amount of the bond, and that the bond was to be released upon
132. The Maryland Rules do not distinguish between a petition and a motion, but histori-
cally a motion could be made either orally or in writing, whereas a petition was always in
writing. Bergen v. Jones, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 371 (1842); see also Gibbs v. Ewing, 94 Fla. 236,
113 So. 730 (1927).
133. See MD. R.P. 1-351.
134. Compare MD. R.P. 1-403(a), (b) (allowing the court to grant any appropriate relief
including "injunctive relief or periodic accountings"), with Former Md. R.P. H6 C 2 (provid-
ing lengthy descriptions of the relief available by injunction or accounting).
135. MD. ANN. CODE art. 75, § 40 (1957), repealed by 1973 Md. Laws ch. 2, § 2.
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payment of the amount actually found to be due.'" 6 The statute was an
outgrowth of the common law doctrine that the claimant could obtain a
judgment for the entire penalty of the bond, regardless of the actual
damage suffered. 137 The defendant's only recourse was to seek the inter-
vention of an equity court to prevent execution for the entire amount of
the judgment.138 In 1963, article 75, section 40 changed existing prac-
tice to provide that judgment would still be entered for the entire
amount of the bond, but would be released automatically upon pay-
ment of the amount of damages actually awarded.' 3 9 Former Rule H8
eliminated the two step process and required simply that the judgment
be for the amount found to be due. 4 0 The clause in the new rule that
limits the judgment to the face amount of the bond thus does not
change Maryland practice; it merely clarifies existing practice. Mary-
land has never permitted the judgment to be for an amount greater
than the penalty of the bond, and there is no indication that this was
intended when Former Rule H8 was developed.
Rule /-406-Bond Premium as Costs
Rule 1-406 preserves Former Rule H5's provision that a party enti-
tled to costs may have the premium for a bond included in such costs.
In addition, the rule deletes the requirement that the surety company be
authorized by the laws of Maryland to qualify as surety.'4 The only
other changes to this rule are stylistic.
II. TITLE 2-CIVIL PROCEDURE-CIRCUIT COURT
A. Chapter 100-COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION AND PROCESS
Rule 2-101-Commencement of Action
Rule 2-101 incorporates Federal Rule 3 almost verbatim and re-
flects the Committee's intent to abolish the pleading distinctions be-
136. Former Md. R.P. H8 committee note. See also 3 J. POE, POE's PLEADING AND PRAC-
TICE § 355 (H. Sachs 6th ed. 1975).
137. Former Md. R.P. H8 editor's note.
138. Id.
139. Id The practice of entering judgment for the entire penalty of the bond was retained
because the statutes of 8 & 9 Will. 3, ch. 11, § 8--in effect in Maryland at the time-author-
ized the entry of a judgment for the penalty of the bond to stand as security for subsequent
breaches that could be recovered by scirefacias rather than bringing an independent action.
Id.
140. See also MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-201 (1984) (providing that the judg-
ment in an action for the penalty of a bond shall be for the amount due).
141. The statutory qualifications for a surety are set out in MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A,
§§ 483-485 (1957).
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tween law and equity. 4 2 The new rule unifies and replaces Former
Rules 140 a and 170 a, and states simply that "[a] civil action is com-
menced by filing a complaint with a court." The Committee noted with
approval that the statute of limitations, tolled at common law only by
impetration of the writ of summons, is currently tolled by statute by the
filing of the action, and the filing of a complaint under the rule will have
the same effect.' 43 The Committee also agreed that filing a complaint
with a judge, at night for example, commenced an action because a
judge is a court. 4 4 This is consistent with Rule 1-322, under which a
judge is authorized to accept papers for filing, then transmit them to the
clerk. One Committee member expressed concern that in certain situa-
tions, such as an Order for Appeal, and with some types of petitions, the
initial pleading cannot be characterized as a "complaint.",' 45 Although
it was suggested that the rule may have to be amended to accommodate
such pleadings,' 46 no such change has yet been made.
Rule 2-Il-Process-Requirements Prehminawy to Summons
Rule 2-111 states the prerequisites for the issuance of a summons.
Section (a) is derived from Former Rule 103 g and requires that the
plaintiff supply the clerk with copies of the complaint and each exhibit,
and with all other papers filed with the complaint for each summons.
The rule expands the former rule, which only required copies of the
original pleading and exhibits. 147 The Committee agreed that delivery
of the necessary copies should not be a filing requirement as the current
rule provides, but only a prerequisite to the issuance of a summons48
Consequently, a plaintiff could meet the time requirements for filing,
but fail to provide sufficient copies to cause the summons to issue. In
addition, the rule omits the exceptions in Former Rule 103 g which al-
lowed the court to order that the exhibits not be served on the defend-
ants, or that the plaintiff not be required to furnish a copy of the
complaint for each defendant if there were five or more defendants.'4 9
142. See in/ta notes 354-59 and accompanying text.
143. See Minutes, Nov. 17, 1978, at 7.
144. Id.
145. Comments of Judge McAuliffe, id.
146. Id.
147. Proposed Rule 2-111 (a) reporter's note.
148. Comments of Judge McAuliffe, Minutes, Nov. 17, 1978, at 7-8.
149. The new rule takes a different approach to the problem of numerous defendants than
did the prior rule. Compare Former Md. R.P. 103 g (requiring a copy for each defendant, but
permitting the court to change that if there are five or more defendants), with MD. R.P. 2-
111 (a) (requiring a copy for each summons to be issued).
[VOL. 43:669
MARYLAND RULES
These omissions significantly reduce the discretionary power afforded
the court with respect to issuance of a summons.
Section (b) parallels Former Rule 103 b and incorporates several
changes in language which simplify the rule but which make no sub-
stantive change in practice. For example, the new rule eliminates the
list of specific information that must be supplied to the clerk and states
instead that the person requesting service of process must supply "all
available information as to the name and location, including the county
where service is to be made, of the person to be served."' The rule also
requires only that a person requesting service "by the sheriff" furnish
this information. Thus, the information need not be provided when ser-
vice is to be performed by a person other than a sheriff; 5' the plaintiff
can directly provide his private process server with any necessary infor-
mation. Although section (b) does not carry forward the language in
Former Rule 103 b requiring that "in the case of a corporation, the
name, county and address of the person, resident agent, state agency or
official to be served" be provided, that information is still required.
Rule 2-111 (b) requires that all available information about the "person"
to be served be furnished; a person, as defined in Rule 1-202(p), includes
corporations, partnerships, and the like. Finally, a new provision which
expressly allows the required information to be furnished in the caption
of the case, is consistent with current practice.15 2
Rule 2- 112-Process-Issuance of Summons
Rule 2-112 is derived from Federal Rule 4(a), which it closely re-
sembles, and from Former Rule 103 c and e. The new rule retains the
automatic nature of the issuance of summons when an action is filed,
but does not expressly limit the automatic issuance of summonses to de-
fendants "in the State."' 153 Thus, under the new rule, process will also
automatically issue against out-of-state defendants. The former rule
also stated that the plaintiff may request "an additional summons" to
issue, without clearly stating whether the additional summons was lim-
ited to one. The new rule clarifies this by stating that upon request,
"more than one summons" shall issue. One noteworthy difference be-
tween the new rule and the federal rule is that when the sheriff is not to
150. Compare the general requirement with that in Former Md. R.P. 103 b: "The person
requesting the issuance of process shall furnish to the clerk the name, county, residence and
mailing address of the person to be served if it is an individual, and in the case of a corpora-
tion, the name, county and address of the person, resident agent, state agency or official to be
served."
151. Proposed Rule 2-111 (b) reporter's note.
152. Id
153. Proposed Rule 2-112(a) reporter's note.
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serve process, Rule 2-112 permits the plaintiff to designate the process
server. The federal rule, however, directs the clerk to issue process only
to either the marshal or the person authorized by Federal Rule 4(c),
under which the court is to specially appoint the process server. Because
appointments are to be made freely under the federal rule, the distinc-
tion may be merely semantic.
Section (b) retains prior practice under Former Rule 103 j, with
one minor change. The former rule authorized the clerk to designate a
person to deliver process to the sheriff of another county rather than
mailing it, if the party paid the cost of personal delivery. The new rule
allows the party to designate, with the clerk's approval, the person to
deliver the process.
Rule 2- 1 I3--Process-uraton, Dormany, and Renewal of Summons
Rule 2-113 is new, and simplifies former practice under Former
Rule 112. Former Rule 112 automatically renewed a summons after the
first non est return to the second return day, but after the second non est
return, the summons was allowed to lie dormant until the plaintiff re-
newed it. The new rule eliminates the "outmoded concept" of return
days,154 which, pursuant to Former Rules 103 d and 102, provided that
a summons was returnable, and hence expired, on the first Monday of
the month following its issuance. The Committee rejected a proposal to
follow the federal rule that a summons never expires, 155 and adopted a
uniform sixty-day expiration date. 5 6 This change should simplify the
rule by providing a standard period of time for each summons before it
becomes dormant; however, it may present difficulties for the clerks, be-
cause summonses will no longer all be due on only one day each month.
Although the proposed rule eliminates the automatic reissuance provi-
sion of Former Rule 112, by extending the period within which the sum-
mons is effective, it compensates for this elimination and prevents any
substantive change in practice. A summons not served within the sixty-
day period will lie dormant, unless renewed by the plaintiffs written
order. Furthermore, the provision of Former Rule 112(b) that allowed
the plaintiff to direct that the summons be issued to a later return date
has been deleted.
The new rule retains the unlimited dormancy period of Former
154. Former Md. R.P. 103 d permitted the plaintiff to direct that the summons be made
returnable at the second return day after its issuance.
155. Minutes, Nov. 17, 1978, at 9. The Committee decided to provide for expiration of a
summons after Judge McAuliffe noted that a non-expiring summons would create limitation
problems. Id.
156. Id. at 9-10.
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Rule 112, so that a summons returned non est may remain dormant in-
definitely without allowing the statute of limitations to become a bar to
the action. The Court of Appeals has approved this practice, despite its
potential to perpetuate claims.' 5 7 Providing an indefinite dormancy pe-
riod relieves the plaintiff of the need to keep renewing the summons and
prevents punishing the plaintiff for the defendant's ability to evade
service.
Rule 2- 114-Process- Content
Rule 2-114 governs the content of a summons and contains several
changes from its predecessor, Former Rule 103 f. Section (a) of the new
rule carries forward Former Rule 103 f's requirements that the summons
be under the seal of the court and signed by the clerk. Section (b) lists
the information that a summons must contain; it adds a requirement
that a summons under the new rule contain the docket reference, but
deletes the requirement that the summons must contain the name and
address of the plaintiffs attorney. Consistent with the new sixty-day
expiration provision of Rule 2-113, Rule 2-114 also requires the sum-
mons to state the date of issuance, the time within which service must be
made, and the time within which return of service is to be made.'5 8 The
provision in Former Rule 103 f requiring the summons to include the
names and addresses of the parties has been limited to the name and
address of the party requesting service. Furthermore, the new rule re-
quires the summons to include "the name and address of the person to
be served as set forth in the complaint," eliminating the clause in For-
mer Rule 103 f which limited the necessity for such information to when
''service is not to be made upon a defendant personally." The words "as
set forth in the complaint" were added to the rule, because the Commit-
tee did not want issuance of the summons to be delayed simply because
the plaintiff does not know the defendant's address.151 If the plaintiff
knows the defendant's address, he is required by Rule 1-301(a) to in-
clude this information in his original pleading. If the plaintiff does not
know this information, the summons will issue without it, and the plain-
tiff can employ a private process server to locate and serve the
defendant. "6
157. See Neel v. Webb Fly Screen Mfg. Co., 187 Md. 34, 41, 48 A.2d 331, 332 (1946);
Renewal of Process and the Statute of Limitations, 9 MD. L. REV. 74 (1948).
158. See Proposed Rule 2-114 reporter's note.
159. McAuliffe letter (Sept. 22, 1983), supra note 92.
160. Id.
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Rule 2-115---Attachment Before Judgment
Rule 2-115 consolidates the procedures for attachment before judg-
ment contained in the rules of Former Subtitle G (Attachment on Origi-
nal Process), and adds several new procedural requirements designed to
safeguard the debtor's due process rights. Attachment proceedings find
their roots in the state's right to subject all property within its borders to
its laws, 6 ' and the purpose of attachment before judgment is two-fold:
to compel the defendant's appearance in court, and to provide the
plaintiff with security for enforcing a judgment once his claim is estab-
lished as being due.'6 2 The debtor's due process rights in attachment
cases result from Supreme Court holdings that a prejudgment depriva-
tion of property, even though only temporary, is nonetheless a depriva-
tion which must be preceded by appropriate procedural safeguards to
assure that the fourteenth amendment due process requirements are
met.163 To be valid, attachment proceedings must be consistent with
the Supreme Court's decision in Sniadach v. Family Fnance Corp., which
held that the defendant must be given notice and an opportunity to be
heard prior to seizure of the property, unless there are extraordinary
circumstances that justify postponing notice and hearing. 64 Efforts to
comply with these requirements are noticeable in several of the rule's
provisions.
An important change from the former rule results from recent stat-
utory changes that allow attachment at any time before judgment. The
draft rule originally was entitled Attachment on Original Process, but
was amended to coordinate the rule with the 1983 revision of the statu-
tory provisions governing attachment, specifically sections 3-302 to -305
of the Maryland Code, Courts Article.'6 5 The previous statute, as well
as the former G rules, allowed attachment only when the case was com-
menced. If a defendant thereafter acted to conceal, fraudulently con-
vey, or abscond with property, the plaintiff had to resort to equitable
remedies. 166 The Committee discussed the need for a change, but noted
161. See Belcher v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 282 Md. 718, 720, 387 A.2d 770, 772
(1978); Coward v. Dillinger, 56 Md. 59, 60-61 (1881); 4 J. PoE, supra note 136, § 502.
162. See State v. Friedman, 283 Md. 701, 706, 393 A.2d 1356, 1359 (1978); Philbin v.
Thurn, 103 Md. 342, 351, 63 A. 571, 574 (1906); see also C. BROWN, supra note 4, at 195 ("In
addition to providing security for the payment of the claim once it is established, this proce-
dure also had the practical effect of forcing the defendant to enter his appearance in court.").
163. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 85-88 (1972).
164. 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (in the context of prejudgment garnishment); see also Fuentes,
407 U.S. at 85-86 (finding a violation of due process, following Sniadach, for prejudgment
replevin of personal property, despite a provision allowing recovery by posting a bond).
165. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-302 to -305 (1984).
166. See Comments of Mr. Brault, Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 57.
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that this was a matter of legislative concern, because the state statute
limited attachment to the time of commencement of the action. 167 As
the applicable statutes have been amended to allow attachment at any
time before judgment and the new rule has been changed to incorporate
this addition, a plaintiff will now have access to the provisions if, after
he has filed his original process, he becomes entitled to prejudgment
attachment due to the actions of the defendant. The Committee's con-
cern for economy is represented in section (a), as it is cross-referenced to
the Maryland Code, Courts Article, sections 3-302 to -305, the current
statutory requirements for obtaining a writ of attachment before judg-
ment. 168 The former rules reiterated these statutory provisions, but the
provisions have not been reproduced in the new rules. 169
Section (a) is derived from Former Rule G42 a and b. Its require-
ment that the attachment process issue only after the creditor has filed
an application stating under oath the basis of the claim stems from court
decisions that an application under oath is necessary to protect against
arbitrary and mistaken seizure. 17 The new rule, consistent with Rule 2-
101, requires the plaintiff to file a "complaint" rather than a "declara-
tion," as was required under Former Rule G42.' Three other changes
in the rule were also necessary to provide consistency with other new
rules. First, the provision allowing the request for issuance of a writ of
attachment to be made ex parte is consistent with Rule 1-351(a)'s re-
quirement that the rules expressly state if such relief will be allowed.' 72
Second, section (a) states that the request and affidavit need not be
served pursuant to Rule 3-321. This complies with the new approach
taken by Rule 1-321 requiring every pleading and paper filed to be
served upon each of the parties "[e]xcept as otherwise provided" in the
rule. 1 3 Third, the new rule eliminates two references in Former Rule
G42 b that allowed someone other than the plaintiff to file the affidavit
on behalf of the plaintiff. Under Rule 1-331 these express allowances
are unnecessary, and the plaintiffis attorney may still perform this act
instead of the plaintiff. Furthermore, Rule 2-115(a) eliminates the re-
quirement in Former Rule G42 that the plaintiff state, except in an ac-
tion for unliquidated damages, that the debtor is bona fide indebted to
the plaintiff in the amount claimed. Instead, the rule contains only the
general statement that the plaintiff file "an affidavit verifying the facts
167. See id; Minutes, June 18-19, 1982, at 26.
168. See Explanatory Note, Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 56.
169. See Former Md. R.P. 640, G41, G45 a.
170. See, e.g., Jonnet v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1976).
171. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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set forth in the complaint and stating the grounds for entitlement to the
writ."
Section (b) is derived from Former Rule G43 and changes Mary-
land practice by providing that a writ of attachment and a complaint
shall constitute a single action on the docket in all cases. Under prior
practice, the attachment and complaint were consolidated only when
the ground for attachment on original process was that a resident debtor
was evading service. As the Committee Note appended to the rule
states, the provision is designed to abolish the practice of having two
distinct parts in an attachment proceeding, the "short note case" and
the "attachment case," each with its own docket number. 17 4 Under the
former system, the filing of the affidavit commenced the "attachment
case," in which the sheriff made the return to the writ of attachment,
showing how he has executed it.' 7 5 The action of the plaintiff against
the defendant was contained in a separate action, the "short note case,"
which was commenced by the filing of the declaration and resulted in
the issuance of a writ of summons.' 76 If the defendant in the case ap-
peared, the merits of the case were tried in the short note case.' 7 7 In this
situation, the defendant appeared only in the short note case, and there-
fore could only use pleas which denied liability to the plaintiff, not those
which denied the validity of the attachment, for example, that the de-
fendant was not a nonresident.' 7 8 The attachment case generally re-
mained outstanding until the short note case was concluded; however,
the defendant might dissolve the attachment by appearing in the action
and giving an approved bond or by filing a motion to quash the attach-
ment. Under the last possibility, the defendant could assert the lack of
residency as grounds for quashing the attachment. 7 9 The new rules
eliminate the bifurcated procedure. Thus, the defendant in the attach-
ment case will no longer divide his pleadings between two separate
cases. Placing all of the proceedings within a single case should thus
simplify attachment cases.
Section (c) is in part developed from Former Rule G44 and is in
part new. This section describes the proceedings to be followed upon
request for a writ of attachment and includes two important procedural
requirements to safeguard the debtor's due process rights. First, section
174. See MD. R.P. 2-115(b) committee note.
175. See 4 J. POE, supra note 136, § 554.
176. See Overmeyer v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 32 Md. App. 177, 183, 359 A.2d 260, 264
(1975).
177. See Overmeyer, 32 Md. App. at 183, 359 A.2d at 264; 4 J. POE, supra note 136, § 554;
Minutes, June 18-19, 1982, at 24.
178. 4 J. POE, supra note 136, § 554.
179. Id. §§ 536-537.
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(c) states that the court review the complaint, the supporting affidavit,
and any supporting exhibits, instead of having only the clerk review the
filings. In order for the writ of attachment to issue, the court must find
that the plaintiff is entitled to the writ. This requirement is consistent
with the requirement for judicial review in Former Rule G44, which was
adopted in response to the United States District Court decision in Ros-
coe v. Butler.' Roscoe held the Maryland District Rule that governed
attachment unconstitutional because it did not provide for notice and
an opportunity to be heard prior to attachment of the debtor's
property.' 8 '
Section (c) also requires that the plaintiff post a bond as a condition
to obtaining the writ, and changes the prior rule. Under Former Rule
G42 e, a bond did not have to be filed in a contract claim for liquidated
damages. 112 The distinction, according to one Committee member, was
based on the provability of the plaintiffs claim and the probability of
damages being incurred by the defendant.8 3 Because a defendant may
have defenses to an unliquidated damages claim, however, he may suffer
losses because of the deprivation of using and possessing the property.84
For this reason, the Committee decided that it would be better to make
the bond requirement apply in all claims, thereby promoting both fair-
ness and uniformity."8 5 The change will also release the courts from
having to determine whether the damages claimed in a particular case
are liquidated or unliquidated.8 6
Another change instituted by section (c) concerns the amount of
the bond which must be filed. Under Former Rule G42 e, the amount
of the bond must be "the sum alleged to be due from the defendant,"
i.e., an amount equal to the claim.' Former Rule H4 a, however, gov-
erned bonds generally and provided for the court to order the penalty of
a bond increased or decreased at any time, for good cause shown.
180. 367 F. Supp. 574 (D. Md. 1973).
181. Id. at 582.
182. See Metal Distrib. Co. v. Solar Heating & Air Conditioning Corp., 263 Md. 663, 284
A.2d 229 (1971).
183. Comments of Judge McAuliffe, Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 59.
184. See Comments of Mr. Brault, id.
185. Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 59.
186. See, e.g., Panamerican Consulting Co. v. Broun, 238 Md. 438, 447-48, 209 A.2d 575,
580 (1964); Eisenberg v. Air Conditioning, Inc., 225 Md. 324, 331-32, 170 A.2d 743, 745-46
(1960).
187. See Overmeyer v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 32 Md. App. 177, 182, 359 A.2d 260, 263
(1976) ("Upon the filing of a declaration, affidavit in support thereof, documentary evidence
of a claim, a bond to the State in an amount equal to the claim, and instructions to the sheriff
as to the description and location of the property to be attached, Md. Rule G42, the court
may issue an order directing the attachment.").
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Under former statutory provisions, the amount of the bond was required
to be double the sum alleged to be due from the defendant.' 88 Rule 2-
115(c) does not correlate the amount of the bond with the amount of the
plaintiff's claim, but simply requires that the court that orders issuance
of the writ "shall prescribe the amount and security of the bond." The
change is reasonable, because there is not necessarily any correlation be-
tween the amount of the plaintiff's claim and the loss that the defendant
may suffer because of the deprivation of the use of the property. In
making the change, however, the new rule offers no guidance for the
court to use in determining the amount of the bond.'8 9 The Commit-
tee's failure to fix the amount of the bond either to the amount of the
plaintiff's claim or the value of the property attached will place the bur-
den on the judge to determine, based solely on the documents submitted
by the plaintiff, the appropriate amount of the bond.
Section (d) is new and provides instructions on which section will
govern the procedure for writs of attachment. It provides that for a levy
of property, the procedures in Rules 2-641 and 2-642 shall govern, and
for garnishment, the procedures in Rule 2-645 shall control." 9 It directs
that for purposes of attachment before judgment, a writ obtained under
Rule 2-115 shall be treated as a writ of execution, with the procedures
governed by Rules 2-641, 2-642, and 2-643. In applying these rules, the
parties shall be treated as judgment creditor and judgment debtor, and
the amount of the plaintiffs claim shall be treated as the amount owed
under the judgment. This last provision, located in the last sentence of
section (d), was necessary because Rules 2-662 and 2-668 both require a
statement in the writ of the amount owed under the judgment, but be-
cause there is no judgment at the time of the writ of attachment, the
statement of the amount of the plaintiff's claim was substituted."'9 The
rule, however, makes an exception with respect to garnishments; a judg-
ment cannot be entered against a garnishee until the plaintiff has ob-
tained a judgment on the claim. The new rule, therefore, has moved the
levy and garnishment provisions from the Former G rules to the judg-
188. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 9, § 37 (1957), repealed by Acts of 1962, ch. 36; see also Burton
v. Halley, 236 Md. 42, 43-44, 202 A.2d 380, 381 (1963); Rhynhart, Attachments in the People's
Court of Baltimore City, 14 MD. L. REv. 235, 248 (1954).
189. In response to Judge McAuliffe's question concerning guidance in the rule for the
court, "Mr. Brault suggested that the amount of potential damages correlates with the nature
and value of the property seized and that the plaintiff might be required to include in his
affidavit a description of the property to be attached." Comments of Judge McAuliffe and
Mr. Brault, Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 60.
190. See infra notes 1130-1225 and accompanying text.
191. Comments of the Reporter, Minutes, June 18-19, 1982, at 30.
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ment section, Chapter 600 of Title 2.192 Although these rules were origi-
nally repeated in substance in this section of Rule 2-115, the Committee
viewed this as unnecessary and agreed to simply cross-reference them.' 93
Section (e) is also new, and tracks the new rules for issuance and
service of process. Historically, in cases of attachment on original pro-
cess, no real service was attempted on the absconding or non-resident
debtors. 94 Instead, the summons was merely posted by the sheriff on
the courthouse door.'95 When an order directing attachment was issued
by the court under former practice, two separate writs issued: the writ
of attachment, which could be served by either posting a copy of the
writ on real or leasehold property of the defendant or by seizing the
defendant's tangible personal property, 9 6 and a writ of summons. 197
Former Rule G48 provided that if the defendant could not be served
with the writ of summons and did not voluntarily appear, the plaintiff
had to make "reasonable efforts" to ascertain his whereabouts and no-
tify him of the pending attachment.
The new rule is consistent with both the elimination of the practice
of having two separate cases, and the trend toward increasing the service
requirements in attachment cases.' 98 With respect to the former, the old
short note and attachment cases are combined in one action, with sec-
tion (e) directing that the clerk shall issue a writ of summons pursuant to
Rule 2-112. Rule 2-112 requires that copies of all filed documents ac-
company the summons served, and it was the Committee's intent that
both the summons and the writ of attachment be served on the defend-
ant.' 99 With respect to the latter, section (e) carries forward the require-
ment in Former Rule G48 that the plaintiff use "reasonable efforts" to
effect service, but also adds two other provisions designed to increase the
defendant's likelihood of receiving service. First, the section provides
192. See mnfra notes 987-1249 and accompanying text.
193. See Explanatory Note, Minutes, June 18-19, 1982, at 22; Comments of Mr. Niemeyer,
Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 62.
194. See Explanatory Note, Minutes, June 18-19, 1982, at 22, 24; Comments of Judge Mc-
Auliffe, Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 62; 4 J. PoE, supra note 136, § 525 (The writ of sum-
mons "is never served or attempted to be served in attachments against nonresidents.").
195. Minutes, June 18-19, 1982, at 24.
196. Former Md. R.P. G44, G46; see 4 J. POE, supra note 136, §§ 518, 524.
197. Former Md. R.P. G48. See, e.g., Tonns v. Collins, 116 Md. 52, 56, 81 A. 219, 220
(1911); Stone v. Magruder, 10 G. & J. 384, 385-86 (1839); 4 J. POE, supra note 136, § 525
("Indeed, the groundwork of the proceeding being the averment of the defendant's nonresi-
dence, and the consequent inability of the plaintiff to reach him by the usual process, it is not
easy to understand why a writ of summons is required to be issued. But the provision of Rule
G48 is express, and the omission of the summons will vitiate the whole proceeding.").
198. See Explantory Note, Minutes, June 18-19, 1982, at 23 (discussing the increase of ser-
vice requirements in attachment cases).
199. Comments of the Reporter, Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 63.
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that if service cannot be achieved despite reasonable efforts and the de-
fendant does not voluntarily appear, the plaintiff may seek substituted
service by publication pursuant to Rule 2-122 for in rem jurisdiction.2 ° °
Rule 2-122 requires that if the whereabouts of the defendant are un-
known, the court may order service by posting or publishing a notice
and by mailing a notice to the defendant's last known address.
Although Rule 2-115(e) refers only to publication, the provision was in-
tended to include the mailing requirement of Rule 2-122 as well.2"' The
second way that the new rule will strengthen the service requirement is
that it allows the court in its discretion to provide for additional notice
to the defendant "by any means it deems appropriate."
In addition to helping to satisfy due process concerns, the Commit-
tee cited the additional notice provisions as the reason for the absence of
a provision for restitution bond.20 2 Originally, when the defendant did
not appear, the short note case would lie dormant and the plaintiff
would prove his claim in the attachment case.20 3 If the plaintiff pre-
vailed in the attachment case, and sale of the attached property or pay-
ment by the garnishee was sought within a year and a day of the
judgment, the plaintiff was required to post a restitution bond.20 4 The
restitution bond was designed to safeguard the interests of the unserved
defendant. 2 5  After a year and a day, execution did not require the
posting of a bond. The rule was relaxed in Former Rule G59, which
required the posting of a restitution bond only if execution was sought
within six months from the return of the writ of attachment.20 6 The
relaxation of the bond requirement, according to the Committee, re-
sulted from the imposition of stricter notice requirements. 20 7 With the
addition of a provision for substituted service, the Committee felt that
200. See Minutes, June 18-19, 1982, at 25.
201. See Explanatory Note, id at 23.
202. See id.:
As the requirement for service on the defendant has been upgraded, the time within
which a restitution bond is required has been shortened. Current Rule G59 requires
such a bond where execution on the judgment entered in the attachment case is
sought at any time within 6 months from the return of the writ. Current Rule G48
does not require substitute service where the defendant's whereabouts are unknown.
It is suggested that the addition of a mailing and publishing requirement, where the
defendant is not personally served, will make unnecessary the restitution bond re-
quirement for enforcement of the judgment rendered.
See also Minutes, June 18-19, 1982, at 31.
203. Id
204. See Western Nat'l Bank v. National Union Bank, 91 Md. 613, 623, 46 A. 960, 963
(1900); Explanatory Note, Minutes, June 18-19, 1982, at 23.
205. Minutes, June 18-19, 1982, at 31.
206. See 4 J. POE, supra note 136, § 551.
207. Minutes, June 18-19, 1982, at 24.
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the provision for a restitution bond was unnecessary and deleted it in its
208entirety.
The strengthening of notice requirements extends into Rule 2-115
(0, which provides that an attachment made before service of original
process automatically dissolves sixty days after levy or service on the
garnishee, unless within that time the defendant is served, or publication
is commenced pursuant to Rule 2-122 and the publication is subse-
quently completed. 2 9 The rule further provides that, upon request dur-
ing the initial sixty-day period and for good cause shown, the court may
extend the attachment for not more than sixty additional days to permit
service to be made or publication to be commenced.
If a defendant subject to an attachment before judgment subse-
quently appears, he may obtain the release of the attached property via
Rule 2-115(g). Section (g) will protect the debtor by furnishing him a
prompt method for releasing property from the original attachment.
The first paragraph of section (g) is derived from Former Rule G57 and
provides that a defendant who has appeared, that is, a defendant who
has entered a general appearance thereby subjecting himself to the
court's jurisdiction, may obtain release of the property by posting a
bond in an amount equal to either the value of the property or the
amount of the plaintiff's claim, whichever is less. The rule thus carries
forward almost verbatim Former Rule G57, which has been attacked as
an unconstitutional violation of equal protection in the context of non-
resident debtors. 2 " For example, if a non-resident's property is attached
in order to ensure appearance, and the defendant has entered a general
appearance allowing in personam jurisdiction to be obtained, any judg-
ment validly obtained by the creditor will be enforceable in any other
state. 2 1 1 Because the requirement of posting a bond is itself a taking of
212property, it has been argued that the requirement is unconstitutional
if the defendant has submitted to the court's jurisdiction, because the
justification for either the original attachment or the bond requirement
no longer exists.2 13
The second and third paragraphs of Rule 2-115(g) contain various
208. Id. at 25.
209. See id. at 32.
210. See Tatelbaum, New Balance in the Rights of Creditors and Debtors.- The Effect on Magland
Law, 2 U. BALT. L. REV. 236, 248-49 (1973); see also Roscoe v. Butler, 367 F. Supp. 574, 575
(D. Md. 1973) (claim asserted by plaintiff, but court did not reach contention because it
found the Maryland rule unconstitutional on other grounds).
211. See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905);
Tatelbaum, supra note 210, at 248.
212. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 85 (1972).
213. Tatelbaum, supra note 210, at 249.
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grounds upon which the defendant may be able to quash the attach-
ment. Under the second paragraph, the property may be released if the
complaint has been dismissed or settled, if the plaintiff has failed to
comply with the provisions of Rule 2-115 or an order of the court, if
property of sufficient value to satisfy the claim and probable costs will
remain subject to the attachment, or if the attachment of the specific
property will cause undue hardship to the defendant and he has made
available alternative property sufficient in value to satisfy the claim and
probable costs. The third paragraph allows the court to release the at-
tached property if the property is exempt or if the plaintiff is not entitled
to attachment before judgment. The defendant who desires release
based on any of these grounds must do so by motion. Although the new
rule does not use the term, the motion corresponds to the motion to
quash permitted to be filed under Former Rule G51. Unlike the former
rules, the new rules set out the specific grounds that must be alleged if a
defendant files a motion to quash an attachment.
A defendant asserting one of the grounds in the second paragraph
must have entered a general appearance, but a motion alleging one of
the two remedies available in the third paragraph is treated as a limited
appearance for that purpose only. Some members of the Committee
argued that some of the specified grounds listed in the second paragraph
actually constituted reasons why the plaintiff was not entitled to the
attachment, and therefore should be available to defendants entering a
limited appearance. 2 4 Another member, however, countered that ex-
pansion of the limited appearance provision would undermine the rule's
attempt to compel defendants to appear.21 5 Furthermore, the specified
grounds of the second paragraph constitute meritorious defenses to the
claim or to the attachment which justify release of the property, but the
grounds in the third paragraph represent challenges to the plaintiff's
legal entitlement to attachment before judgment.21 6
Nevertheless, the dissenting members seem to have a valid objec-
tion. For example, a motion to release property because the plaintiff has
failed to comply with the provisions of Rule 2-115 is dealt with in sec-
tion (g)'s second paragraph, available only to a defendant who has ap-
peared. Such a plaintiff, however, arguably is not entitled to the
attachment, a defense that is available to a defendant who has entered
only a limited appearance. It is unclear whether the defendant must
submit to the court's jurisdiction simply to challenge this aspect of the
attachment's validity; however, it appears that he would. The rule does
214. Comments of Professor Bowie and Mr. Niemeyer, Minutes, June 18-19, 1982, at 33.
215. Comments of Mr. Brault, id. at 33-34.
216. Id. at 34.
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suggest an implicit rationale supporting the rule's effect as written. If a
plaintiff is not entitled to attachment due to some substantive reason, for
example, because the defendant is not a nonresident or that title to the
property sought to be attached is not in the defendant, then the defend-
ant should not be forced to appear in order to move to quash the attach-
ment. When, however, the plaintiff has made a procedural error but is
otherwise entitled to the attachment, the defendant should not be al-
lowed to circumvent the rule's objective by avoiding appearance.
Section (g)'s last sentence provides that either party may request a
hearing on the motion, and if requested, the hearing shall be held
promptly. This provision makes a hearing on a motion to quash op-
tional for the parties, while the former rule required that when a motion
to quash was filed, "[t]he court shall upon notice to the adverse party
hear the motion to quash forthwith, ' ' 27 thereby making the hearing a
requirement.
Section (h) governs when a third person claims an interest in prop-
erty attached pursuant to this rule. The rule simply directs the claimant
to proceed pursuant to Rule 2-643(d) of the judgment section of the
rules. 2 8 The rule thus takes the same approach as section (d) which
provides that the procedure for a levy or garnishment will be in accord-
ance with the rules governing levy or garnishment on a judgment. 1 9
Possibly an oversight, section (h) does not state, as does section (d), that
in applying Rule 2-643(d) the defendant shall be treated as the judg-
ment debtor and the plaintiff shall be treated as the judgment creditor.
Presumably, that was intended by the Committee, and is implicit in the
rule.
In consolidating the procedure of this section with that in the judg-
ment section, the rules eliminate Former Rule G58, which governed
claims by third persons. Under the former rule, the claimant was re-
quired to file a petition under oath, serve a copy upon the plaintiff and
the defendant if he had appeared, and establish the validity of his claim
at a hearing. 220 The former rules were interpreted, however, as not su-
perseding the previously existing remedies, and therefore allowed the
claimant to proceed either under this rule or by a motion to quash.22 , It
is unclear whether Rule 2-643(d) is intended to be the exclusive remedy
for the claimant under the new rule, but unlike Former Rule G58, the
217. Former Md. R.P. G51 b.
218. See tnfra note 1167 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
220. See 4 J. POE, supra note 136, § 561.
221. See H.L. Neuman Co. v. Duhadaway, 154 Md. 595, 597, 141 A. 342, 343 (1928); Kean
v. Doerner, 62 Md. 475, 478 (1884); 4 J. POE, supra note 136, § 561.
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new rule provides for the claimant to proceed by motion. Thus, it seems
that this is the exclusive method for third persons to attack an
attachment.
Section (i) requires the sheriff to retain the attached property unless
the court directs otherwise. Unlike its predecessor, Former Rule G60,
this rule restricts the court's discretion to sell attached property. Under
Former Rule G60, the court could order attached property to be sold
"whenever the court may deem such sale expedient." Under the new
rule, the court may order the attached property sold only if one of the
parties requests the sale and the property is perishable. Evidence in the
minutes, however, suggests that the section was intended to allow the
court to act sua sponte if it felt it was necessary.2 2 Nevertheless, the
language of the rule does not provide sua sponte action.
Section (j) is new and for the first time the rules explicitly direct the
court to dissolve the attachment if judgment is entered for the defend-
ant. Under former practice, if the defendant appeared, the merits of the
case were tried in the short note case before determining the attach-
ment's validity. 223 If the defendant prevailed in the short note case,
then the attachment failed by necessity. With the proposed rule com-
bining the two cases, it was necessary to include a mechanism for dis-
solving the attachment when the defendant prevails on the merits.
Section (j) provides that mechanism.
The defendant also may move for the court to assess and enter
judgment for "any damages sustained by the defendant by reason of the
attachment." The rule, unfortunately, provides no direction concerning
the proper method of calculating such damages; thus, the calculation
will be left to the discretion of the court.
Section (k) is also new and governs the effect of a judgment for the
plaintiff in an attachment proceeding. This section draws a distinction
between cases where personal jurisdiction is obtained and where it is not
obtained. When judgment for the plaintiff is entered, the judgment is to
be satisfied by applying any funds collected by the sheriff, the proceeds
of any pre-judgment sales, and, to the extent necessary, the proceeds
from the sale of any other attached property. If no personal jurisdiction
has been obtained, the court has jurisdiction only over the attached
property, and any judgment will be an in rem judgment against that
property. The proceeds from the attached property, therefore, will limit
the plaintiffs recovery. If personal jurisdiction has been obtained, how-
222. See Comments of Mr. Nilson, Minutes, June 18-19, 1982, at 34 ("As written, the sec-
tion gives the court discretion to act sua sponte or upon request of the parties.").
223. See, e.g., Philbin v. Thurn, 103 Md. 342, 351, 63 A. 571, 574 (1906).
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ever, the plaintiff receives an in personam judgment against the defend-
ant, and to the extent that the proceeds fail to satisfy the judgment, the
plaintiff may enforce the judgment through the normal enforcement
procedures in Rules 2-631 to 2-649.224
The Committee recognized the rule's importance to the substantive
law of res judicata and accordingly inserted a provision clarifying that
entry of a judgment for the plaintiff, when personal jurisdiction has not
been obtained, is an in rem judgment against the property and does not
bar a subsequent action for the unpaid balance. 22 5 The Committee also
discussed the collateral estoppel effect of the rule when the defendant
does not appear and the plaintiff fails to establish his claim on the mer-
its. 2 2 6 One member expressed the opinion that a plaintiff who failed to
establish his claim would be barred from relitigating the same claim by
nonmutual collateral estoppel.2 27 Another member, however, was con-
cerned that the plaintiff's failure to provide adequate proof may be due
to the defendant's absence, and therefore the plaintiff should not be
barred from relitigating the claim. 22' Historically, when this situation
occurred the attachment case was dismissed, but there was no effect on
the short note case. 22 9 The Committee did not change the rule to re-
solve this problem, and potentially a plaintiff who fails to prove his case
may be precluded from relitigating the same claim.
Section (k) simplifies Maryland practice by eliminating the distinc-
tion between a condemnation nIsi and condemnation absolute. The new
rules also eliminate the rules prescribing the procedure for awarding
judgment to the plaintiff when the defendant does not appear. Under
the former rules, if the defendant did not appear, a judgment of con-
demnation nisi was entered. Fifteen days thereafter the plaintiff could
prove his claim pursuant to Former Rule 648, and a judgment of con-
demnation absolute was entered against the property.
Rule 2-115 does not provide procedures for the entry of judgment
against the property; section (k) merely states that if the defendant does
not appear, the judgment will be an in rem judgment against the at-
tached property. The rule does not require proof by the plaintiff when
the defendant fails to appear, even though the Committee intended this
to continue as a requirement.23 0 Furthermore, Former Rule 648, which
224. See inra notes 1110-1245 and accompanying text.
225. See Minutes, June 18-19, 1982, at 35-38.
226. Id.
227. Comments of Judge McAuliffe, id. at 35.
228. Comments of Mr. Brault, id. at 36.
229. Id.
230. See Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 67-68.
Judge McAuliffe called attention to Rules G45 and 55 which require the plaintiff to
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allowed the court or jury to determine the plaintiffs damages and costs
upon entry of an interlocutory or default judgment, has not been carried
forward. Although Rule 2-613(e) 23' does allow the court to require the
plaintiff to prove his claim, that section is inapplicable because it re-
quires the court to find that personal jurisdiction over the defendant has
been obtained. Nevertheless, the language of Rule 2-115 ("any judg-
ment . . . shall be in rem") should be interpreted to require the plaintiff
to prove the claim to obtain a judgment against the property of a non-
appearing debtor.
Rule 2-121-Process--Servzce-In Personam
Rule 2-121 is derived from and consolidates various provisions of
Former Rules 104, 105, and 107, effecting few changes in current prac-
tice. Section (a), which generally describes the manner of service, com-
bines Former Rules 104 b, 105 a, 107 a 1, 107 a 2, and 107 a 4 to
eliminate much superfluous and repetitive material present in the for-
mer rules, without changing the substance of the rules. The new rule
requires service to be accomplished "by delivering to the person to be
served a copy of the summons, complaint, and all other papers filed with
it." The rule is thus consistent with Rule 2-111, which is derived from
Former Rule 103 g, but it unnecessarily repeats Rule 2-1 l's require-
ment that the defendant be served with a copy of the summons, the
complaint, and all other papers filed with it.
2 32
The new rule also takes a different approach than Former Rule 104
b 1 by establishing separate rules to determine the persons who are to
serve and be served, rather than by specifying a particular method in
the rule, then making exceptions in a number of separate rules. For
example, Former Rule 104 b 1 (i) and (ii) prescribed delivery "by the
sheriff," but then provided exceptions in various other rules, most nota-
bly Former Rule 116 a which allowed almost any process to be served
by a private person. Rule 2-121 does not state the person who is to serve
process, placing this instead in a separate rule, Rule 2-123, which com-
bines all of the provisions of the former rules governing the persons who
may serve process.
prove his claim against the defendant. He noted that the type of judgment em-
ployed under the existing practice is one for condemnation of the attached property.
He proposed that judgment of condemnation be retained by the proposed rule, in
lieu of using judgment in rem. Mr. Hermann recommended that the proposed rule
expressly provide for the plaintiff's proof of claim.
Id. The Committee apparently agreed that such a provision would be helpful, and referred
the rule back to the Subcommittee, but no such provision was ever added to the rule.
231. See inifa text accompanying notes 1082-84.
232. See supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
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Former Rule 104 b 1 (i) and (ii) required service to be made on the
party to be served or to an agent authorized by appointment or by law
to receive service of process. When the defendant was not an individual,
the plaintiff had to search various other provisions to determine the
proper person to be served. 233 The new rules effectively eliminate this
inconvenience; Rule 2-121 simply requires service on "the person to be
served," while Rule 2-124 (Process-Person to be Served) defines this
term and includes the relevant provisions governing particular situa-
tions that were previously embodied in several separate rules.234
Section (a) permits service by certified mail, restricted delivery. In
addition, the endorsement must read: " 'Restricted Delivery-show to
whom, date, address of delivery.' " The section also provides that ser-
vice by certified mail is complete upon delivery. 235 This differs from the
provision in Rule 1-321, which allows service by regular mail for plead-
ings and papers other than original pleadings and states that service is
complete upon mailing. Apparently the Committee believed that ser-
vice of original process required more safeguards than service of subse-
quent papers.
The new rule does not distinguish service outside the state and ser-
vice in a foreign country. Rule 2-121(a) deletes the former rules' re-
quirements for service in a foreign country and substitutes instead a
general alternative service provision which authorizes service outside the
state in the manner prescribed by the court, or by the foreign jurisidic-
tion "if reasonably calculated to give notice." The Committee used the
term "foreign jurisdiction" intending this to include both states and
236
countries.
Section (b) is derived from Former Rules 104 h 1 and 107 a 3 and
describes the procedures available to the plaintiff when the defendant
acts to evade service. The rule retains the former requirement that the
plaintiff offer proof of the defendant's evasion of service by affidavit, and
authorizes the court to order service by mail to the defendant's last
known address and delivery to "a person of suitable age and discretion"
at the defendant's "place of business, dwelling house, or usual place of
abode." This procedure essentially mirrors prior practice. The Com-
mittee rejected a suggestion that service by leaving the summons with a
233. See, e.g., Former Md. R.P. 106 (service on a corporation); id. 108 (service on the
United States); id. 119 (service on a defendant under disability).
234. See bifra notes 224-51 and accompanying text.
235. See McAuliffe letter (Sept. 22, 1983), supra note 92 (stating this clause was inserted in
response to the District Court Subcommittee's observation that MD. R.P. 1-321 expressly
states when service by ordinary mail is complete, but this rule did not specify when service by
certified mail is complete).
236. Minutes, Nov. 17, 1978, at 11-12.
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person of suitable age and discretion be adopted for all service, as is
allowed under Federal Rule 4(d)(1). 37
Section (d) (Methods Not Exclusive) preserves prior practice and
provides that the methods outlined in the rules do not exclude other
means of service provided by rule or statute. The Committee, however,
provided no insight as to the necessity of retaining this rule or as to what
other possible methods of service exist; presumably this is merely a safety
device.
Rule 2-122-Process--Sewice-In Rem or Quasi in Rem
Rule 2-122 is derived from Former Rules 105 b and 111 a and
prescribes the options for constructive service available to a plaintiff
who cannot locate the defendant. In accordance with established due
process requirements, constructive notice is authorized under section (a)
only where the defendant's whereabouts are unknown. 238 Additionally,
the rule applies only to in rem or quasi in rem actions, not where per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant is sought. 239
Section (a) includes several changes from Former Rule 105 b worth
noting. First, unlike the mandatory requirement in Former Rule 105 b,
even if the plaintiff satisfies the rule's requirements, the court's order for
substituted service is discretionary. Second, the section reverses the or-
der in which it lists the various forms of substituted service. Although
the rule simply lists the options, without stating any preference, the
Committee's discussion implies that a preference was intended. 40
Under the new rule, courthouse posting precedes publication and land
posting as substitute process; under Former Rule 105 b, publication was
listed first and posting was to be used "in lieu of publication." Third,
regardless of whether publication or posting is used, section (a) requires
notice to be mailed to the defendant's last known address. Under For-
mer Rule 105 ,'mailing of process was required if the substitute method
of service was posting, but not if the substitute method of service was by
publication.
A fourth change requires a plaintiff, in order to satisfy the publica-
tion requirement, to publish the notice in "one or more newspapers of
general circulation published in the county in which the action is pend-
ing." The section eliminates the exception in Former Rule 105 b 1 (a)
for counties in which no newspaper is published. (The rules define
237. See d. at 11.
238. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950).
239. See Minutes, Jan. 5, 1979, at 26.
240. See Proposed Rule 2-122(a) reporter's note; Minutes, Jan. 5, 1979, at 27-28.
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"county" to include Baltimore City;2 4 ' thus, the apparent omission of
Baltimore City effects no change.) Finally, subsection (a)(3), unlike For-
mer Rule Ill a, expressly requires posting of the notice "in a conspicu-
ous place" on the land.
Section (b) (Time) governs the time limits for substitute service.
Adapted from Former Rule 105 b 2, this section shortens from sixty to
thirty days the time by which service by mailing and posting or publica-
tion is to precede the date when the defendant's response is to be filed.
Section (c), based in part on Former Rule 105 b 1 (a), prescribes the
notice's contents. The rule's narrative replaces the mandatory form for
publication in the Appendix of Forms, but retains its essential require-
ments.242 Under section (c), the notice must: (1) be signed by the clerk;
(2) include the caption of the case; (3) describe the substance of the com-
plaint and relief sought; (4) inform the defendant of the latest date for
response; (5) warn the defendant that failure to respond may result in a
default judgment; and (6) contain any other information required by
the court. The Committee narrowly defeated a motion to reinstate the
form in lieu of the narrative.2 43
Rule 2-123--Process-y Whom Served
Rule 2-123 simplifies the Maryland Rules by consolidating several
former rules governing who may serve court orders demanding compli-
ance or requiring action. Section (a) states the general rule that process
can be served by either a sheriff or a competent private person who is
eighteen years of age or older, including an attorney of record, but not
by a party to the action. This rule effects no substantive change in
Maryland practice, but merely combines several former rules. Although
the new rule eliminates the wording in Former Rule 116 a that "the
person shall have the same power and duty to execute such process as
the sheriff," that power would seem to be implied.
Section (b) limits section (a) by restricting service by a private per-
son to cases in which process is simply to be delivered, mailed, or pub-
lished. Consequently, writs of execution, replevin, or attachment of
property or person must still be served by the sheriff. Unlike the former
rule, the new rule explicitly authorizes the court to order service by a
private person when service by the sheriff would otherwise be required.
Unfortunately, the rule provides no guidance as to when such service
241. MD. R.P. 1-202 (h).
242. See MD. R.P. Appendix of Forms, Form 2.
243. See Minutes, Jan. 5, 1979, at 29 (Judge Proctor moved that a brief form be inserted
instead of section (c), but the vote resulted in a tie, and the Chairman broke the tie by voting
against the motion.).
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would be appropriate. Section (c) carries forward former practice with
only stylistic changes in the rule. The provision adopts the practice of
substituting an elisor to serve or execute process instead of the sheriff
when the sheriff is a party to or interested in an action.
Rule 2-124-Process-Persons to be Served
Rule 2-124 specifies the persons who can or must be served to effec-
tuate service of process. By combining several provisions previously con-
tained in separate rules, the new rule simplifies practice and makes it
easier for attorneys to determine the proper person to be served.
Although Rule 2-124 generally parallels the former rules, it makes new
methods of service available for particular persons. Section (a) provides
that service upon an individual is made by serving either the individual
or an agent authorized to receive service for the individual.
Section (b) is derived from Former Rule 119, but considerably
shortens the former rule by omitting several provisions. First, the Com-
mittee deleted the express limitation that service on the parent, guard-
ian, or other persons is required only if there is such a person within the
jurisdiction of the court. Consequently, the rule can only be read to
require service of the disabled individual and the parent, guardian, or
custodian, whether or not such parent, guardian, or custodian is within
the court's jurisdiction. The change will ensure that service will not be
deemed complete if only the infant or incompetent person has been
served.
A second difference between the former rule and Rule 2-124(b) is
the elimination of the special provision for notice to disabled defendants
in in rem or quasi in rem actions. Although substituted service may be
accomplished if the whereabouts of the defendant are unknown, pursu-
ant to Rule 2-122, the court is no longer authorized to appoint an attor-
ney to conduct proceedings on behalf of a disabled defendant who fails
to appear and answer. The Committee did not address a suggestion by
the Subcommittee that the definition of "Individual Under Disability"
be expanded to include persons under physical disability. 244 Thus, an
"Individual Under Disability" under Rule 1-202 (k) (Definitions-Indi-
vidual Under Disability) remains "an individual under the age of 18
years or an individual incompetent by reason of mental incapacity."
Rule 2-124 (c) consolidates the provisions of Former Rule 106 while
providing for more liberal service procedures. The new rule continues
the former rule's designation of the resident agent, president, secretary,
and treasurer as the individuals upon whom process can be served. Sim-
244. See Minutes, Jan. 5, 1979, at 30-3 1.
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ilarly, this section generally follows prior practice when a corporation
has no resident agent, or a good faith attempt to serve the resident
agent, president, secretary, or treasurer has failed. In that event, service
may be made on "the manager, any director, vice president, assistant
secretary, assistant treasurer, or other person expressly or impliedly au-
thorized to receive service of process."
The new rule, however, makes several changes. First, the former
rule required an unsuccessful attempt at service upon each party-the
resident agent, president, secretary, and treasurer-before process could
be served on an alternate. 245 The new rule requires only a good faith
attempt "to serve the resident agent, president, secretary, or treasurer."
By stating the categories in the disjunctive, the new rule requires only
one good faith attempt upon one of the persons listed. Second, Former
Rule 106 b 3 established a preference system for alternates; only if the
resident agent could not be served or did not reside in the state and the
listed officers did not reside or could not be found in this state could
process be served on another person expressly or impliedly authorized to
accept service.2 46 The new rule suggests no preference and allows ser-
vice upon any of the listed officers or any other authorized person if
there is no resident agent or a good faith attempt has failed.
Finally, the new rule omits the definition of an "Unsuccessful At-
tempt to Serve" found in the former rule. The former rule required
service to be attempted during normal business hours at the address of
the resident agent as certified by the Department of Assessments and
Taxation. It defined an unsuccessful attempt as one in which the resi-
dent agent could not be found or the place was closed. Rule 2-124(c)
requires an unproductive "good faith attempt," without defining the
term. Thus, whether an attempt has failed for purposes of the rule will
have to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Rule 2-124(c) carries forward the provision in Former Rule 106 e
which allows service on the State Department of Assessments and Taxa-
tion if the corporation has no resident agent or two good faith attempts
to serve have failed. The new rule does not extend the time for filing an
initial pleading when the corporation is served through the Department
of Assessments and Taxation. That provision, however, is contained in
Rule 2-321 (b)(3) in the pleadings and motions chapter.2 4 7 Unlike For-
245. SeeJ. Whitson Rogers, Inc. v. Hanley, 21 Md. App. 383, 390-91, 319 A.2d 833, 838
(1974) (finding service on a person expressly or impliedly authorized to receive service void
because, "she could be validly served only after failure to find in Maryland any of the other
specifically designated officers or officials of the corporation who reside in the State").
246. Id
247. See tnfra notes 401-15 and accompanying text.
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mer Rule 106 e 2, the new rule does not cross reference section 6-307 of
the Maryland Code, Courts Article, which sets out the duties of the De-
partment of Assessments and Taxation when it is served with process for
248a corporation.
Sections (d) and (e) are new. Section (d) provides that service upon
the State of Maryland is made by serving the Attorney General; this is
consistent with article V, section 3 of the Maryland Constitution, which
authorizes the Attorney General to prosecute and defend cases by or
against the state. Sections (d) and (e) also provide that if an action at-
tacks the validity of a state officer's or agency's order, then the officer or
agency must also be served.
Sections (f) and (g) carry foward with few changes the provisions of
Former Rule 108 a and b, which govern service on the United States.
As in the former rule, section (f) requires service upon the United States
to be made upon the United States Attorney, an Assistant United States
Attorney, or a clerical employee designated by the United States Attor-
ney. Unlike the former rule, the designation of such a clerical employee
must be by "a writing filed with the clerk of the court."
Sections (f) and (g) expand the allowable methods of service. For-
mer Rule 108 a provided that the official had to be served by delivery;
Rule 2-124(o does not specify any particular method of service. There-
fore, service in any permissible form will be acceptable under the new
rule.2 49 Also, although Former Rule 108 a and b directed that an addi-
tional service on the Attorney General of the United States and an of-
ficer or agency (in an action attacking the validity of an order of such
officer or agency) be made by registered mail, the new rule provides that
they be served, making available any permissible form of service. As
with section (c), the provision in Former Rule 108 f allowing the United
States sixty days after service in which to file an answer has been moved
to Rule 2-321(b).
Section (h) is new and replaces the list of express statutory excep-
tions in Former Rules 105 c and 106 f. If any statutes require or permit
methods of service different from those allowed under Rule 2-124, they
preempt this rule to that extent.25" This section is necessary because in
the event of a conflict between a rule of procedure and a statute, or
judicial decision, in Maryland the rule of procedure governs. Unfortu-
nately, the Committee did not cross-reference this section to the statutes
that were listed in Former Rules 105 c and 106 f; those statutes will now
248. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-307 (1984).
249. Set Proposed Rule 2-124 (d) reporter's note (now MD. R.P. 2-124(0).
250. See Minutes, Jan. 5, 1979, at 31.
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be much more difficult for a practitioner to locate because they are scat-
tered throughout the Maryland Code.2 5 '
Rule 2-125--Process---Service on Sundays and Hozdays
Rule 2-125 is derived from Former Rule 104 c, but changes the rule
in a way that conflicts with Section 6-302 of the Maryland Code, Courts
Article.2 52 The Committee, under a belief that the former rule con-
flicted with the statute,2 53 changed the rule in a way they felt would
make it conform.2 54 Section 6-302 prohibits service of a writ of distraint
or for eviction or possession on Sunday, but permits such service on holi-
days. 255 Former Rule 104 c, although drafted unclearly, appears to
251. Former Md. R.P. 105 c listed the following exceptions:
This Rule shall not require or permit process by publication in substitution for the
following methods of service against:
1. Foreign Corporations, pursuant to Rule 106 (Service of Process -
Corporation).
2. Defendants in actions involving the Maryland Securities Act, pursuant to Code,
Article 32A, section 3 8 (g), (h).
3. Insurers pursuant to Code, Article 48A, section 57.
4. Fraternal Benefit Societies, pursuant to Code, Article 48A, section 347.
5. Unauthorized Insurers, pursuant to Code, Article 48A, sections 201-211.
6. Foreign Electrical Corporations, pursuant to Code, Article 23, section 406.
7. Nonresident Real Estate Brokers or Salesmen, pursuant to Code, Article 56,
section 219.
8. Insurance, Surety or Bonding Companies having accredited agents pursuant to
Code, Section 6-306 of the Courts Article.
Former Md. R.P. 106 f provided:
The provisions of this Rule shall be inapplicable to the parties provided for in the
following statutes to the extent that service of process is provided for therein:
1. Insurers pursuant to Code, Article 48A, section 57.
2. Defendants in actions involving the Maryland Securities Act, pursuant to Code,
Article 32A, section 38(g), (h).
3. Fraternal Benefit Societies, pursuant to Code, Article 48A, section 347.
4. Unauthorized Foreign or Alien Insurers, pursuant to Code, Article 48A, sections
202-211.
5. Foreign Electrical Corporations, pursuant to Code, Article 23, section 406.
6. Nonresident Real Estate Brokers or Salesmen pursuant to Code, Article 56, sec-
tion 219.
7. Insurance, Surety or Bonding Companies having accredited agents, pursuant to
Code, § 6-306 of the Courts Article.
252. MD. CTS. & JUD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 6-302 (1984).
253. See Proposed Rule 2-125 reporter's note, Minutes, Jan. 5, 1979, at 32 ("Mr. Brault, in
presenting this rule which had also been approved by the Style Subcommittee, stated that the
present Rule 104(c) and the statute (Courts Article § 6-302) were in conflict.").
254. See Proposed Rule 2-125 reporter's note, Minutes, Jan. 5, 1979, at 32.
255. Section 6-302 states in its entirety:
(a) When permitted. - The process of a court or administrative office or agency of the
state or local government may be served on a Sunday or holiday.
(b) Service of certain writs on Sunday prohibited - A writ of distraint, or for eviction or
possession may not be served on Sunday.
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have been consistent with the code provision.256 The new rule, however,
prohibits service of such writs on holidays as well as Sundays. Because
the rules control in an event of conflict, writs of distraint and writs for
eviction or possession should not be served on Sundays or holidays.
Rule 2-126-Process-Return
Rule 2-126 consolidates several former Maryland rules and draws
upon Federal Rule 4 (g) to simplify practice and to add several provi-
sions. Consistent with the elimination of the concept of return days,
Rule 2-126 measures the time for return in terms of the time fixed for
the response of the person served. Although a debate among Committee
members over whether the rule should be termed "return" or "proof of
service" resulted in its title of return, most of the rule actually speaks to
proof of service. 5 7 Section (a) continues former practice with several
minor changes. First, section (a) requires that if process is served by
mail, the original return receipt must be filed with the clerk as proof of
service. It does not require an additional affidavit showing that process
was mailed and received, as did Former Rules 104 b 2 and 107 a 2.
Second, similar to Rule 2-121, 2-126(a) consolidates the return provi-
sions for service inside and outside the state. These provisions were
stated separately in the former rules.
Finally, section (a) restates the requirements of proof contained in
Former Rule 116 c, "the name of the person served, the date, and the
particular place and manner of service." The application of these re-
quirements has been changed in two respects. First, although Former
Rule 116 required that that information be set out in an affidavit, Rule
2-126(a) imposes no similar requirement. Second, the rule appears to
impose those requirements on every service of process, including that by
a sheriff. Former Rule 116 applied only to service by a private party.
Both Former Rule 116 c and Rule 2-126(a) require an affidavit when
process is served by a private person, stating that the server is at least
eighteen years of age.
Section (b) continues the prior requirement that the server file
proof of compliance with Rule 2-122. As under the former rule, the
publisher's certificate constitutes proof of publication. Unlike the for-
mer rule, however, the new rule also requires the server to file a copy of
the publication or posting notice.
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-302 (1984).
256. Former Md. R.P. 104 c stated: "Except for a writ of distraint, or for eviction or posses-
sion, on Sunday, process may be served on Sunday or a holiday."
257. See Minutes, Jan. 5, 1979, at 33; Minutes, Mar. 2-3, 1979, at 8-10.
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Section (c) is new and governs service by a method other than or in
addition to delivery, mailing, posting, or publication. In such cases, the
section mandates return as "prescribed by rule or law promptly after
execution of the process." Thus, the rule departs from the general tim-
ing scheme of Rule 2-126, which requires return within the time during
which the person served must respond. Unfortunately, the rule does not
direct the reader to any rule or statute under which it would apply.
Section (d) is also new and requires return of unserved process as
soon as practicable, but no later than ten days from the process's expira-
tion. The Committee decided that requiring return of process not
served was better than simply including a built-in expiration date.
258
Although the Committee considered requiring an affidavit stating the
reasons for non-service, no such provision was included.25 9 Section (e),
another new provision, demands that return include a copy of the pro-
cess if service is effected, and the original if service is not effected.
Section (f) consolidates Former Rules 104 a 2 and 622 h 2 and car-
ries forward the prior requirement that return be filed with the court
issuing process. The rule also continues to require that a writ of execu-
tion be returned to the county court where the property is located, and
in addition, requires that a writ of attachment or any other writ against
property be returned to the county court where the property is located.
Section (g) adopts verbatim the last sentence of Federal Rule 4(g):
"Failure to make proof of service does not affect the validity of the ser-
vice." The new rule thus incorporates Former Rules 104 h 3(c) and 116
c 3 in clearer language. The rule prevents a defendant who has been
served from attacking the validity of service on the ground that the
plaintiff failed to make proof of service. 2 °
Rule 2-131-Appearance
Rule 2-131 is derived from Former Rule 124, and although it effects
minor changes, it primarily makes explicit what was accepted practice.
Section (a) is new and incorporates Maryland District Rule 3 b. 2 6 ' The
section allows an individual to enter an appearance by counsel or in
proper person; Former Rule 124 did not state who was entitled to enter
an appearance on behalf of a party. Rule 2-131(a) also prohibits entry
of appearance on behalf of a corporation by anyone other than an attor-
ney. Corporate officers are therefore prohibited from entering an
258. See Minutes, Mar. 2-3, 1979, at 11.
259. Id.
260. See 2 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 38, 4.43.
261. See Explanatory Note, Minutes, Mar. 13, 1982, at 71.
1984]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
appearance for the corporation unless they represent the corporation as
counsel or unless a statute or rule provides otherwise.26 2
Section (b) repeats Former Rule 124 a with only stylistic changes.
Under that section, an appearance may be entered by filing a motion or
pleading, filing a written request for entry of an appearance, or request-
ing entry of an appearance orally in open court if the court permits.
Section (c) is derived from Former Rule 124 b and c, also with only
minor changes. Like its predecessor, Rule 2-131(c) states explicitly that
special appearances are abolished. Unlike Former Rule 124 c, the new
rule does not expressly provide for a limited appearance for raising pre-
liminary objections, but such an appearance is implicit in its language.
The new rule omits the provision in Former Rule 124 d dealing with
appearance by out-of-state attorneys. The ommission does not change
prior practice, because the rule cross-references the relevant rules of civil
procedure and Rules Governing Admission to the Bar that set out the
procedures for and limitations of such appearances. 263
Rule 2-132--Striking of Attorney's Appearance
Rule 2-132 incorporates much of Former Rule 125, but makes sev-
eral changes in the procedural requirements for withdrawal of an attor-
ney's appearance. Section (a) is new and permits an attorney to
withdraw as a matter of right if the client has another attorney of rec-
ord. The attorney may withdraw simply by filing a notice of with-
drawal with the court. That procedure departs from Former Rule 125 c
1 under which the attorney was required to serve a motion to withdraw
and allow the other party an opportunity to object.
Section (b) governs striking an attorney's appearance by motion
and substantially follows Former Rule 125 a and c 2. Applicable when
the client has no other attorney of record, the rule requires the attorney
desiring to withdraw either to: (1) make a motion in open court, (2)
accompany the motion with the client's written consent to withdrawal,
or (3) include a certificate that notice of the attorney's intention to move
for withdrawal has been filed at least five days prior to the filing of the
motion. The second option is new; under the former rule an attorney
could not avoid the requirement to send notice to the client and to file a
certificate by obtaining the client's written consent. Section (b) also
prohibits the court, unless the motion is granted in open court, from
striking the appearance before the expiration of the time limit for re-
262. See Minutes, Mar. 13, 1982, at 71.
263. MD. R.P. 2-131 cross-references MD. R.P. 1-311, 1-312, and 1-313, and Rules Gov-
erning Admission to the Bar 19 and 20.
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sponding to the motion for withdrawal. Rule 2-311 provides that a
party must respond to a motion within fifteen days after being served.
Although Rule 2-132 does not explicitly provide for service of the mo-
tion to withdraw as did Former Rule 125 b, service is required under
Rule 1-321, which mandates service of every pleading and other paper
filed unless a rule provides otherwise. Section (b) also retains the pres-
ent grounds for the court's discretionary denial of the motion by author-
izing the court to deny withdrawal if it would cause "undue delay,
prejudice, or injustice."
Sections (c) and (d) follow Former Rule 125 d and e with only sty-
listic changes. Section (c) directs the clerk to mail notice to the client's
last known address when his attorney's appearance has been stricken.
The notice is to warn the client to employ new counsel to prevent dis-
missal, judgment by default, and assessment of court costs. The rule
does not provide the form notice provided in the Committee Note to
Former Rule 125. Because the requirements of the rule have not been
altered, clerks may continue to use this form. Section (d) continues For-
mer Rule 125 e's provision that an attorney's appearance is automati-
cally terminated if no appeal has been taken and the time for appeal has
expired, unless the court, prior to such automatic termination, orders
otherwise.
B Chapter 200-PARTIES
Rule 2-201-Real Party in Interest
Rule 2-201 tracks Federal Rule 17(a) and is generally consistent
with Former Rule 203 a, b, and c.2"4 The rule continues the general
principle of Former Rule 203 a that an action must be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest. Also, the rule lists the exceptions set
out in Former Rule 203 b except that subsections b(5) and (6), dealing
with municipal corporations and chartered and unchartered counties re-
spectively, have been deleted. The deletion resulted from the Commit-
tee's view that those sections were inapplicable because they relate to
capacity to sue rather than real parties in interest.165 The new rule also
continues the requirement of Former Rule 203 c that, if a statute pro-
vides, an action for the use or benefit of another shall be brought in the
264. See Minutes, Mar. 2-3, 1979, at 13-14.
265. See id. at 15 (where the Committee decided that research should be done before elimi-
nating these sections); Minutes, May 12, 1979, at 8 ("Mr. Simmons' research had indicated
that their inclusion was not necessary, and that the provisions had probably been added for
clarification.").
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name of the State of Maryland. 266
Rule 2-201 is different from Former Rule 203 in two respects. First,
the new rule omits the provision in Former Rule 203 d and incorporates
instead a clause almost identical to that in Federal Rule 17(a). The new
clause explicitly acknowledges that dismissal may result from failure to
join the real party in interest, but also limits that sanction by providing
that before dismissal the court must allow a reasonable time for joinder
or substitution. The former rule permitted the court to order that the
real party in interest be made a party plaintiff, without specifying the
result of failure to do so. Second, the Committee believed that adopting
the federal relation back provision where there is joinder or substitution
would promote uniformity and fairness.26 7 As a result, the new rule par-
allels the federal rule, stating that the joinder or substitution has the
same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real
268party in interest.
Rule 2-202- Capacity
Rule 2-202 combines into a single rule, with several modifications,
the former Maryland rules on capacity. 26 9 Section (a) provides the gen-
eral rule that "[a]pplicable substantive law" governs when determining
who may sue or be sued. 27" The Committee chose this language to indi-
cate that the whole law of the state governs, including conflict of law
provisions. 271  Rule 2-202(a) deletes Former Rule 204 a and b because
the Committee found that rule to be part of substantive law. 27 2 Simi-
larly, Former Rules 206 and 207 have been omitted. Those rules indi-
cated the code provisions governing certain particular capacity
266. See 1 J. POE, supra note 136, § 295 ("This was always the rule in suits for the wrongful
death of the plaintiff's decedent, but has now been modified" by Rule Q41.).
267. Proposed Rule 2-201 reporter's note.
268. Although the relation back provision applies under FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) whenever
there is "ratification, joinder, or substitution," MD. R.P. 2-201 refers only to "joinder or sub-
stitution." "Ratification" was omitted from the rule because its meaning was not understood
and the Committee did not feel that research into this was necessary because the prior Mary-
land rule did not contain this term. Minutes, Mar. 2-3, 1979, at 16.
269. See Minutes, Mar. 2-3, 1979, at 17. The former rules governing capacity were Former
Md. R.P. 204 (Capacity-Individual-Own Right), 205 (Capacity-Representative), 206
(Capacity-Corporations), and 207 (Capacity-Miscellaneous Associations).
270. Compare MD. R.P. 2-202(a) (capacity to sue or be sued is determined by "[aipplicable
substantive law"), with FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b) (capacity to sue or be sued is governed by "the
law of his domicile"). Originally the new rule provided that "the law of the State governs"
when determining capacity. This was amended to say "applicable substantive law" because
the Committee felt the former version was too narrow. Minutes, Mar. 2-3, 1979, at 17-18.
271. Minutes, Mar. 2-3, 1979, at 17.
272. Id.
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determinations. 2 73 Consequently, the practicing attorney will no longer
be able simply to examine the rules to determine whether a special code
provision exists, but will need to be familiar with the applicable case law
and statutes.
Sections (b) and (c) essentially restructure Former Rule 205 c, d,
and e.2 74 Section (b) permits an individual under disability to sue by a
guardian or other like fiduciary, a change from the language of Former
Rule 205 d, which allowed such individual to sue by guardian or com-
mittee. The change is not intended to change practice, but merely rep-
resents the Committee's desire to have the language coincide with that
of the federal rule. 275
Rule 2-202(b) makes two changes in Maryland practice governing
suits by a parent on behalf of a minor. First, Former Rule 205 c, which
governed who could bring suit when a minor was in the custody of one
parent, applied only to tort actions, but the new rule enlarges this provi-
sion to apply generally to all suits. 27 6 Second, under the new rule the
custodial parent has the exclusive right to sue on behalf of a minor for
273. Former Md. R.P. 206 governed capacity of corporations and stated:
Actions by or against corporations shall be governed by the following Code
provisions:
(1) Foreign Corporations, pursuant to Code, Article 23, sections 87-93 and particu-
larly sections 91, 92.
(2) Domestic Corporations, pursuant to Code, Article 23, sections 94-98.
(3) Religious Corporations, pursuant to Code, Article 23, sections 256-297 and
particularly section 272.
Former Md. R.P. 207 controlled capacity of miscellaneous associations, and stated:
Actions by or against associations shall be governed by the following Code
provisions:
(1) Unincorporated Associations and Joint Stock Companies, pursuant to Code,
Article 23, section 138.
(2) Lloyd's pursuant to Code, Article 48A, sections 134-151, and particularly sec-
tion 150.
(3) Reciprocal Exchanges and Inter-Insurers, pursuant to Code, Article 48A, sec-
tions 257-270, and particularly section 262.
(4) Cooperative Associations, pursuant to Code, Article 23, sections 349-378.
(5) Cooperative Marketing Associations, pursuant to Code, Article 23, section 356.
(6) Electric Cooperatives, pursuant to Code, Article 23, sections 379-411, and par-
ticularly section 382.
(7) Fraternal Beneficial Associations, pursuant to Code, Article 48A, sections 271-
308, and particularly section 289.
274. The change in language in this rule is consistent with the definitional change in MD.
R.P. 1-202(k) from "person under disability" to "individual under disability."
275. See Minutes, Mar. 2-3, 1979, at 19 ("Mr. Lombardi suggested that the addition after
the word 'guardian' of the words 'or other like fiduciary,' and deletion of the word 'commit-
tee,' which Mr. Brault pointed out is used in the Federal rule."). FED. R. Civ. P. 17 (c),
however, uses all three of these terms, as well as the term "conservator."
276. Proposed Rule 2-202(b) reporter's note.
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one year, a change from the previous six-month limitation.27 7 The
Committee felt that six months was not long enough, and apparently
chose the one-year time period because it is consistent with the limita-
tions periods for libel and slander and actions under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. 278 As under Former Rule 205 c, after the one-year period
has expired, the suit may be filed by any person interested in the minor.
The new rule eliminates the requirement that notice be mailed to the
custodial parent by registered mail; apparently, notice may be by regu-
lar mail.
Section (c) simplifies Former Rule 205 e and continues its require-
ment that the guardian or other fiduciary defend an action against the
individual under disability. The section modifies the former rule by re-
quiring the court to appoint an attorney for an unrepresented individ-
ual under disability. Thus, the new rule is mandatory rather than
permissive.2 79
Rule 2-211-RequiredJoinder of Partz's
Rule 2-211 follows, with very few changes, Federal Rule 19280 and
directs when a particular person must be joined in an action. No former
Maryland rule addressed the standards governing the necessary joinder
of parties, although Former Rule 323 a 8 provided for dismissal for
"want of necessary parties. ' ' 28 ' The determination of who is a necessary
party has so far been left to case law. The Court of Appeals of Mary-
land has held that all persons interested in the subject matter of a suit
are necessary parties, and therefore must be made parties to it.2 8 2
277. Id.
278. Minutes, Mar. 2-3, 1979, at 19, 22 ("Judge Proctor's suggestion that it be extended to
18 months was countered by Judge McAuliffe's suggested compromise of 12 months, that
time frame being consistent with limitations on actions for libel and slander, and under the
Uniform Commercial Code, etc."). See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-105 (1984)
(stating the "[a]n action for assault, battery, libel, or slander shall be filed within one year
from the date it accrues"); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-725 (1983) (stating that a breach
of contract action must be filed within four years from the date of its accrual, but the parties
may agree to reduce the period to not less than one year).
279. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c), which contains a mandatory provision for appointment
of a guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise represented in an
action.
280. Minutes, Mar. 2-3, 1979, p. 23.
281. See also Former Md. R.P. 282 (providing a remedy where a party plaintiff or defend-
ant was omitted in an action in equity).
282. See, e.g., Newark Trust Co. v. Talbot Bank, 217 Md. 141, 147, 141 A.2d 516, 519
(1957); Martin v. Carl, 213 Md. 564, 568, 132 A.2d 601, 603 (1956); Bachrach v. Washington
United Coop., 181 Md. 315, 318, 29 A.2d 822,824 (1942); Munnikhuysen v. Magran, 57 Md.
172, 187 (1881). Likewise, the Court of Appeals has found any person having an interest in a
declaration to be a necessary party pursuant to the Declaratory Judgments Act, MD. ANN.
CODE art. 31A, § 11 (1957). See Bender v. Secretary, Md. Dep't of Personnel, 290 Md. 345,
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The Committee was uncertain about the extent of the changes ef-
fected by the new rule.2 3 Some members argued that introducing the
concept of an involuntary plaintiff would change existing Maryland
law.28 4 Others noted that the concept is equitable in nature, and thus
part of Maryland common law. 2 5 Despite that uncertainty, the effect
on Maryland practice should be minimal because, in response to con-
cerns of the Court of Appeals, the phrase "except as otherwise provided
by law" was inserted at the beginning of the rule.286 The intent of this
addition was to ensure that current case law would not be abrogated. 8 7
The primary difference between the new rule and prior law is that Rule
2-211 provides specific requirements as to who must be joined, and de-
scribes the factors for the court to consider in determining the outcome
if joinder cannot be effected.
Rule 2-211 (a) defines those persons who are necessary to an action
as those whose absence will prevent complete relief to the parties, may
impair the absent person's ability to protect a related claimed interest,
or may subject the parties to a substantial risk of multiple or inconsis-
tent obligations. Adapted from Federal Rule 19(a), the section directs
the court to order such persons to be made a party to the action. Sec-
tion (b) follows Federal Rule 19(c) and requires a party to state in his
pleading the name of any person meeting the above criteria who has not
been joined and the reasons why.
Rule 2-211(c) is derived from Federal Rule 19(b) and permits the
court to decide whether to dismiss an action when a person meeting the
criteria of section (a) cannot be joined. The section lists four factors to
be considered in making this decision: (1) the extent to which a judg-
ment in the person's absence might prejudice that person or those al-
ready parties; (2) the extent to which prejudice can be lessened or
avoided by protective measures; (3) whether a judgment in the person's
absence would be adequate; and (4) whether the plaintiff will have an
adequate remedy if the action is dismissed. Those same factors are listed
350, 430 A.2d 66, 69 (1981) ("Any person who, as a result of a declaration, may gain or be
deprived of a legal right or other benefit has an interest that might be affected by the outcome
of the action and is, therefore, a necessary party."). See also Williams v. Moore, 215 Md. 181,
185, 137 A.2d 193, 196 (1957); Reddick v. State, 213 Md. 18, 29, 130 A.2d 762, 767 (1957);
United Slate Workers v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 185 Md. 32, 36, 42 A.2d 913, 914-15
(1945); Saunders v. Roland Park Co., 174 Md. 188, 193, 198 A. 269, 270-71 (1938).
283. See Minutes, Mar. 2-3, 1979, at 24.
284. Comments of Mr. Brault, id.
285. Comments of Mr. Herrmann, id.
286. Letter from the Hon. John F. McAuliffe, Chairman of the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure, to the judges of the Court of Appeals of Maryland (Aug. 1,
1983) [hereinafter cited as McAuliffe letter (Aug. 1, 1983)].
287. Id.
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in Federal Rule 19(b) for determining whether the person is "indispen-
sible," but the Committee chose to omit that term in the new rule in
order to reduce confusion.2"8 In making the change, however, the Com-
mittee did not intend to vary the substantive meaning from that in the
federal rule."8 9 Therefore, case law interpreting the federal rule should
be persuasive evidence when interpreting Rule 2-211(c). Section (d)
clarifies, as does Federal Rule 19(d), that the required joinder provisions
are subject to the rule governing class actions.2 9
Rule 2-212-Permss've Jo'nder of Parties
Rule 2-212 incorporates Federal Rule 20 almost verbatim, and
therefore follows the federal concept of permissive joinder, which is
more restrictive than prior Maryland practice. Under Former Rule 313
d, parties could be joined when either: (1) a substantial question of law
or fact was common to another claim,2 9' or (2) joinder was "conve-
nient. ' '292 In addition to deleting the provision allowing joinder when-
ever it would be convenient, the new rule requires that there be a
common question of law or fact and that the action be based on the
same transaction or occurrence. 29 The requirement that the claim or
defense arise out of the same transaction or occurrence is new to Mary-
land practice. Consistent with Federal Rule 20, the new rule requires
both of the stated requirements to be met, i.e., joinder of parties will be
denied if the right to relief did not arise from the same transaction or
occurrence, even if common questions of law or fact exist.2 94 Although
"transaction or occurrence" is not defined in the rules, the federal re-
quirement has been interpreted as including all logically related events
entitling a person to institute legal action against another.2 95
Section (b) adopts Federal Rule 20(b) almost verbatim and autho-
rizes the court to order separate trials or make other orders to prevent a
288. Minutes, May 11-12, 1979, at 9-10.
289. Id. at 10.
290. For a discussion of MD. R.P. 2-231 see infra notes 401-15 and accompanying text.
291. See C. BROWN, supra note 4, at 67 n.18 ("The Rules are unclear as to whether the
common question runs through all claims or just through two or more. Rule 313 d 1 seems to
require commonality with respect to all claims, but Rules 313 d 2 and 313 d 3 seem to negate
that requirement.').
292. See The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., 243 Md. 280,
288, 220 A.2d 598,602 (1966); Martin v. Carl, 213 Md. 564, 568, 132 A.2d 601, 603 (1956); C.
BROWN, supra note 4, at 67; Minutes, May 11-12, 1979, at 9.
293. MD. R.P. 2-212 (a).
294. See, e.g., Music Merchants, Inc. v. Capital Records, Inc., 20 F.R.D. 462, 465 (E.D.N.Y.
1957); 3A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 38, 20.06, at 20-39 & n.6.
295. See Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1974); 7 C.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1653, at 270 (1972).
[VOL. 43:669
MARYLAND RULES
party from being embarrassed, delayed, or put to added expense. Thus,
although Rule 2-212 does not permit parties to be joined merely because
it is convenient, section (b) makes convenience an important considera-
tion when determining whether to order separate trials or to grant other
relief when two parties do not assert any claims against each other.
Rule 2-213-Misjoinder and Nonjoinder of Parties
Rule 2-213 is similar to Federal Rule 21 and governs violations of
either the required or permissive joinder rules. The new rule is consis-
tent with Former Rule 283 f, under which it was not necessary to dismiss
an action in equity for misjoinder. Under the new rule, misjoinder is not
a ground for dismissal of the action. Instead, the misjoined party may
be dropped at any stage of the proceeding, and a misjoined claim may
be severed and proceeded with separately.2 9 6 Furthermore, a nonjoined
party may be added at any time. Although stated in neither the federal
nor the Maryland rules, nonjoinder is also not a ground for dismissal
unless joinder of a necessary party is not possible. 297 Although the text
of the new rule is silent as to what constitutes misjoinder and nonjoin-
der, misjoinder results when the parties fail to satisfy the conditions of
permissive joinder, and nonjoinder arises when a necessary party, as de-
fined in the required joinder provisions, is not joined.2 8
Rule 2-214-Intervention
Although Former Rule 208 and Federal Rule 24 are similar in con-
tent, new Rule 2-214 adopts much of the federal, rather than the state,
wording.299 The Committee intended the new rule "firmly [to] imbed"
in Maryland intervention jurisprudence the Court of Appeals' consistent
practice of interpreting the Maryland rule in light of federal case law
applying Federal Rule 24." Section (a) follows the language of Federal
Rule 24(a) and does not significantly alter the former rule's requirement
296. See, e.g., Sabolsky v. Budzanoski, 457 F.2d 1245, 1249 (3d Cir. 1972).
297. See Teamsters Local Union No. 116 v. Fargo-Moorhead Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 620 F.2d
204, 205-06 (8th Cir. 1980); 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 38, 21.04.
298. See T. COYNE, RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS 253 (1982).
299. Comments of Mr. Brault, Minutes, May 11-12, 1979, at 11.
300. Id. at 12. See, e.g., Maryland Radiological Soc'y v. Health Services Cost Review
Comm'n, 285 Md. 383, 388 n.5, 402 A.2d 907, 910 n.5 (1979) ("In the absence of Maryland
authority, the similarity of Maryland Rule 208 and Federal Rule 24 makes the decisions of
the federal courts interpreting their rule of considerable precedential value in construing our
rule."); Montgomery County v. Ian Corp., 282 Md. 459, 463, 385 A.2d 80, 82 (1978) ("Mary-
land Rule 208 was derived from Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 as it formerly appeared. Since there are
no relevant Maryland cases on the subject, we examine what has been said relative to the
federal rule."); Citizens Coordinating Comm. on Friendship Heights, Inc. v. TKU Assocs.,
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that a party have an interest protectable solely by intervention. °
Section (b) is almost identical to Former Rule 208 b, but adds sub-
section (b)(3) from Federal Rule 24 to further coordinate the Maryland
rule with federal practice.302 That subsection requires the court, in de-
ciding whether to grant permissive intervention, to consider "whether
the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties." Section (c) largely reflects former practice
under Former Rule 208 c, but opts for much more of the federal lan-
guage. The rule now specifically requires that the motion for interven-
tion state the grounds and be accompanied by a copy of the proposed
pleading. The Committee minutes note that this is presently done, even
though not required by the rule.
313
Rule 2-221-Interpleader
Rule 2-221 incorporates aspects of both the federal and Maryland
Rules, and in addition adds several new provisions. Although Former
Rule BU70 was identical to Federal Rule 22(1), the Committee felt that
the rule needed to be restyled. 30 4 As adopted, section (a) essentially fol-
lows the former rule, but with some additions. First, the rule now re-
quires that a complaint for interpleader specify the nature and value of
the property. Second, the Court of Appeals was concerned that the rule
could be interpreted to preclude the deposit of property into court or the
granting of ancillary relief before the order of interpleader is entered.0 5
In response, the Committee added a provision that permits, but does not
require, the claimant to pay or tender the property into court or to re-
quest ancillary relief.306 Some Committee members expressed concern
that the rule does not contain a definition of "interpleader" or "in the
nature of interpleader. ' 3 7 One member indicated that the Style Sub-
committee was aware of this, but chose to follow the form of Federal
Rule 22, which uses the terms without defining them. 8
276 Md. 705, 712, 351 A.2d 133, 138 (1976) ("The federal cases defining Rule 24, therefore,
continue to serve as a guide to our interpretration of Rule 208 a.").
301. See Citizens Coordinating Comm., 276 Md. at 712, 351 A.2d at 138 (The requirement for
an applicant to intervene "is that he have an interest for the protection of which intervention
is essential and which is not otherwise protected.").
302. SeeComments of Mr. (nowJudge) Rodowsky, Minutes, May 11-12, 1979, at 12 ("Mr.
Rodowsky felt that the present Maryland language would be preferable, but he would add
the last sentence of Federal Rule 24(b) so as to keep out the 'kibitzer.' ").
303. See Comments of Mr. Brault, id. at 13.
304. See Minutes, May 11-12, 1979, at 14.
305. McAuliffe letter (Aug. 1, 1983), supra note 286.
306. Id.
307. See Comments of Mr. Ryan and Dean Kelly, Minutes, Mar. 7-8, 1980, at 32.
308. See Comments of Mr. Niemeyer, id. One commentator defines impleader as "an equi-
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Section (b) is derived from Former Rule BU72 and addresses the
possibilities available to the court when a complaint for interpleader has
been brought. The section clarifies the former rule's provision that de-
fendants have "an opportunity to answer and contest" the inter-
pleader;30 9 under the new rule the defendants must have an opportunity
to answer, after which the court must schedule a hearing to determine
whether interpleader is appropriate. In addition to permitting the court
to issue any of the orders allowed under Former Rule BU72 b, the new
rule is enlarged to allow for dismissal of the action. Because a court
frequently will realign the parties in an interpleader order, the Commit-
tee sought to clarify the terminology of subsection (b) (3) by inserting the
parenthetical after "original plaintiff.
31 0
The Committee was concerned that, because interpleader is an eq-
uity action, the right to a jury trial might disappear unless expressly
provided for.31 ' Accordingly, section (c) follows the former rule and
makes clear that interpleader does not abridge any preexisting right to a
jury trial on an underlying action. As before, the demand for a jury trial
must be made within fifteen days after the entry of the order of inter-
pleader. Unlike before, the new rule allows the court to modify the time
for demand and the rule deletes the provisions relating to post-demand
procedure.3 1 2
Section (d) changes prior practice. The former rule set a fifteen-
day limit after entry of an interpleader decree within which the plaintiff
was required to file an original pleading, "unless otherwise ordered by
the court." The new rule simply provides that the plaintiff's complaint
shall be filed "[w]ithin the time specified in the order of interpleader. ' 3 13
Section (d) also clarifies that the action is then to proceed as any other
action.
Rule 2-231-Class Actions
Derived from Federal Rule 23, the new Maryland rule governing
table device whereby a person faced with the possibility of conflicting claims of liability or
ownership asserted by two or more potential plaintiffs can secure a declaration as to his liabil-
ity, or as to the rightful ownership of property held by him." J. MOORE, FEDERAL CIVIL
RULES PAMPHLET 198 (1982).
309. See Former Md. R.P. BU72 a.
310. See Minutes, Mar. 7-8, 1980, at 31.
311. Comments of Mr. Sykes, Minutes, May 11-12, 1979, at 15.
312. Proposed Rule 2-221(c) reporter's note. See Former Md. R.P. BU73, stating that
when a jury trial is requested, the court shall either transfer the action to a law court or order
the asserted claim tried separately in a law court.
313. See Proposed Rule 2-221 (d) reporter's note ("This section is derived from Rule BU74,
amended to provide that timing of the complaint will always be as ordered by court, in lieu of
the current 15 days unless otherwise ordered by court.").
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class actions provides much more guidance in its application than the
former rule. In drafting the rule, the Committee sought to: (1) retain a
general class action rule that avoids "political" issues, such as attorneys'
fees and notice requirements; (2) add a certification process; (3) avoid
the jurisdictional issues raised by the Court of Appeals' holding in Pol-
lokoffv. May/and National Ban ,3 14 and (4) retain the distinction between
"of right" and "discretionary" class actions.315 The resulting rule fol-
lows Federal Rule 23 almost entirely, and therefore to a large extent will
follow federal case law.
Former Rule 209 was structurally simple, and in section (a) stated
that a class action could be maintained only if the action met four re-
quirements: (1) there was a common question of law or fact; (2) the
group was so numerous as to make joinder impracticable; (3) one or
more claims or defenses of the class leaders were representative of the
group; and (4) the class leaders were able fairly and adequately to pro-
tect the interests of all of the members of the group. Those four require-
ments are continued in Rule 2-231(a), which is derived from Federal
Rule 23(a). But although those were the only requirements for allowing
a class action under Former Rule 209, under the new rule those are
necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for certification. Section (a),
therefore, follows the federal rule by referring to them as "Prerequisites
to a Class Action."
The additional factors for determining when a class action can be
maintained are prescribed in Rule 2-231 (b), which is derived from Fed-
eral Rule 23(b). For an action to be maintained as a class action, the
prerequisites of section (a) must be met and the action must fall into one
of three categories. A class action is maintainable: (1) when prosecution
of separate actions would create a risk of inconsistent, varying, or preju-
dicial adjudications; (2) where injunctive or declaratory relief is appro-
priate with respect to the class as a whole; or (3) where common
questions of law or fact predominate over individual questions and a
class action is superior to other methods of adjudication.
As initially drafted, the first two categories of section (b) were la-
beled class actions "of right" and the third as "permissive" class ac-
tions.36 This resulted from the Committee's attempt to retain the
314. 288 Md. 485, 418 A.2d 1201 (1980). In Pollokoj& the Court of Appeals of Maryland
refused to allow class action plaintiffs to aggregate their claims to meet the $2500 jurisdic-
tional amount necessary to bring an action in circuit court. For a complete discussion of the
case, see Recent Decision, Pollokoff v. Maryland National Bank-Multiple Planifl May Not
Aggregate Their Claims to Meet theJurisdzctional Amount, 41 MD. L. REv. 464 (1982).
315. Comments of the Reporter, Minutes, Jan. 9, 1981, at 12-13.
316. See Minutes, Jan. 9, 1981, at 11, 13.
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distinction in Former Rule 209 b between "of right" and "discretion-
ary" class actions. 3 7 But the Committee decided to drop those headings
because federal case law does not agree with the distinction. Therefore,
the Committee reasoned, their inclusion would cause confusion in inter-
pretation of the new rule.318 Furthermore, the language of the rule con-
tains sufficient latitude so that even those class actions maintainable as
of right would allow the judge a certain amount of discretion. 3 ' 9 By
omitting the distinction, the new rule will give courts the benefit of the
extensive case law that has developed regarding the federal rule.
Rule 2-231(c) is derived from Federal Rule 23(c)(1) and provides
that "the court shall determine by order as soon as practicable after
commencement of the action whether it is to be maintained as a class
action." Like the federal rule, the new rule allows for flexibility-an or-
der "may be conditional 3 20 and "may be altered or amended before the
decision on the merits."'3 2 ' Section (c) is the only section in which the
Committee added to the federal requirements. First, the section pro-
vides that certification may be initiated either by the court or by any
party. 2  More significantly, the section differs from the federal rule by
providing for a hearing if requested by any party, apparently for the
purpose of arguing whether the action should be maintained as a class
317. Id. at 13; see also Former Md. R.P. 209 b (providing that a court could not refuse to
permit a class action "where a class action is maintained of right."). In reality, this exception
removes very little from the court's discretion. It is the court that has the duty to determine
whether a class action may be maintained as of right. For example, Former Md. R.P. 209
cross-referenced the MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 14-110 (1981) (resale or mortgage of
property subject to remainder vested in infants or unborn persons) and Former Md. R.P.
W73 b (providing that foreclosure of a power of sale or assent to a decree shall not be permit-
ted except with the concurrence of the record holders of not less than 25% of the mortgage
debt) as instances where a class action may be maintained of right. Neither the statute nor
the rule, however, provided for a class action to be so maintained. While most parties seeking
class action status will therefore begin their cases by arguing that the action is of right, courts
have the discretion to decide to the contrary. See, e.g., Johnson v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 26
Md. App. 122, 125-26, 337 A.2d 210, 212-13 (1975) (no right to maintain class action).
318. See Minutes, Jan. 9, 1981, at 14-15.
319. Comments of the Reporter, i. at 15.
320. See, e.g., Phillips v. Joint Legislative Comm. on Performance and Expenditure Review
of the State of Miss., 637 F.2d 1014, 1023 n.14 (5th Cir. 1981) (court can make certification
contingent on replacement of counsel); Cullen v. New York State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 435 F.
Supp. 546, 564 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (conditioning certification on the appointment of additional
counsel).
321. See, e.g.,Johnson v. Shreveport Garment Co., 422 F. Supp. 526, 530 (W.D. La. 1976),
aft', 577 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating that FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) empowers a court to
alter certification prior to a decision on the merits); Walsh v. City of Detroit, 412 F.2d 226,
227 (6th Cir. 1969) ("Even without this Rule, the District Court had the power and authority
to reconsider any of its orders entered during pendency of the case, which orders had not
become final."); see also 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 38, 23.04, at 23-113.
322. See Comments of Mr. Sykes, Minutes, Jan. 9, 1981, at 16-17.
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action.32 3 Finally, the rule borrows from the Uniform Class Actions Act
by requiring the court, in its order determining whether to certify the
action as a class action, to include its findings and the reasons for its
decision.3 24 The provisions for a hearing and explanation should help to
further clarify and define the class action proceeding, and to provide a
more complete record from which to appeal the determination. As long
as the parties do not use these provisions in a dilatory manner or in some
other way designed to obstruct the proceedings, they are welcome addi-
tions to the class action rule.
Sections (d) and (e) are based on the federal rule. Section (d)
adopts Federal Rule 23(c)(4)325 and permits the court to allow a class
action with respect to a particular issue or to divide a class into sub-
classes. Section (e) is derived from Federal Rule 23(c)(2) and provides
for notice to the members of a class. In addition to granting the court
discretionary power to order notice in any class action, the rule provides
a mandatory provision for notice in (b)(3) class actions. The notice is to
inform members that they have an absolute right to opt out of the class
action if they so desire; that the judgment, whether favorable to the class
or not, will bind all members who have not opted out; and that mem-
bers who remain in the class may still enter an appearance through
counsel. The provision is consistent with the federal rule and recognizes
that (b)(3) class actions must balance the economy of a class action
against the desire of individuals to pursue their own claims.
3 26
Section (e) differs from the federal rule by omitting the federal pro-
vision that "the court shall direct to the members of the class the best
notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice
to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. ' 32 7 The
change resulted from the Committee's decision to avoid "political" is-
sues such as notice.3 28 The rule leaves the type of notice to the judge's
discretion and assumes that his order will comport with constitutional
requisites.3 2 9
Section (f) adopts Federal Rule 23(d) and provides the court with
323. Id. at 17. Compare the provision in MD. R.P. 2-231(c) with UNIF. CLASS ACTIONS ACT
§ 2(a), 12 U.L.A. 23 (Supp. 1984) (requiring the court to hold a hearing to determine whether
or not an action is to be maintained as a class action).
324. SeeComments of Mr. Nilson, Minutes, Jan. 9, 1981, at 18. Compare the requirement in
Mo. R.P. 2-231(c) with UNIF. CLASS ACTIONS ACT § 4(b), 12 U.L.A. 25 (Supp. 1984) (requir-
ing a court certifying or refusing to certify a class action to state its reasons and its finding on
the facts).
325. See also UNIF. CLASS ACTIONS ACT § 2(c), 12 U.L.A. 23 (Supp. 1984).
326. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), (c)(2) advisory committee note.
327. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
328. Comments of the Reporter, Minutes, Jan. 9, 1981, at 22.
329. Comments of the Chairman, i.
[VOL. 43:669
MARYLAND RULES
broad powers to fashion appropriate orders in the conduct of class ac-
tions. The section is the analog to Former Rule 209 c, but while the
former rule specifically described only one type of order that the court
could issue, i.e., an order requiring notice to protect the members of a
class, the new rule describes a total of five. The court may make orders:
"(1) determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to
prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evi-
dence;" (2) providing for notice to class members for their protection,
advising them of the course of the proceedings or explaining how they
might participate in the action; (3) imposing conditions on the represen-
tative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be
amended to eliminate allegations as to representation of absent persons,
and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar proce-
dural matters.
Section (g) contains provisions not found in either the federal or
former Maryland rule, and is derived from the Uniform Class Actions
Act.33 ° As originally drafted, this provision limited discovery solely to
representative parties.33 But the Committee unanimously amended the
draft to give a court the discretion to permit, upon motion, discovery by
or against other members of the class.332 The amendment corresponds
with federal practice, in which courts have denied discovery on absent
class members without a demonstration of necessity.
333
In section (h) the Committee adopted the full language of Federal
Rule 23(e), despite their desire to avoid notice issues.33 4 As under For-
mer Rule 209 d, the new rule prohibits dismissal or compromise of a
330. Comments of the Reporter, id at 24.
331. See Minutes, Jan. 9, 1981, at 12, for an earlier draft of this provision. This earlier
draft is identical to the first sentence of the UNIF. CLAss ACTIONs ACT § 10(a), 12 U.L.A. 28
(Supp. 1984), which reads: "Discovery under [applicable discovery rules] may be used only on
order of the court against a member of the class who is not a representative party or who has
not appeared." The Committee decided to reword this provision because they felt that it was
unclear. Minutes, Jan. 9, 1981, at 24.
332. Minutes, Jan. 9, 1981, at 24.
333. See, e.g., Clark v. Universal Builders, 501 F.2d 324, 341 (7th Cir. 1974) (party seeking
deposition of absent class member must show necessity and absence of motive to take advan-
tage); Enterprise Wall Paper Mfg. Co. v. Bodman, 85 F.R.D. 325, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)(dis-
covery denied for absent class members); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 83 F.R.D.
260, 264 (D. I11. 1979) (named plaintiffs are always parties to discovery while absent class
members are not subject to discovery except under special circumstances); United States v.
Trucking Employers Inc., 72 F.R.D. 101, 104-05 (D.D.C. 1976) (interrogation of absent class
members are permitted, but the party must demonstrate a need for discovery and no purpose
or effect of harassment); Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532, 534 (N.D. Ga. 1972)
(absent class members are not parties for discovery purposes under FED. R. Civ. P. 33 and
34).
334. See supra note 328.
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class action without court approval. The new rule goes further, how-
ever, by following the federal rule's requirement of notice of the dismis-
sal or compromise "to all members of the class in the manner the court
directs. '3 3
5
Section (i) incorporates Federal Rule 23(c)(3), and essentially re-
quires the court to specify the scope of the judgment rendered in a class
action proceeding. For (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions, the judgment-
whether favorable or not-"shall include and describe those whom the
court finds to be members of the class." The requirement for a (b)(3)
action is the same, except that the court must also specify those to whom
the notice of subsection (e)(1) was directed and who have not requested
exclusion, and whom the court finds to be class members.
Rule 2-241--Substitution of Parties
Rule 2-241 is based on Former Rules 220 and 222 as well as Federal
Rule 25 (Substitution of Parties). The former Maryland rules governing
substitution of parties were a combination of substantive law and proce-
dural rules. 336 The Committee noted that there have been many proce-
dural problems with the rules as formerly written. 337 The new rule is
consistent with the former rules, but eliminates all references to substan-
tive law and adds several provisions from the federal rule.33 8
Section (a) outlines the coverage of the rule. The section sets forth
five situations, derived from Former Rules 220 and 222 and Federal
Rule 25, in which substitution may occur. Substitution is permitted for
a party who: "(1) dies, if the action survives;33 9 (2) becomes incompe-
tent;340 (3) either voluntarily or involuntarily transfers an interest in the
action;34 1 or (4) if a corporation, dissolves, forfeits its charter, merges or
consolidates;3 42 or (5) if a public officer ceases to hold office." ' 3 4 3
Section (b) incorporates the procedural requirements for substitu-
tion formerly located in Former Rule 220 c, d, and e. The section lists
335. See 3B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 38, 23.80, at 23-513 ("The manner
of giving notice is committed to the sound discretion of the court. The function of the notice
is to describe the settlement.").
336. See Former Md. R.P. 220, 222 & 225.
337. See Minutes, May 11-12, 1979, at 15.
338. Id at 15-16.
339. See Former Md. R.P. 220; FED. R. Civ. P. 25(a).
340. See FED. R. Civ. P. 25(b).
341. See FED. R. Civ. P. 25(c). The phrase "whether voluntarily or involuntarily" was
added "to clarify that an appropriate trustee, receiver, or assignee may be substituted when a
party's interest in the action is transferred by operation of law." McAuliffe letter (Aug. 3,
1983), supra note 286.
342. See Former Md. R.P. 222.
343. See FED. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
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the persons who may institute a substitution proceeding and applies sec-
tion (b) to substitution under any of the situations of section (a), unlike
Former Rule 220 which applied only when there was the death of a
party. Under the former rule, a successor in interest was afforded the
first opportunity to file a motion to substitute.144 If he failed to do so,
the opposing party could file,34 and only when both of those persons
failed to file could another person affected or the court file. 34 6 The new
rule eliminates the filing preferences and allows any of them to file for
substitution. 34 7  The Committee noted that the former rule was in-
tended to allow only the personal representative to be the substitute
party where death required substitution, and that they intended that
practice to continue under the new rule.348
The section also replaces the former requirement of a motion with a
notice requirement. The rule provides for the contents and service of
the notice. With respect to service, the Committee addressed two con-
cerns. First, notice of the substitution must be served on all parties,
thereby giving them an opportunity to object. 349 Second, to satisfy due
process, the new rule continues to subject the substituted party to service
on original process, unless the substituted party has already submitted
to the court's jurisdiction.35 °
Section (c) is new and provides that a motion to strike the substitu-
tion may be filed within fifteen days after service of the notice51 When
substitution is not made, the court, pursuant to section (d), may dismiss
the action, continue the trial or hearing, or take any other action as
justice requires. The time factor was the biggest issue faced by the Com-
mittee when considering this rule.3 52 Former Rule 220 f provided for
dismissal if no substitution was made within one year from service of the
order for substitution. Federal Rule 25 requires dismissal unless a mo-
tion for substitution is filed within ninety days after the death of the
party is suggested on the record. Even the loose structuring of the time
requirement under Federal Rule 25, however, has been criticized as
344. See Former Md. R.P. 220 c.
345. See id. d.
346. See id. e.
347. See Proposed Rule 2-241(b) reporter's note ("This section is derived from Rule 220 c,
d and e relative to persons who may institute a substitution procedure, amended by deletion
of the first-right-to-file preference currently afforded.").
348. See Comments of the Chairman and Judge Proctor, Minutes, May 11-12, 1979, at 16.
349. See Comments of the Chairman and Mr. Niemeyer, id. at 17.
350. See Comments of Judge McAuliffe, i.
351. See Minutes, June 23, 1979, at 26. This section was taken from the prior amendment
procedure. Id.
352. Comments of Mr. Brault, id at 23.
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being "subject to an over technical interpretation. '353 The Committee
wisely decided to omit any time requirement and allowed dismissals to
be within the total discretion of the court.
C Chapter 300-PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
Rule 2-301-Form of Action
Derived from Federal Rule 2,354 Rule 2-301 abolishes the distinc-
tions between pleading a case at law or in equity. 35 5 In place of techni-
cal forms of action, the new rule creates "one uniform method of
pleading, with an emphasis on fact pleading,3 56 applicable in all civil
actions." '35 7 As in the Federal Rules, Rule 2-301 encourages "the resolu-
tion in one proceeding of as many claims as a party may have"; 35 8 thus,
a litigant should "seek in one action all appropriate relief, both legal
and equitable, to which he is entitled.
'359
In drafting Rule 2-301, the Committee was careful to note that the
substantive and procedural differences between law and equity remain
unchanged;360 the only changes are in pleading. For instance, the rule
353. See 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 38, 1 25.06[3].
354. MD. R.P. 2-301 source note. FED. R. Civ. P. 2 provides: "There shall be one form of
action to be known as a civil action." MD. R.P. 2-301 is virtually a verbatim incorporation of
the federal rule. As in the federal rules, it should be noted that "[w]hat was intended was the
removal of the distinctions in pleading" only. Minutes, Mar. 7-8, 1980, at 33.
355. Comments of Mr. Brault, Minutes, May 11-12, 1979, at 18; cf Bradley v. United
States, 214 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir. 1954).
The federal rules of civil procedure abolished all distinctions as to form between
actions at law and suits in equity, but they did not abolish the difference in sub-
stance between legal and equitable remedies. There is no longer a law side and an
equity side of the federal court, but said rules did not limit or extend the jurisdiction
of the United States. They still have and exercise jurisdiction in actions at law and
suits in equity. The substantial difference between law and equity, and between
legal and equitable remedies, still exists.
Id See generaly C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 68 (4th ed. 1983) (describing
the successful experience of the creation of the single form of action in the federal courts).
356. The Committee noted that MD. R.P. 2-301 is derived from FED. R. Civ. P. 2. See
MD. R.P. 2-301 source note. But in the sense that the rule places an "emphasis on fact plead-
ing," it also resembles pleading under the code system. See 'nfra note 368.
357. McAuliffe letter (Aug. 1, 1983), supra note 286 (providing comments and explanations
to the proposed revision). It is important to note that, in creating a single form of action, MD.
R.P. 2-301 abolishes all special pleadings. For instance, there will no longer be an assumpsit
action, as provided for in Former Md. R.P. 340, for a cause of action arising ex contractu.
358. Herndon & Higginbotham, Pleading and Motion Practice in Federal Court, in I ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY: CIVIL PRACTICE AND LITIGATION IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 223
(1983).
359. Id.
360. Minutes, Mar. 7-8, 1980, at 33. The Committee rejected the Style Subcommittee's
proposal which read: "[a]ll procedural distinctions between Law and Equity are abolished"
because it would be unclear which distinctions were merely "procedural." Id at 32-33. See
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neither expands nor contracts the right to a jury trial for the resolution
of legal claims, 36 ' and equitable relief remains available when there is
no adequate remedy at law. As such, the new "civil action" eliminates
forms of action, reduces the importance of the term "cause of action,"
and allows a party to seek both legal and equitable relief. Presumably,
the federal practice of trying a legal claim before a jury prior to a
judge's disposition of an equitable claim3 62 (unless, of course, the right
to a jury trial has been waived) will be followed in Maryland courts.
Rule 2-302-Pleadings Allowed
As in Federal Rule 7(a), Rule 2-302 places all allowable pleadings
in a single rule. Basic pleading is limited to a complaint and an answer.
If applicable, a counterclaim, 36 3 cross-claim, or third-party claim is per-
mitted; answers to such claims are mandatory. In addition, a reply to
an answer may be made, but only upon court order.
The rule eliminates all other pleadings left over from the old, com-
mon law pleading practices. 3 ' For instance, a party will no longer be
allowed to file a dilatory plea.36 5 Moreover, the rule follows Federal
Rule 7(c) in abolishing demurrers, pleas, and replications. Thus, these
changes establish but a single manner in which to pursue or respond to a
civil action.3 6
generally Brown, The Law/Equity Dichotomy in M4ayland, 39 MD. L. REv. 427 (1980) (describing
the existing bounds of law and equity jurisdiction, examining principles peculiar to this dual
system, and indicating several trends that undermine the constitutional right to a jury trial).
361. Minutes, Mar. 7-8, 1980, at 33. But see Brown, supra note 360, at 454. The Brown
article posed a serious question that, absent the Committee's careful use of the word "plead-
ing," the rule could have been the source of considerable dispute: "Even after the adoption of
a single form of action, a perplexing question remains: When does the right to a jury trial-
constitutionally protected for all actions traditionally brought at law-exist?" Id.
The Committee, realizing that there were several areas of possible controversy,
"agreed that the intent was not to disturb ...the distinction between law and equity" ex-
cept with respect to pleadings. Minutes, Mar. 7-8, 1980, at 33.
362. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). In Beacon Theatres, the
Court held that while "the same court may try both legal and equitable causes in the same
action . . . only under the most imperative circumstances. . . can the right to a jury trial be
lost through prior determination of equitable claims." 359 U.S. at 508-11. As MD. R.P. 2-
301 is derived from FED. R. Civ. P. 2, the holding in Beacon Theatres should be very persuasive
authority.
363. Unlike FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a), which makes a counterclaim compulsory "if it arises out
of the same transaction or occurrence," MD. R.P. 2-302 provides only for permissive
counterclaims.
364. Comments of Mr. Brault, Minutes, May 11-12, 1979, at 19. For a discussion of the
outmoded pleadings allowed under the former rules, see C. BROWN, supra note 4, §§ 3.90-3.93.
365. See Former Md. R.P. 341; see also C. BROWN, supra note 4, § 3.91, at 115 ("it makes no
sense to file a dilatory plea today").
366. The Committee felt that the rule should help to "simplify practice and .. .curb
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Rule 2-303-Form of Pleadngs
Section (a) of Rule 2-303 requires that averments of claim or de-
fense be separately set forth in numbered paragraphs.36 7 Each para-
graph should be limited to a statement describing a single set of
circumstances. Each cause of action and each separate defense should
be separately set forth and numbered. Under Rule 2-303(b), pleadings
are to be factual yet concise,368 and may not contain argument. A
pleading should,'however, set forth as many facts as are necessary to
state entitlement to relief or grounds for defense. 369
Rule 2-303(c) allows alternative or hypothetical statements of a sin-
gle claim or defense to be set forth in the same count or defense.3 70 As
under the former rules, a pleading is not made insufficient when at least
one of the alternative statements sufficiently sets forth a claim or de-
fense. Consistent with Rule 2-301's elimination of law/equity pleading
distinctions, Rule 2-303(c) allows a party to set forth as many legal and
equitable claims or defenses as the party may have. This practice will
apply even if the alternative claims or defenses are inconsistent with one
another.
Rule 2-304-Pleading Special Matters
As in Federal Rule 9(a), Rule 2-304(a) makes it unnecessary to aver
abuses of procedure intended to delay and frustrate prosecution of actions." Proposed Rule
2-302 reporter's note.
367.
This section differs somewhat from both the existing Maryland Rules and FRCP
10(b) from which it is drawn. Maryland Rule 340 c pertains only to separate num-
bered counts; this section contains the additional requirement that defenses, like
causes of action, be separately set forth and numbered. The requirements that the
averments which collectively constitute a cause of action or defense be set forth in
separate numbered paragraphs is adapted from Rules 370 a I and 372 a 1.
Proposed Rule 2-303(a) reporter's note.
368. See supra note 356 and accompanying text (noting the "emphasis of fact pleading").
There was some debate as to the merits of Rule 2-303's fact pleading requirement: One
member of the Committee stated "that the rule should require a pleader to do his thinking in
advance" and that "he should be required to pigeon-hole his causes of action and plead the
facts." Comment of Judge McAuliffe, Minutes, May 11-12, 1979, at 21. Another member
responded "that to do this would return the old English practice of no writ, no relief." Com-
ment of Mr. Niemeyer, id. Another member "stated that it was only fair to the defendant and
the court to require the plaintiff to inform them as to what the case was about." Comment of
Judge Proctor, id. The present language requirement was then passed by a considerable mar-
gin. Minutes, May 11-12, 1979, at 22.
369. MD. R.P. 2-303(b) is derived from Former Md. R.P. 301 b. Proposed Rule 2-303(b)
reporter's note.
370. Section (c) changes former practice by allowing a party to plead alternative claims.
Under Former Md. R.P. 301 d, only answers could be stated in the alternative.
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a party's capacity or authority to sue or be sued. 3 7 1 Moreover, Rule
2-304(b) follows Federal Rule 9(c) by allowing a party to "aver gener-
ally that all conditions precedent have been performed or have oc-
curred." Unlike the federal rules, however, Rule 2-304(b) does not
require that "[a] denial of performance or occurrence [of a condition
precedent] shall be made specifically and with particularity. '37 2
Rule 2-304(c) parallels Former Rule 301 c's exception to the clear
statement requirement. 373 The Committee rejected the argument that
time, because of statutes of limitations, was always material374 and de-
feated a proposal that time always be averred.3 75
As originally drafted, Rule 2-304 contained a provision which
would have required that certain complex torts be pleaded with particu-
larity instead of by general averment. Members of the Committee criti-
cized this provision, stating that there were many complex torts, other
than those listed in the draft provision, which should be set forth with
particularlity. 376 Under Maryland case law, 3 7 7 the degree of particular-
ity required of a pleading increases as torts climb "up a scale from a
simple tort, to a complex tort, to fraud. 3 7' As a result, the Committee
decided to leave the case law alone, it being felt that there was "little
gain in attempting to codify any of this [common law] rule. '3 79
371. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(a) also contains a provision allowing for a "specific negative aver-
ment" when a party desires to raise the issue of a party's legal existence or authority or capac-
ity to sue or be sued. An earlier draft of Proposed Rule 2-304 included the same provision.
This provision was deleted, however, and a similar provision, derived from Former Md. R.P.
311 a, 342 c 1 and 2, and FED. R. Civ. P. 9(a) was placed in MD. R.P. 2-323(0, which allows
for a negative defense. For a further discussion of MD. R.P. 2-323, see iwfra text accompany-
ing notes 451-90. See generally 2 J. POE, supra note 136, §§ 603-667A (pleas in bar).
372. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 9(c) with Former Md. R.P. 342 c, d and MD. R.P. 2-323.
373. Former Md. R.P. 301 c provides "it shall not be necessary to state time or place in a
pleading except where time or place forms a part of the cause of action or ground of defense."
374. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 9() (stating that "[flor purposes of testing the sufficiency of a
pleading, averments of time and place are material and shall be considered like all other
averments of material matter").
375. Minutes, May 11-12, 1979, at 25-26. See MD. R.P. 2 -32 3 (g)(1 6 ) (listing statute of
limitations as an affirmative defense to be included within an answer).
376. Such torts as malpractice, products liability, and professional liability were not in-
cluded under the provision. "Moreover, section (6) [of the draft provision] only required
malice to be averred generally." Minutes, May 11-12, 1979, at 23.
377. E.g., Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 Md. 282, 252 A.2d 855 (1969). For a
discussion of special pleadings, see C. BROWN, supra note 4, § 3.53, at 100-02.
378. Comments of Mr. Brault, Minutes, May 11-12, 1979, at 24. See Myers, 253 Md. at
292, 252 A.2d at 861; see also Kaiser, Pleading Negligence in Mayland-Res Ipsa Loquitur As a Rule
of Pleadng, 11 MD. L. REV. 102, 104 (1950) ("general averment of negligence following a
simple statement of the defendant's act or omission will be regarded as an ultimate fact; while
in more complex situations where the breach of duty is not readily apparent, such an aver-
ment will be regarded as a mere legal conclusion').
379. Minutes, May 11-12, 1979, at 24.
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The Committee also deleted a provision following Federal Rule
9 (g). That provision required plaintiffs to plead special damages.3 0 By
eliminating the provision, however, the Committee did not mean that
special damages should not be pleaded with specificity. The Committee
simply chose not to codify this area of common law pleading.
3 8
'
Rule 2-305---Claims for Relief
Rule 2-305 requires that any claim "contain a clear statement of
facts." The clear statement requirement is derived from Former Rule
301 c. 382 The requirement of setting forth a demand for relief is derived
from Former Rules 340 a and 370 a 3V83 Consistent with Rule 2-
303(c),38 4 which allows alternative and hypothetical claims and de-
fenses, Rule 2-305 contains a provision clarifying that a demand for al-
ternative relief is allowable. This last provision is derived from Federal
Rule 8(a)(3), 38 5 but unlike the federal rule, which provides the general
rules of pleading for both claims and defenses, Rule 2-305 pertains only
to claims. The pleading requirements for answers are set forth in Rule
2-323.
Rule 2-311-Motions
Rule 2-311 applies to all motions unless otherwise provided. The
rule has two purposes: The first purpose is to consolidate, into a single
filing, the motion (or response), the supporting grounds and authorities,
and the request for a hearing.38 6 The second purpose is to allow the
380. Id. at 26.
381. The Chairman noted that "if the law required these damages to be plead specifically,
we did not require the rule to so state." Id. While the Minutes did not explain exactly what
the Chairman meant by this comment, 8 M.L.E. Damages § 151 (1960), provides an excellent
explanation of the current Maryland case law:
It is well settled that where by reason of a certain wrong or from the breach of a
contract, the law would impute certain damages as the natural, necessary, and logi-
cal consequence of the acts of the defendant, such damages need not be specifically
set forth in a declaration, but are, on a proper averment of such breach or wrong,
recoverable under a claim of damages generally; whereas, on the other hand, special
damages are such as actually result from the wrong done, but which do not neces-
sarily result therefrom, and for that reason are not implied by law, and to be recov-
ered must be specially alleged with particularity to avoid surprise to defendant.
382. Former Md. R.P. 301 c provided: "Any pleading which contains a clear statement of
the facts necessary to constitute a cause of action or ground of defense shall be sufficient
383. Former Md. R.P. 340 a 3 pertained to declarations at law, while Former Md. R.P.
370 a pertained to a bill of complaint in an equity action.
384. See supra note 370 and accompanying text.
385. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3) provides in part: "Relief in the alternative or of several differ-
ent types may be awarded."
386. Comments of Mr. Brault, Minutes, Nov. 16, 1979, at 16. It should be noted that
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court to "dispose of motions without hearings whenever a hearing is not
deemed necessary and the ruling the court determines to be appropriate
is not dispositive of a claim or defense.
38 7
Section (a) requires that an application for an order, unless made at
a hearing or in a trial, be made by written motion setting forth the de-
sired relief. This section does not change Maryland practice, for it is
essentially the same provision found in Former Rule 321 a; as re-drafted,
however, the language corresponds to that found in Federal Rule
7(b)(1). 318
Under section (b), a response must be filed to all but the following
motions: Motion to Shorten or Extend Time (Rule 1-204),389 Motion
for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (Rule 2-532),39 ° Motion for
New Trial (Rule 2-533), 3 1' and Motion to Alter or Amend a Judg-
ment-Court Trial (Rule 2-534).392 The response must be filed no later
than fifteen days after service of the motion or thirty days after service of
the original complaint. 93 Thus, if a party files an original complaint
and a motion for summary judgment 394 at the same time, the party
against whom the motion is directed has thirty days in which to file a
response to the motion. If, however, a party files a motion more than
fifteen days after filing the original complaint or after the opposing
counsel has filed an answer, the party against whom the motion is di-
rected has but fifteen days to file a response to the motion. Although the
rule provides no express sanctions for failure to file a response, "the non-
responding party risks losing the possibility of a hearing on the
while consolidation is a primary objective, a party is free to supplement a motion with a
memorandum incorporated by reference. Comments of Judge McAuliffe and Chairman
Ross, id.
387. McAuliffe letter (Aug. 1, 1983), supra note 286 (clarifying the Committee's intent be-
hind Proposed Rule 2-311).
388. FED. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(l) provides in pertinent part: "An application to the court for
an order shall be by motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be made in
writing, shall state with particularity the grounds therefore, and shall set forth the relief or
order sought." Note that while MD. R.P. 2-311(a) does not mention that grounds for relief
shall be stated with authority, MD. R.P. 2-311 (c) does make this requirement. See infra note
396.
389. See supra notes 44-61 and accompanying text.
390. See in/ta notes 902-12 and accompanying text.
391. See rn/a notes 913-15 and accompanying text.
392. See bn/a notes 916-31 and accompanying text.
393. See MD. R.P. 2-321(a), discussed at in/a note 403 and accompanying text.
394. See MD. R.P. 2-501, dicussedat in/ra notes 704-17 and accompanying text. But see MD.
R.P. 2-321, discussedat in/a notes 401-15 and accompanying text (automatically extending the
time for filing an answer to 15 days after the court's order on a motion filed pursuant to MD.
R.P. 2-322).
1984]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
motion. ""
Section (c) alters Former Rule 319 in two respects: First, it substi-
tutes the word "grounds" for the word "points" in an attempt "to curb
the practice of simply listing cases. '396 In furthering this attempt, sec-
tion (c) follows Federal Rule 7(b)(1) in requiring that grounds in sup-
port of a motion be stated "with particularity." '3 97 Second, the phrase
"shall contain or be accompanied by a statement of points" has been
omitted. This omission furthers the requirement that grounds and au-
thorities be integrated into the motion and response. 398 The obvious
purpose of these changes is to reduce the number of motions, it being the
Committee's "consensus that most motions are frivolous or dilatory in
nature."
399
Section (d) requires motions or responses, when based upon facts
not found in the record or on file in the proceeding, to be supported by
an affidavit. This rule is essentially the same as the exception found in
Former Rule 321 b and does not alter Maryland practice.
Whether the court will hold a hearing on a motion is governed by
sections (e) and (f). Section (e) grants the judge discretion as to whether
a hearing will be held on motions for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, new trial, or to amend the judgment. The court may not, how-
ever, grant such a motion without a hearing." Section (f) is derived
from Former Rule 321 d, but differs from that rule in two respects:
First, a request for a hearing must be contained within the motion or
response. Second, a hearing is mandatory only when a hearing is re-
quested and the ruling upon the motion would be dispositive of a claim
or defense, or when a rule expressly provides for a hearing.
395. Comments of Chairman Ross, Minutes, Nov. 16, 1979, at 17; Proposed Rule 2-311
reporter's note.
396. Proposed Rule 2-311 reporter's note; see Minutes, Oct. 12-13, 1979, at 11-12.
397. For a discussion of FED. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(l), see supra note 388. While there are no
sanctions provided for a party who merely lists points of authority, "Judge McAuliffe stated
that making a hearing discretionary with the judge will certainly upgrade the statement of
grounds and authorities." Comments of Judge McAuliffe, Minutes, Oct. 12-13, 1979, at 13.
398. Proposed Rule 2-311 reporter's note; Minutes, Oct. 12-13, 1979, at 11-12.
399. Minutes, Oct. 12-13, 1979, at 13.
400. See McAuliffe letter (Aug. 1, 1983), supra note 286; text accompanying note 286. Cf
MD. R.P. 2-311 () (the court "may not render a decision on the motion that is dispositive of a
claim or defense without a hearing if one was requested as provided in this section.")
The provisions of Rule 2-311 are designed to foster careful preparation of the mo-
tions and responses that are filed for the court's consideration and to eliminate all
unnecessary hearings. The subcommittee believes these purposes will not be served
if a requested hearing must be granted whenever a motion seeks a ruling that would
be dispositive of a claim or defense; the majority of motions seek such a ruling.
McAuliffe letter (Aug. 1, 1983), supra note 286.
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Rule 2-321-Time for Fihng Answer
Consistent with the mandatory filing requirement of Rule 2-302,"°
Rule 2-321 sets forth the time periods within which defendants must file
their answers to pleadings. Although section (b) is derived from the for-
mer rules and section (c) is derived from both the former Maryland rules
and the federal rules, section (a) "is completely new and is required be-
cause of the policy decision . . . to eliminate return days."
2
Section (a) embodies the "general rule" that the defendant must
file an answer within thirty days of being served.40 3 But to this "general
rule" section (b) provides an exhaustive list of exceptions, and section (c)
provides for the automatic extension of time for filing an answer. Sec-
tion (b) follows the former Maryland rules in many respects and allows
certain defendants to file within sixty or ninety days of being served.
Defendants served outside of Maryland but within the United States
have sixty days to file an answer;404 however, defendants served outside
of the United States have ninety days.4 "5 A defendant served by publi-
cation or posting4 6 must file an answer within the time prescribed in
the notice.4 "7 A corporation served with an original pleading by service
upon a state agency authorized to receive process has sixty days in
which to file an answer.40" If the United States or an officer or agency of
401. MD. R.P. 2-302 provides: "There shall be a complaint and an answer.... There
shall be an answer to any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint."
402. Minutes, Oct. 12-13, 1979, at 16; see Proposed Rule 2-321 reporter's note; Proposed
Rule 2-126 reporter's note. Under Former Rule 102, the "return day" is the first Monday of
each month. Former Rule 307 a I requires a defendant to file an answer to the pleadings
within 15 days of the return day to which the defendant is summoned. See C. BROWN, supra
note 4, § 3.56, at 105. It was the Committee's view that the "return day" was an outmoded
concept. Minutes, Nov. 17, 1978, at 8.
403. MD. R.P. 2-321(a); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a) ("defendant shall serve his answer within
20 days after the service of the summons and complaint").
404. MD. R.P. 2-321(b)(1); cf. Former Md. R.P. 307 c 4, 107 b.
405. MD. R.P. 2-321(b)(5); cf. Former Md. R.P. 307 c 4, 107 b.
406. See MD. R.P. 2-122.
407. MD. R.P. 2-321(b)(2), cf. Former Md. R.P. 307 a 2.
408. MD. R.P. 2-321(b)(3), cf. Former Md. R.P. 307 c (6), 106 e 3, 106 f 1-7. As under the
former rules, a corporation may be served with an original pleading by service upon the State
Department of Assessments and Taxation, and an insurer may be served by service upon the
Insurance Commissioner. Rule 2-124(h) states that the rules do not abrogate statutes author-
izing a different manner of service; however, the rule provides no indication as to which
statutes so apply. Former Md. R.P. 106, however, listed several statutes that authorize cer-
tain agencies to receive process on behalf of certain defendants: MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A,
§ 57 (1957), authorizes the Insurance Commissioner to receive process issued against an in-
surer; MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-802(a)(1) (1975), authorizes the Securities
Commissioner of the Division of Securities to receive process issued against defendants in
actions under the Maryland Securities Act; MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 347 (1957), autho-
rizes the Insurance Commissioner to receive process issued against a fraternal benefit society;
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 202-211 (1957 & Supp. 1983), authorizes the Insurance Coin-
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the United States is served, it has sixty days in which to file an an-
swer.4°9 If any other rule or statute prescribes a different time period,
the answer shall be filed as provided therein.4 1 °
Section (c) is derived from Former Rule 309 a and Federal Rule
12(a).4 '" It automatically extends the time for filing an answer to fifteen
days after entry of the court's order on a motion to dismiss, 4 ,2 motion for
more definite statement,4 13 or a motion to strike.4 14 If the court grants a
motion for a more definite statement, the time for filing an answer is
extended to fifteen days after the service of the more definite statement.
Thus, a party may extend the time for filing an answer by at least fifteen
days by filing a motion pursuant to Rule 2-322. Of course, any party
may, under Rule 1-204, file a motion to shorten or extend the time for
filing an answer for cause shown.4 15
Rule 2-322-reh'm'nary Motons
Fashioned after Federal Rule 12, Rule 2-322 replaces Former Rules
301 j, 317, 323, 342, 345, 346, and 37 1.416 By creating a variety of mo-
tions with which to attack pleadings, the rule modifies Maryland prac-
tice in several respects.
missioner to receive process issued against an unauthorized foreign or alien insurer; and MD.
ANN. CODE art. 56, § 219 (1957), authorizes the Secretary of the Maryland Real Estate Com-
mission to receive process issued against non-resident real estate brokers and salesmen.
409. MD. R.P. 2-321(b)(4); cf Former Md. R.P. 108 d (60 days); FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a) (60
days). Despite the rule's similarity to both the former Maryland and federal rules, some
committee members felt that the United States should be required to answer within 30 days.
See Minutes, Oct. 12-13, 1979, at 17; id., Nov. 16, 1979, at 22.
410. MD. R.P. 2-321(b)(6). This section is new and is consistent with MD. R.P. 2-124(h).
The section was left vague in order to avoid the necessity of amending the rule when addi-
tional statutes are enacted. Comments of Mr. Brault, Oct. 12, 1979, at 18. Cf FED. R. Civ.
P. 4(e) (allowing service in the manner prescribed by statute or court order upon parties not
inhabitants or not found within the forum state). "Judge McAuliffe opined that the excep-
tion for special proceedings or statutes would include such instances as the mechanics lien
rules, and a U.S. statute under the supremacy clause of the constitution." Minutes, Nov. 16,
1979, at 22. See, e.g., MD. R.P. BG73 a (if court determines that there is reasonable ground for
a mechanics lien to attach, it shall pass a show cause order directing the defendant to file a
counter-affidavit or verified answer within the time provided in the order).
411. See Former Md. R.P. 309 a (time for filing answer enlarged "to fifteen days after
compliance with the demand or disposition by the Court of such motion, demurrer or excep-
tion"); FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a) ("if the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until
the trial . . . the responsive pleading shall be served within 10 days after notice of the court's
action;. . . if the court grants a motion for a more definite statement the responsive pleading
shall be served within 10 days after the service of the more definite statement").
412. See MD. R.P. 2-329(a), (b).
413. See id. (d).
414. See id (e).
415. See MD. R.P. 1-204, dk'cussedat supra notes 44-61.
416. See Minutes, Jan. 4, 1980, at 15.
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Section (a) of Rule 2-322 is derived from Former Rule 3234'7 and
requires that the following defenses be raised in a preliminary motion to
dismiss: lack of jurisdiction over the person, improper venue, insuffi-
ciency of process, and insufficiency of service of process. As in the for-
mer rule, failure to raise such a motion results in waiving the defense.48
Unlike the former rule, however, the defenses of plaintiffs lack of legal
capacity, and charitable immunity may not be raised in a preliminary
motion; instead, these defenses are only to be raised in the answer.41 9
Section (b) of Rule 2-322 is also derived, in part, from Former Rule
323.420 Unlike the defenses listed in section (a), section (b) allows the
defenses of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, failure to join a
necessary party, and governmental immunity to be raised either in a
preliminary motion to dismiss, in the answer itself, or "in any other ap-
propriate manner after [the] answer is filed."4 2 '
Another section (b) defense, failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, changes Maryland practice by replacing the de-
murrer of Former Rules 345 and 371.422 Modeled after Federal Rule
12(b)(6), 423 this motion reinforces Rule 2-305's requirement that a
"pleading that sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain a clear
statement of the facts necessary to constitute a cause of action and a
demand for judgment for relief sought. '42 4 As with the other section (b)
defenses, the defense of failure to state a claim may be raised by prelimi-
nary motion, answer, or in any other appropriate manner. As in the
federal rule, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim that presents
matters extraneous to the pleadings will be treated as a motion for sum-
mary judgment under Rule 2-502.425
Section (c) of Rule 2-322 provides that motions raised under sec-
tions (a) and (b) are to be determined prior to trial except that the court
417. See Proposed Rule 2-322(a) reporter's note; Former Md. R.P. 323 a 1-4.
418. See Former Md. R.P. 323 b.
419. The issue of legal capacity is to be raised as a negative defense under MD. R.P. 2-
323(0(2), and charitable immunity is an affirmative defense to be raised under MD. R.P. 2-
323(g)(21). One other defense provided in Former Md. R.P. 323 a, pendancy of another
action between the same parties for the same cause, was apparently dropped without
comment.
420. See Former Md. R.P. 323 a 8-10.
421. MD. R.P. 2-322(b).
422. See Proposed Rule 2-322(b)(2) reporter's note.
423. See id. MD. R.P. 2-322(b)(2) adds a new element to Maryland practice: "the speaking
demurrer." "The speaking demurrer," derived from the federal rule, allows the introduction
of new facts, supported by affidavit, that do not appear on the face of the pleadings but
nonetheless challenge a plaintiff's right to recover. See Minutes, Jan. 4, 1980, at 16-17. Such
motions are treated as motions for summary judgment. Id
424. MD. R.P. 2-305.
425. See Minutes, Jan. 4, 1980, at 16-17.
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may defer the determination of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim until the trial. This section parallels Federal Rule 12(d) except
that the federal rule provides for a preliminary hearing while the new
Maryland rule does not. Because the granting of a motion under section
(a) or (b) would be dispositive of a claim, if a hearing is requested, it
must be granted.4 2 6
Derived from Federal Rule 12(e), section (d) of Rule 2-322 replaces
Former Rule 346's demand for a bill of particulars with a motion for
more definite statement. Because the proposed rule replaces the de-
mand with a motion, court action will now be required;4 27 however, as it
is unlikely that a ruling on such a motion will be dispositive of a claim, a
hearing on the motion will not likely be granted.42 8 If the court grants
such a motion, the pleadings must be corrected within fifteen days un-
less the court fixes a greater time. Failure to do so may result in the
pleading being stricken.
The motion for more definite statement should only be used if a
pleading "is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably
frame an answer."' 429 It is not intended that the motion be used as a
substitute for discovery, 430 and the motion should be considered in con-
junction with the fact that Rule 2-303(b) simply requires a pleading to
"contain only such statements of fact as may be necessary to show the
pleader's entitlement to relief or ground of defense. 4 31 However, if the
motion points out specifically that the pleading "(1) fails to identify the
statute or ordinance allegedly violated . . . , (2) consists of mere conclu-
sions of law . . . , or (3) fails to specify exactly which parties are being
referred to in various parts of a pleading where several plaintiffs or de-
fendants are parties,''432 such a motion should be deemed proper.
Rule 2-322(e) is modeled after Federal Rule 12() and is derived in
426. See supra note 400 and accompanying text.
427. "It was observed that the [Former] Maryland rule avoids any court action, and that
was better than the [new] rule." Minutes, Jan. 4, 1980, at 17. It was noted, however, that in
federal practice the motion for a more definite statement is rarely used. Id.
428. See supra note 400 and accompanying text. Motions are to be disposed of "without
hearings whenever a hearing is not deemed necessary and the ruling the court determines to
be appropriate is not dispositive of a claim or defense."
429. Herndon & Higginbotham, supra note 358, at 317 (discussing FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e)).
430. See id. ("A Rule 12(e) motion is simply not a substitute for pre-trial discovery."); Gra-
ham, Highlights of Rules of Federal Procedure, in PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: CIVIL 106
(Md. Inst. for Continuing Professional Educ. of Lawyers, Inc. 1980): "The purpose of the
motion is not to aid parties in preparation for trial, but in the preparation of the responsive
pleading, so it is said that the motion should only be granted when a pleading is so vague and
indefinite that a response cannot be made." Accord Minutes, Jan. 4, 1980, at 18 (noting "that
the rule was easily confused by practitioners with a discovery request").
431. MD. R.P. 2-303(b).
432. Herndon & Higginbotham, supra note 358, at 317; see also Graham, supra note 430, at
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part from Former Rules 301 j and 322 . 4 " The new rule provides that,
upon motion to strike434 or upon the court's own initiative at any time,
"any insufficient defense or any improper, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous material [may be] striken from any pleading . . . [and] any
pleading that is late or otherwise not in compliance with these rules
[may be] stricken in its entirety. '43 5 In effect, this new rule creates a
motion to strike that may be applied to three distinct situations: (1) it
may strike insufficient defenses from the pleadings; (2) it may strike un-
necessary or improper material from the pleadings; and (3) it may strike
an entire pleading because it is either filed late or is not in compliance
with the rules. In this respect, Rule 2-322(e) may be seen as embodying
three analytically distinct motions to strike, each of which merits some
discussion.
The first motion to strike, new to Maryland practice, permits an
attack on defenses insufficient in substance. This motion is the plain-
tiffs equivalent of the Rule 2-322(b)(2) motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted4 36 and, thus, replaces the
plaintiff's demurrer to an insufficient plea or answer.4 37 Although there
was some conflict under the former rules as to whether a motion ne
recipiatur or to strike should perform the office of a demurrer,4 38 the
106 ("[Ijt may be that a motion for a more definite statement is often more appropriate than
a motion for dismissal for failure to state a claim.").
433. Proposed Rule 2-322(e) reporter's note.
434. A motion to strike must be made prior to responding to the pleading or, if no respon-
sive pleading is required, within 15 days after service of the pleading. MD. R.P. 2-322(e). For
example, if defendant seeks to strike improper material from plaintiff's complaint, the motion
to strike must be filed prior to answering. Under MD. R.P. 2-321(c), the time for answering
will automatically be extended to 15 days after the court's order on the motion to strike. If,
however, a plaintiff seeks to strike improper material from the defendant's answer, the motion
to strike must be filed within 15 days after service of the answer because plaintiffs may not
otherwise respond to the answer. See MD. R.P. 2-302 ("replications are abolished").
435. MD. R.P. 2-322(e).
436. Such is the view of those commenting on the similarity of FED. R. Civ. P. 12(o to
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 1381, at 791 (1969) ("a motion to dismiss the answer on the grounds that it states an
insufficient defense no longer is the proper procedure for eliminating a particular defense,
although there seems to be no harm in treating an application under Rule 12(b)(6) as a
motion to strike"); Note, The Motion to Strike an Insuftient Defense-Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 11 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 441,442passtn (1980) (noting that the motion to strike an
insufficient defense is analytically and functionally similar to the FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted).
437. See Former Md. R.P. 345, 373. Under the former rules, "any question as to the suffi-
ciency of substance of any pleading [could] be raised by demurrer . . . and thus the proper
method of determining the sufficiency of a plea [was] by demurrer. In equity the method of
determining the sufficiency of an answer [was] by demurrer." 18 M.L.E. Pleading § 84, at 120
(1961); see 2 J. POE, supra note 136, §§ 596-598, 669.
438. See 2 J. POE, supra note 136, § 668, at 385 ("Query. Since under [Former] Rule 322 the
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new rules put an end to this quarrel by specifically abolishing the de-
murrer4 39 and expanding the motion to strike to question the legal suffi-
ciency of a defense.
The second motion is not new to Maryland practice and is essen-
tially the same as the motion to strike unnecessary and improper mate-
rial as set forth in Former Rule 30 1440 Under the new rules, this motion
serves to reinforce the requirement that pleadings be kept "simple, con-
cise, and direct"44 and "not include . . . any immaterial, impertinent,
or scandalous matter.
4 4 2
The third motion is the same as the motion ne recipiatur or to
strike of Former Rule 322. This motion should be used to strike a
pleading, in its entirety, when it is filed late or otherwise fails to conform
to the rules. Thus, if defendant files an answer after the time prescribed
in Rule 2-321 has lapsed, plaintiff should file a motion to strike the an-
swer "on the ground that, being without proper sanction or not in due
time, it is . . . no [answer] at all, and is, therefore, no obstacle in the
way of a judgment. 4 4 4 In addition, a complaint that fails to set forth
each cause of action in a separately numbered paragraph could conceiv-
ably be stricken for failure to conform to the requirements of Rule 2-
303(a).4
It is yet to be seen whether Maryland courts will favor motions to
motion [ne recipiatur or to strike] may be filed because a pleading is too late, improperly
verified 'or for any other reason,' may such a motion be filed to raise the legal sufficiency of a
pleading as 'any other reason'?"). But see McCormick v. St. Francis DeSales Church, 219 Md.
422, 428, 149 A.2d 768, 772 (1959) ("The fact that the Rule states that the motions ne recip iatur
and to strike may be used, individually, in the alternative, or in combination 'for any pur-
pose,' if intended to extend their former scope at all, would not seem to reach so far as to
permit them to serve the office of a demurrer .... "); seealso 18 M.L.E. Pleadng§ 122, at 194
(1961) ("A motion ne recipiatur or motion to strike cannot perform the office of a demurrer
439. See MD. R.P. 2-302 ("Demurrers ... are abolished.").
440. Former Md. R.P. 301 j provided:
Unnecessary, impertinent, scandalous, irrelevant or other improper matter in any
pleading may, by order of court, upon motion, or upon its own initiative, be stricken
out at the cost of the party introducing the same, or the court, in its discretion, may
require the filing of an amended pleading from which such unnecessary or improper
matter shall be omitted.
441. MD. R.P. 2-303(b).
442. Id.
443. Former Md. R.P. 322 provided that
A motion that any pleading be not received either because it is filed too late or is not
properly verified, or for any other reason, as well as any motion to strike out any
preceding motion for any reason, may be made either by a motion ne rectpiatur or by
a motion to strike, or both.
444. 2 J. PoE, supra note 136, § 668, at 385.
445. For a discussion of the requirement of MD. R.P. 2-303, see supra text accompanying
notes 367-70.
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strike or will grant them, even when technically appropriate and well-
founded, only upon a showing of prejudice to the moving party.4 46 It
should be noted, however, that in the federal courts "because striking a
portion of a pleading is a drastic remedy and because it is often sought
by the movant simply as a dilatory tactic, motions under Federal Rule
12(f) are viewed with disfavor and are infrequently granted. 447
Rule 2-322(f) is derived from Federal Rule 12(g) and encourages
parties to join all available Rule 2-322 defenses in a single motion. If a
party raises a motion pursuant to this rule and fails to join any of these
defenses that are then available, the defense may be waived unless pre-
served by Rule 2-324(a).448 This rule is consistent with Rule 2-303(c)
which allows a party to "state as many separate claims or defenses as the
party has, regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or equi-
table grounds. ' 44 9 As with Federal Rule 12(g), "the objective of the rule
is to eliminate unnecessary delay at the pleading stage. . .[by] presen-
tation of an omnibus pre-answer motion in which defendant advances
every available [Rule 2-322] defense and objection he may have that is
assertable by motion. "450
Rule 2-323--Answer
Once a defendant has been served with a summons and complaint,
he may either file one of the preliminary motions provided in Rule 2-
322451 or may file a responsive pleading on the merits. In accordance
with the policy to abolish distinctive pleadings for law and equity, 452
Rule 2-323 creates a single responsive pleading on the merits to be
known as the "answer. '45 3 An answer must be filed in response to any
446. See 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 436, § 1381, at 799-80.
447. Id. § 1380, at 783; see also discussion of MD. R.P. 2-311, supra notes 386-400 and ac-
companying text (noting the Committee's view that most motions are frivolous and dilatory
and its desire to reduce the number of motions).
448. MD. R.P. 2-324(a) preserves the following defenses:
(a) The defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, see MD.
R.P. 2-322(b)(2);
(b) The defense of failure to join a party, see MD. R.P. 2-211;
(c) An objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim, see MD. R.P. 2-322(e);
and
(d) The defense of governmental immunity, see MD. R.P. 2-322(b)(4).
449. For a discussion of MD. R.P. 2- 3 03(a), see supra note 367 and accompanying text.
450. 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 436, § 1384, at 837.
451. See supra notes 416-50 and accompanying text.
452. See MD. R.P. 2-301 committee note.
453. See FED. R. CIv. P. 7. Under the former Maryland Rules, the plea in bar was the
pleading on the merits filed in response to plaintiff's declaration at law. See Former Md. R.P.
342. "A plea in bar [was] one which show[ed] some ground for barring or defeating the
plaintiff's case by giving a substantial and conclusive answer to his statement of it in the
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claim for relief that has not been disposed of by preliminary motion to
dismiss. 45 4 Once the answer has been filed, the claim is at issue, and the
time for pleading is ended.45 5
Answers must be "stated in short and plain terms. '456 They are to
assert all available defenses of law and fact 4 57 and must contain any of
the following if applicable: defenses permitted under Rule 2-322(b) that
have not already been raised in a preliminary motion;4 58 any specific
admissions or denials pursuant to Rule 2-323(c); 459 any general denial to
a claim for money damages for breach of contract, debt, or tort pursu-
ant to Rule 2-323(d);4 6 ° and any of the negative or affirmative defenses
enumerated in Rule 2-323(f) and (g).461
As in Rule 2-322(c),46 2 Rule 2-323(b) provides that the defenses of
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, failure to join
a necessary party, and governmental immunity shall be determined
before trial upon application of either party. Also as in Rule 2-322(c),
the court may defer determination of the defense of failure to state a
claim until trial.
Rule 2-323(c), (d), and (e) incorporates existing Maryland practice
on admissions and denials. Section (c) follows Former Rule 372 a 2 by
requiring defendants specifically to admit or deny all averments in a
plaintiff's complaint. Specific denials should not be based upon minor
inaccuracies, and, to prevent such a practice, the Committee borrowed
the following sentence from Federal Rule 8(b): "Denials shall fairly
meet the substance of the averments denied. 4 6 3 If a defendant lacks
declaration." 2 J. POE, supra note 136, § 603, at 294. In equity, the answer was the pleading
filed in response to the plaintiffs bill of complaint. See Former Md. R.P. 371 a. "While the
plea in bar at law retain[ed] the vestiges of the remote common-law system of pleading, the
answer filed in equity correspond[ed] to the generally used rules of modern pleading, includ-
ing those found in the federal court system." C. BROWN, supra note 4, § 3.55, at 103.
454. See MD. R.P. 2-322(a), (b); supra text accompanying notes 416-25.
455. See MD. R.P. 2-323(a); Minutes, May 11-12, 1979, at 28. See also Mo. R.P. 2-302
("There shall be a complaint and an answer .... No other pleading shall be allowed except
that the court may order a reply to an answer. Demurrers, pleas, and replications are
abolished.').
456. MD. R.P. 2-323(a).
457. Id.
458. Id (1).
459. Id (2).
460. Id.
461. Id. (3).
462. See supra text accompanying note 426.
463. Comments of Mr. (now Judge) Rodowsky, Minutes, May 11-12, 1979, at 27. Com-
mentators, however, have suggested a different purpose for the same phrase in FED. R. Civ. P.
8(b): "Answers that neither admit nor deny but simply demand proof of plaintiff's allega-
tions, or pleadings that alleged that averments in an earlier pleading are immaterial and do
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sufficient information with which to appraise the plaintiffs claims, a
statement to this effect will be treated as a denial.
Section (d) preserves the general issue plea of Former Rule 342 b 1,
2, and 3 in the form of a general denial in specified causes. The general
denial "is of expressly limited application, ' '4 ' and is to be pleaded only
in response to a claim for money damages in a court for breach of con-
tract, debt, or tort. This section is phrased to allow a defendant to deny
generally certain counts while answering other counts with specificity.4 65
Section (e) is derived from Federal Rule 8(b) and Former Rules 372
b 1, 2, and 312 b.4 66 This section notes the effect of failing to admit or
deny plaintiffs averments. As a rule, averments in plaintiffs complaint
that are left unanswered 467 are deemed to be admitted. However, when
requiring a party to admit, deny, or explain an averment compels in-
crimination contrary to the fifth amendment privilege, failure to deny
an averment will not be treated as an admission.
4 68
Rule 2-323(0 provides for the raising of negative defenses. The rule
does not change existing practice, but, rather, incorporates several of the
former rules under a single heading. Failure to raise the following nega-
tive averments with supporting particulars will result in the matters be-
ing admitted: "(1) legal existence of a party, including a partnership or
a corporation,46 9 (2) the capacity of a party to sue or be sued,4 7 ° (3) the
authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, 4 7 1 (4)
not require an answer are insufficient to constitute a denial." 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 436, § 1264, at 277-78.
464. Proposed Rule 2-323 reporter's note.
465. Comments of Mr. (now Judge) Rodowsky, Minutes, May 11-12, 1979, at 28.
466. Proposed Rule 2-323(e) reporter's note.
467. Cf Former Md. R.P. 372 b ("all averments, other than the amount of any damage
averred, if not denied in the answer, shall be deemed to be admitted except as against persons
under disability who are not represented .... ").
468. Although a similar provision was stated in Former Md. R.P. 372 b 1, the inclusion of
this provision sparked substantial debate before passage. See Minutes, May 11-12, 1979, at
29-30; id., June 22-23, 1979, at 27-29; id., Oct. 12-13, 1979, at 7-9.
469. Cf Former Md. R.P. 311 a ("Whenever the partnership of any parties, the incorpora-
tion of any alleged corporation, the execution of any written instrument, the original or a
copy of which is filed in the action, or the ownership of a motor vehicle is alleged in the
pleadings in any action, such fact shall be deemed to be admitted insofar as such action is
concerned, unless it shall be denied by the next succeeding pleading of the opposite party to
the merits."); id. 342 c 1(h) (denial of partnership in action ex contraclu); id (i) (denial of
incorporation in action cx contractu); id. 2(c) (denial of partnership in action ex dicto); id. (d)
(denial of incorporation in action ex dc/ic/o).
470. Cf Former Md. R.P. 323 a ("Any of the following defenses constitute grounds for a
motion raising preliminary objection. . . . 5. Lack of legal capacity to sue on part of
plaintiff.").
471. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 9(a) ("When a party desires to raise an issue as to the legal exist-
ence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be used in a representative capacity,
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the averment of the execution of a written instrument,4 7 2 [or] (5) the
averment of the ownership of a motor vehicle."4 7
Rule 2 -3 2 3 (g) is drawn from Federal Rule 8(c) and Former Rule
342 c 1 and 2, and contains an exhaustive list of affirmative defenses
that a party must plead, if applicable, while making general or specific
admissions and denials: (1) accord and satisfaction, (2) merger of a
claim by arbitration into an award, (3) assumption of risk, (4) discharge
in bankruptcy or insolvency from the plaintiff's claim, (5) collateral es-
toppel as a defense to a claim, (6) contributory negligence, (7) duress, (8)
estoppel, (9) fraud, (10) illegality, (11) laches, (12) payment, (13) release,
(14) resjudicata, (15) statute of frauds, (16) statute of limitations,4 7 4 (17)
ultra vires, (18) usury, (19) waiver, (20) privilege, and (21) total or par-
tial charitable immunity.47 5 In addition, a catch-all provision permits a
party to "include by separate defense any other matter constituting an
avoidance or affirmative defense on legal or equitable grounds.
4 76
Moreover, if a defense is improperly designated as a counterclaim, the
court shall treat it as proper if justice requires.
Although the Committee added several affirmative defenses not
found in the former rules, it also deleted from the list several outmoded
and rarely raised defenses: Alien Enemy;4 77 Tender;478 Plea Puts Daretn
Continuance,4 79 Denial of Consideration; 4 0 Justification, Excuse, Dis-
he shall do so by specific negative averment, which shall include such supporting particulars
as are peculiarly made within the pleader's knowledge.').
472. Cf Former Md. R.P. 311 a; id. 342 c 1(j); id. 2(e).
473. Cf Former Md. R.P. 311 a; id. 342 c 1(m) (denial of ownership of motor vehicle in
action ex contractu); id. 2() (denial of ownership of motor vehicle in action ex deliclo).
474. One local scholar has commented that the statute of limitations defense "has tradi-
tionally been disfavored in Maryland." See C. BROWN, supra note 4, § 3.53, at 101, 102 (citing
Lichtenberg v. Joyce, 183 Md. 689, 699, 39 A.2d 789, 794 (1944)). See generally Note, Legal
Suffiiency of Replicaton to Plea of Limitations, Piper v. Jenkins, 15 MD. L. REv. 277 (1955).
475. Under Former Md. R.P. 323 a 7, total or partial charitable immunity was grounds for
a motion raising a preliminary objection to be filed before any other pleading was filed.
476. MD. R.P. 2 -3 2 3 (g); cf FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c) (allowing a party to set forth "any other
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.").
477. See Former Md. R.P. 342 c 1(a). Mr. Sykes questioned the uncertain constitutionality
of this defense in light of recent Supreme Court decisions on the legal status of aliens. He
then suggested that the defense was actually a matter of capacity. Minutes, Sept. 14, 1979, at
8. The Supreme Court has stated that, "The ancient rule against suits by resident alien
enemies has survived only so far as to prevent use of the courts to accomplish a purpose which
might hamper our own war efforts or to give aid to the enemy." Exparle Kawato, 317 U.S.
69, 75 (1942). See also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 776 (1950) (closing courts to
nonresident alien enemy). Compare Kawato and Johnson, with Dorsey v. Kyle, 30 Md. 512, 519
(1869) (stating the former Maryland rule).
478. See Minutes, Sept. 14, 1979, at 9. The Committee deleted tender by a 10 to 6 vote
despite Mr. Sykes' recommendation that the list include tender and other "exotic" defenses
which the plaintiff would not anticipate. Id
479. See id. at 10. Under Former Md. R. P. 342 c I(e), and 2(b), a plea pus darein continu-
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charge-Trespass;48 ' Truth-Libel--Slander; 4 2 and Property in De-
fendant or Third Person. 48 3  The Committee also decided against
including the following defenses available under Federal Rule 8(c): fail-
ure of consideration, 4 4 injury by fellow servant, 4 5 and license .416 Col-
lateral estoppel "as a defense to a claim" has been listed separately from
res judicata in order to distinguish the tWo. 487 The Committee retained
the defenses of discharge in bankruptcy or insolvency despite the con-
cern that federal law would preclude holding a bankrupt liable for his
debts because he failed to plead his bankruptcy.488 The Committee also
ance could raise any defense that arose after the suit had been brought. This plea was made
unnecessary by the liberal amendment practice under Former Md. R.P. 320.
480. See Minutes, Sept. 14, 1979, at 12. Denial of consideration suggests non-performance
of a condition and is difficult to allege early in a case. See Comments of Mr. (now Judge)
Rodowsky, id.
481. See id. at 13. Mr. Rodowsky contended that the burden of a defendant in having to
plead justification, excuse, and discharge before fully working out a defense outweighed the
benefit in having these items pleaded. Id.
482. See id. For several years, Maryland law has not required truth to be pleaded as an
affirmative defense. See Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 176 Md. 580, 597, 350 A.2d 688, 698
(1976) (holding that "the burden of proving falsity [in a libel or slander suit] rests upon the
plaintiff"). For an earlier view on the effect of the plea of justification in a libel suit, see Note,
The Effect of PleaJustifcaton in a Libel Suit-Dolmchick v. Greenbelt Consumer Services, 13
MD. L. REV. 357 (1953).
483. See Minutes, Sept. 14, 1979, at 13. Despite the applicability of this defense in detinue
and replevin actions, a general denial under MD. R.P. 2-323(d) will be as effective as a spe-
cific defense. Id.
484. See id. at 15; supra note 383 (noting the elimination of the affirmative defense of denial
of consideration).
485. See Minutes, Sept. 14, 1979, at 15. Several Committee members observed that the
defense is no longer needed due to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Article.
Id.; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 15 (1979).
486. See Minutes, Sept. 14, 1979, at 16. The Committee apparently relied upon Mr. Sykes'
remark that license is an affirmative defense to trespass. Id Although license does not appear
to have been the subject of any reported case under the federal rules, see 5 C. WRtGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 436, § 1270, at 298 n.98, some states have held that a defendant may be
required to plead license in actions other than trespass, see, e.g., Ramme v. Long Island R.R.
Co., 266 N.Y. 327, 331, 123 N.E. 747, 748 (1919) (A permit case in which the New York Court
of Appeals held that "[a] license to do something that cannot be lawfully done without such
license is new matter constituting a defense which [under the language of the New York Code
of Civil Procedure] must be alleged in the answer.").
487. See Minutes, Sept. 14, 1979, at 16.
488. See id. at 9-10. The Committee was apparently persuaded by the existence of "dis-
charge in bankruptcy" in FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c). Prior to the new Bankruptcy Act, a discharge
in bankruptcy did not extinguish a debt but merely constituted "a personal defense, a bar to
enforcement. [Thus, if] that bar must be specially set forth as an affirmative defense, . . .
[f]ailure to do so before a . . . judgment is entered constitutes waiver of the defense." In re
Carwell, 323 F. Supp. 590, 592 (E.D. La. 1971); see Ellis v. Rudy, 171 Md. 280, 189 A. 281
(1937). Under the new Act, however, a discharge voids any debt of the debtor and operates
as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action. See Bankruptcy
Act, 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1978).
It should be noted that the General Assembly has repealed most of article 47's
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retained usury despite a belief held by some members that the term "il-
legality" was broad enough to cover the defense of usury." 9 Section (g)
does not expressly provide any sanction for failing to plead the listed
affirmative defenses. The Committee apparently considered it implicit
in the rule that an affirmative defense may not be raised unless it is
pleaded in the answer or in an amended pleading."
Rule 2-324-Preservation of Certain Defenses
Rule 2-324 is drawn directly from Federal Rule 12(h)(2) and (3)
and is consistent with Former Rule 323 b."9 ' As Rule 2-322(0 clearly
states, defenses enumerated in Rule 2-322 must be asserted in a motion
raising preliminary objection unless preserved by Rule 2-324.492 Under
section (a) of this rule, the following defenses and objections will not be
waived although not included in a motion raising preliminary objection:
a defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted;
4 93
a defense of failure to join a party under Rule 2-211; an objection of
failure to state a legal defense to a claim; 49" and a defense of governmen-
tal immunity.4 95 These defenses and objections may be raised in any
pleading, in a motion for summary judgment, or at trial. Section (b)
provides that the court may dismiss an action on its own motion if it
deems that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
Rule 2-325-Jury Trial
Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantees that:
"The right of trial by Jury of all issues of fact in civil proceedings in the
several Courts of Law of this State, where the amount in controversy
insolvency proceedings. See 1975 Md. Laws ch. 49, § 1. The laws regulating assignments for
the benefit of creditors, however, have been retained. See MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 15-
101 to -103 (1975 & Supp. 1982); see also MD. R.P. Subtitle BP (Receivers and Assignees or
Trustees for Creditors).
489. See Minutes, Sept. 14, 1979, at 10. Mr. Rodowsky stated that usurious contracts are
not "illegal," but merely enable a debtor to avoid the usurious interest. Id.; see Brown v. Real
Estate Inv. Co., 134 Md. 493, 495, 107 A. 196, 196 (1919) (usurious loan not void or invalid).
Federal legislation, however, may render some usurious contracts void. See, e.g., Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976) ("loan shark" statute
rendering some loans "unlawful debts").
490. See Comments of Mr. Brault, Minutes, Sept. 14, 1979, at 17. Two members, however,
urged that sanctions be included in the rule. See Comments of Judge McAuliffe and Mr.
Ryan, id. The Committee's failure to include sanctions, however, should not preclude the
courts from finding that a defendant waives the defenses if not properly asserted.
491. Proposed Rule 2-324 reporter's note.
492. See supra note 442 and accompanying text.
493. See MD. R.P. 2-322(b)(2).
494. See id. (e).
495. See d. (b)(4).
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exceeds the sum of five hundred dollars, shall be inviolably pre-
served." '4 96 In order to exercise this right to a jury trial, the action must
be one at law rather than in equity.4 9 7 The fact that law and equity
have been merged for purposes of pleading does not alter the substantial
differences between law and equity, 49 and, as such, the scope of the
right to trial by jury has not been altered.4 9 9
The demand for a jury trial under section (a) of Rule 2-325 is essen-
tially the same as in Former Rule 343 a. The rule used the words "de-
mand" and "election" interchangeably. The demand must be in
writing and may be either a separate paper or a separately titled conclu-
sion of a pleading. The Committee rejected a proposal that the election
be made only at the end of a pleading instead of on a separate piece of
paper.5" It should be noted that although the demand for a jury trial
must be in writing, an effective withdrawal of a demand for jury trial
under section (f) need not be in writing, provided that all parties not in
default consent. Such is the practice under Federal Rule 38(d).
Section (b) also adopts the approach of Federal Rule 38(d) by
couching the time requirement in terms of waiver. Under the section, a
plaintiff may wait until defendant's answer is filed before demanding a
jury trial.5"' This section remains consistent with the mandatory lan-
guage of sections b and c of Former Rule 343 and the case law that has
496. MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 23. It should be noted that although the District
Court has exclusive jurisdiction over tort and contract actions in which the amount in contro-
versy is $2500 or less, MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 4-401(1), -402(d)(1) (1984), a
jury trial may be demanded in any case where the amount in controversy exceeds $500. If
such a demand is timely filed, the action will be transferred automatically to the circuit court.
MD. R.P. 2-325(c).
497. See, e.g., Bringe v. Collins, 274 Md. 338, 346, 335 A.2d 670, 676 (1975); Pennsylvania
v. Warren, 204 Md. 467, 474, 105 A.2d 488, 491 (1954); Capron v. Devries, 83 Md. 220, 224,
34 A. 251, 252 (1896); see also Brown, supra note 360, at 457-74; C. BROWN, supra note 4,
§ 5.15, at 148 ("The equity courts had no jury system of their own. Consequently, it is gener-
ally assumed that there is no constitutionally protected right to a jury trial. for equitable
claims.).
498. Such is the experience in the federal courts. See, e.g., Bradley v. United States, 214
F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir. 1954) (noting that although "[t]here is no longer a law side and an equity
side of the federal court. . .[t]he substantial difference between law and equity, and between
legal and equitable remedies, still exists.').
499. For a more detailed discussion of the new "civil action" and its effect on trial by jury,
see supra notes 361-62 and accompanying text. See also Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359
U.S. 500, 508-11 (1959) (Although a federal court "may try both legal and equitable causes in
the same action .. .only under the most imperative circumstances . . . can the right to a
jury trial be lost through prior determination of equitable claims.").
500. See Minutes, Jan. 4, 1980, at 20-21. One member opposed allowing election by a
separate piece of paper because on one occasion a demand for jury trial had been slipped into
a file after the time for making an election had passed. Id. at 20.
501. Id.
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developed relative under that rule.5" 2 Failure to comply with this sec-
tion amounts to a waiver of the right to a jury trial, 50 3 and there is no
relief even for good cause if a timely election was not made.50 4
Section (d) is similar to Former Rule 343 d in providing for a jury
trial demand following certain administrative hearings where there is a
statutory right to an appeal in the form of a trial de novo. Section (d)
extends the time for filing the demand from "within fifteen (15) days
after the appeal has been filed"50 5 to "within 15 days after the time for
answering the petition of appeal .... "506
Rule 2-326-Transfers From District Court on Demand forJuy Trial
Rule 2-326, new to Maryland practice, sets forth the procedural
rules that are to be followed once an action has been transferred from
the District Court to circuit court. The general rule for actions within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the District Court is that subse-
quent pleadings and discovery in the circuit court is to be governed by
District Court rules unless the court orders otherwise. 50 7 There are two
exceptions to this rule: Counterclaims, cross-claims, and amended
pleadings exceeding the exclusive original jurisdiction of the District
Court are governed by circuit court rules. 50 1 In addition, although Dis-
trict Court procedure is otherwise applied, a circuit court may order
discovery in a landlord-tenant or grantee action. 5 9
When the action transferred is one over which the District Court
and circuit court share concurrent jurisdiction, a complaint complying
with Rules 2-303 through 2-305 must be filed within thirty days after
filing the demand for a jury trial.,"' Upon receiving the new complaint
filed in compliance with those rules, the defendant must respond by an-
502. See, e.g., Impala Platinum, Ltd. v. Impala Sales (U.S.A.), Inc., 283 Md. 296, 389 A.2d
887 (1978).
503. See, e.g., Bringe v. Collins, 274 Md. 338, 335 A.2d 670 (1975); Connor v. Celanese
Fibers Co., 40 Md. App. 452, 392 A.2d 116 (1978); Maryland Coal & Realty Co. v. Eckhart,
25 Md. App. 605, 337 A.2d 116 (1975).
504. See Minutes, Jan. 4, 1980, at 21.
505. Former Md. R.P. 343 d.
506. MD. R.P. 2-325(d).
507. MD. R.P. 2-326(b).
508. Id.
509. Id. "The Committee decided as a policy matter that a general allowance of discovery
in landlord tenant actions would not be consistent with the legislative intent, evidenced by
pertinent code provisions, that the trial of such actions and an appeal should be handled in
an expeditious manner." Letter from Hon. John F. McAuliffe, Chairman of the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedute,'to the Court of Appeals of Maryland (Jan.
26, 1984).
510. MD. R.P. 2-326(c).
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swer or motion raising preliminary objection within thirty days.5 '
Thereafter, the action will follow the circuit court rules of procedure as
if it originally had been filed in circuit court.
51 2
Rule 2-327-Transfer of Action
Section (a) of Rule 2-327 is derived from Former Rule 515 a but no
longer requires an automatic transfer when an action, falling within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the District Court, is improperly filed in circuit
court. Rather, the circuit court may dismiss the action if it determines
that transferring the action would not serve the interests of justice.' 
3
Similarly, under section (b), if a court sustains a defense of improper
venue, it may transfer the action to a more appropriate circuit court in a
county in which the action could have been brought. As in Former
Rule 317, the court has the discretion to transfer or dismiss the action
for lack of venue depending upon "the interest of justice. 51 4
Section (c) is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and makes the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens a rule of procedure. Although Maryland
already has a forum non conveniens statute,51 5 it provides little relief to
the party bringing a lawsuit in a proper, albeit inconvenient, forum be-
cause it provides only for the case to be stayed or dismissed.51 6 The new
rule, thus, follows the federal practice of permitting transfer, upon mo-
tion of any party, to any other circuit court where the action might have
been brought, provided that the transfer is for the convenience of the
parties and witnesses and serves the interests of justice.
It should be noted that an action transferred pursuant to this rule
may be consolidated, under Rule 2-501, with another action in that
county provided that the actions involve a common question of law or
fact or a common subject matter.5 7
511. Id.
512. Id
513. Compare Former Md. R.P. 515 a ("the plaintiff shall not on that account be nonsuited
or the action dismissed; but the action shallbe transferred") (emphasis added), with MD. R.P.
2-327(a) (if "the court determines that in the interest of justice the action should not be
dismissed, the court may transfer the action") (emphasis added).
514. See Former Md. R.P. 317.
515. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-104(a) (1984).
516. See id, see also C. BROWN, supra note 4, § 1.26, at 20 ("The harsh aspect of this statu-
tory provision is its remedy: the case in the inconvenient forum may only be stayed or dis-
missed. The lack of a transfer remedy, therefore, requires the filing of a new suit when this
provision is invoked; if the statute of limitations had run, this could leave a party without a
claim.").
517. See Explanatory Note, Minutes, May 23, 1981, at 59. For a more detailed discussion
of MD. R.P. 2-501, see infra notes 704-17 and accompanying text.
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Rule 2-331-Counterclaim and Cross-claim
Rule 2-331 is a virtually verbatim adoption of Former Rule 314.
The only important Committee discussion in this area was on whether
to adopt the federal compulsory counterclaim rule. After extensive de-
bate, the Committee declined to adopt the federal practice518 because it
believed that the introduction of compulsory counterclaims could en-
courage unnecessary litigation, 5 9 hamper litigation strategy, 520 and pro-
duce uncertainty. 1 2  In addition, committee members noted that many
permissive counterclaims are, in fact, "mandatory because the doctrine
of res judicata may compel a counterclaim 5 12 2 and "parties often avail
themselves of the practice. ' 523 Apparently, the Committee concluded
that these concerns outweighed the policy of foreclosing multiple filings
by requiring that all relevant matters be raised in a single action before
the court.5 24
Maryland counterclaims are still permissive. They need not arise
out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject of the op-
posing party's claim; and they may assert a claim for relief in excess of
518. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) ("A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim
which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it
arises out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.") (emphasis added) and FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b) ("A
pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not aruing out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim.") (emphasis
added), with MD. R.P. 2-331(a) ("A party may assert as a counterclaim any claim that party
has against any opposing party, whether or not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim.") (emphasis added) and Former Md. R.P.
314 a I ("In any action any party, against whom a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-
party claim has been asserted, may plead as a counterclaim any claim he has against any
opposing party.") (emphasis added). A motion to adopt the federal rule on compulsory coun-
terclaims failed to carry by a vote of five in favor to 12 opposed. Minutes, Nov. 16, 1979, at
26.
519. Comments of Mr. (now Judge) Rodowsky, Minutes, Nov. 16, 1979, at 25.
520. Comments of Mr. Brault, id. Mr. Brault gave an example of a doctor who counter-
claims for a fee of $1500 in a medical malpratice action brought against the doctor. Id. He
also pointed out that insurance counsel do not wish to represent a defendant in a counter-
claim. Because of potential conflict of interests, they often refer counterclaims to other coun-
sel. Id.
521. Comments of Mr. (now Judge) Rodowsky, id. Mr. Rodowsky questioned the mean-
ing of the phrase "scope of transaction or occurrence" and opined that a compulsory counter-
claim rule requires an attorney "to rummage about," and requires the client to assert any
other claims or waive them. Id.
522. Comments of Mr. Brault, id. at 24-25.
523. Comments of Dean Kelly, id. at 26.
524. Comments of Dean Kelly and Professor Bowie, id. at 24. For a discussion of the policy
of encouraging the resolution of all claims in a single proceeding, see supra notes 506 and
accompanying text.
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the amount or different in kind from that sought by the opposing
party.52 5 Similarly, the rules pertaining to cross-claims are basically un-
changed: Cross-claims are still permissive.52 6  Unlike counterclaims,
they must arise out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the sub-
ject of either the original action or a counterclaim, or be related to prop-
erty that is the subject of the original action; and a cross-claim may be
used in a manner similar to impleader to require a co-party to make
good on damages the cross-claimant owes to the plaintiff. There are,
however, some minor changes in the counterclaim and cross-claim rules.
Section (c) of the rule requires that a person not previously a party
who is added as a party to a counterclaim or cross-claim must be served
with a copy of all pleadings previously filed in the action. Also, the time
for filing a counterclaim or cross-claim has been changed from fifteen
days after the time for filing the responsive pleading5 2 7 to thirty days
after the time for filing an answer.528  Failure to file within this time
period is grounds for a motion to strike, which must be filed within fif-
teen days of service of the late counterclaim or cross-claim.5 29 Unless
there is a showing that the delay caused by the late filing did not "preju-
dice" the other parties, the court will grant the motion to strike.
5 30
Although the rule does not define the word "prejudice," one member
suggested that a court, in deciding such a motion to strike, should bal-
ance the validity of the excuse for delay against the resulting inconven-
ience caused to the parties.5 3 '
Rule 2-331 does not expressly require that a counterclaim or cross-
claim be made in a separate pleading.53 2 Several members expressed
concern that the absence of such a requirement could produce confusion
in distinguishing the counterclaim or cross-claim from the responsive
pleading.5 33 Other members, however, expressed the belief that the lan-
guage of the former rule is implied in the new rule, and that pleaders
525. See Former Md. R.P. 314 a 2.
526. Permissive cross-claims are also the rule in federal courts. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (g)
("A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim by one party against a co-party arising out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or a
counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject matter of the original
action.").
527. See Former Md. R.P. 314 d 2.
528. MD. R.P. 2-331(d).
529. Id.
530. Id.
531. Comments of the Chairman, Minutes, Jan. 4, 1980, at 10.
532. But cf. Former Md. R.P. 314 d I ("[A] counterclaim or cross-claim, if it brings in a
new party, shall be filed as a separate and distinct pleading, appropriately captioned, and
shall not be combined with the responsive pleading.").
533. Comments of the Chairman and Mr. Brault, Minutes, Jan. 4, 1980, at 3.
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must file counterclaims or cross-claims in separate pleadings when a new
party is added.
5 34
Rule 2-332-Third Party Practice
This rule closely follows Former Rule 315 with only minor changes.
Under section (a), as in Former Rule 315 a, a defendant (third-party
plaintiff) may assert a claim against another person (third-party defend-
ant) who may be liable for contribution to the defendant for a part of
defendant's liability to the plaintiff. As in the former rule, the defend-
ant may bring in the third party or the defendant may elect to bring a
separate action. 53 5 Also as in the former rule, a plaintiff's claim against a
third-party defendant is mandatory. Once a third party has been
brought into the litigation, section (c) requires the plaintiff to "assert
any claim against the third-party defendant arising out of the transac-
tion or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim
against the third-party plaintiff ... ."' Failure to assert such a claim
will result in the claim being waived.
Section (e) modifies current practice by allowing a late filing with-
out leave of court. As in Rule 2-331(d), the time for filing is thirty days.
If a party does not timely file, it is the opposing party's burden to file a
motion to strike within fifteen days after receiving the late pleading.
Once the motion to strike is filed, the burden shifts to the late-filing
party to show that the delay has caused no prejudice. If the party fails
to meet this burden, the court will grant the motion to strike. Obvi-
ously, the time limits will thus be more important to plaintiffs than de-
fendants: If a plaintiff fails to file a claim against a third-party
defendant within the allotted time and prejudice results, the plaintiffs
claim will be forever barred. If the defendant fails to bring in a third
party, the claim may be asserted later, in a separate action.
Rule 2-341-Amendment of Pleadings
The Committee patterned Rule 2-341 after Former Rule 320.
Although the new rule follows the former rule's liberal amendment pol-
icy by allowing any amendment to a pleading at any time prior to fif-
534. See id.
535. See, e.g., Maloney Concrete Co. v. D.C. Transit Sys., 241 Md. 420, 422, 216 A.2d 895,
896 (1965).
536. MD. R.P. 2-322(c); see Former Md. R.P. 315 d 3 ("The plaintiff may not assert against
the third party in a separate action, instituted after the third party is impleaded, any claim
which arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of his claim against
the defendant in the pending action."); see aLro State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. v. Briscoe, 245 Md.
147, 150, 225 A.2d 270, 272 (1967).
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teen days of trial,53 7 amendments sought within fifteen days of trial or
after the trial has commenced must have either the written consent of
the party opponent or leave of court. 538 A further limitation not con-
tained in the former rule is that amendments introducing new facts or
varying the case will not be allowed if filed within fifteen days of trial or
thereafter. 539 As in the former rule, the court will not grant a continu-
ance or mistrial due to an amendment "unless the ends of justice so
require. "540
The scope and purpose of the amendment rule has not changed. A
party may amend to "(1) change the nature of the action or defense,5 4 1
(2) set forth a better statement of facts concerning any matter already
raised in a pleading, 54 2 (3) set forth transactions or events that have oc-
curred since the filing of the pleading sought to be amended,5 43 (4) cor-
rect misnomer of a party,544 (5) correct misjoinder or nonjoinder of a
party so long as one of the original plaintiffs and one of the original
defendants remain as parties to the action,5 45 (6) add a party or par-
ties,54 6 [or] (7) make any other appropriate change."
The Committee rejected a draft addressing the relation back of
amendments. The draft section, drawn from Federal Rule 15(c), would
have avoided some statute of limitations problems. 547 But the Commit-
tee expressed concern that a provision which deals with questions re-
garding statutes of limitations is more substantive than procedural.5 48
As such, existing Maryland case law will control the relation back ques-
537. MD. R.P. 2-341(a).
538. Id. (b).
539. Id.
540. Id.; see Former Md. R.P. 320 e.
541. MD. R.P. 2-341(c)(1); cf. Former Md. R.P. 320 a 2 ("An action may be amended from
one form to another.").
542. MD. R.P. 2-341(c)(2); cf. Former Md. R.P. 320 a 3 ("[A] further or better statement of
particulars of any matter in any pleading may be made at any time.").
543. MD. R.P. 2-341(c)(3); cf. Former Md. R.P. 379 ("Prior to the entry of a final decree,
any party may file a supplemental pleading, alleging material facts which occurred after the
previous pleading was filed .... ").
544. MD. R.P. 2-341(c)(4); cf. Former Md. R.P. 320 b 1 ("A writ or action shall not abate
by reason of misnomer of a party . . . . In every case. . . a party makes such amendments
in his pleadings as justice may require in order to effect a fair trial.").
545. MD. R.P. 2-341(c) (5); cf. Former Md. R.P. 320 b I ("A writ or action shall not abate
by reason of. . . nonjoinder or misjoinder of a party or by the omission of an heir or devisee
... . When an amendment is made to correct nonjoinder or misjoinder, someone of the
original plaintiffs and someone of the original defendants must remain as parties to the
action.").
546. MD. R.P. 2-341(c)(6); see, e.g., Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Baltimore County, 230 Md. 524,
528, 187 A.2d 875, 876 (1963); Abromatis v. Amos, 127 Md. 394, 404, 96 A. 554, 557 (1916).
547. Minutes, Nov. 6, 1980, at 11.
548. Id., Nov. 9, 1981, at 4.
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tion. Under the case law, if an amendment sets forth a new cause of
action, then the statute of limitations runs from the time of the accrual
of the cause until the date the amended complaint is filed-in other
words, the amendment does not relate back to the original filing. How-
ever, if the amendment does not state a new cause of action, then limita-
tions are determined as of the date of the original filing.5 49
Rule 2-342-Amendment of Other Papers
This rule is new and allows for the amendment of any motion or
other paper with leave of court. Thus, if for example a party files a
motion to dismiss for insufficient process, Rule 2-342 would allow the
party to amend the motion, upon leave of court, to include insufficiency
of service of process, improper venue, or lack of jurisdiction over the
person, defenses which if not included in the preliminary motion are
waived.
D. Chapter 400-DISCOVERY
This chapter incorporates many provisions from the federal rules
and expands Maryland discovery practice in order to replace much of
the information gathering that formerly was accomplished by the plead-
ings. Expanded discovery is not, however, new to Maryland practice.
In 1941, the former discovery rules were adopted55 ° with the purpose of
effecting "a broad and complete exchange of information prior to trial
so that cases will be settled or tried not based upon confusion, happen-
stance, or surprise but upon a full understanding of each party's factual
posture, 'thereby advancing the sound and expeditious administration
ofjustice.' ""' The former discovery rules "were patterned after most of
the Federal Civil Rules dealing with the subject at that time."5 5 The
new discovery rules incorporate the most recent federal changes in the
discovery area and take into account the general streamlining of plead-
ing practice.
549. See, e.g., Myers v. Aragona, 21 Md. App. 45, 318 A.2d 263 (1974); see also C. BROWN,
supra note 4, § 3.70, at 108 (quoting Cline v. Fountain Rock Lime & Brick Co., 214 Md. 251,
258, 134 A.2d 304, 309 (1957), for the proposition that, "No new cause of action will be raised
if the amendment 'refers to the same general aggregate of operative facts upon which the
original complaint was based.' ").
550. See Foreman, Depositions and Dzscovery.-Dzgest of Maryland Decislons, 18 MD. L. RE\v. 1
(1958); Pike and Willis, The New Marland Deposition and Discovery Procedure, 6 MD. L. REV. 4
(1941).
551. C. BROWN, supra note 4, § 4.10, at 1117-18 (quoting Baltimore Transit Co. v. Mezza-
notti, 227 Md. 8, 13, 174 A.2d 768, 777 (1961)). The purposes for discovery under the federal
rules is explained in the leading case of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
552. Former Md. R.P. ch. 400 editor's note.
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Rule 2-401- General Provisions Governing Discovery
Section (a) of this rule adopts virtually all but the last sentence of
Federal Rule 26(a) and sets forth the following methods for obtaining
discovery: "(1) depositions upon oral examination or written questions,
(2) written interrogatories, (3) production or inspection of documents or
other tangible things or permission to enter upon land or other property,
(4) mental or physical examinations, and (5) requests for admission of
facts and genuineness of documents." The last sentence of Federal Rule
26(a) allows for unlimited frequency of use, unless restricted by the
court. The Discovery Subcommittee did not add that sentence for the
obvious reason that it would be inconsistent with Rule 2-421 (a)'s restric-
tion on interrogatories to one set of thirty and with Rule 2-411 (b)'s re-
quirement that leave of court be obtained to re-depose a person, and
because it would encourage multiple use of discovery methods.5 53
Modeled after Federal Rule 26(d), section (b) applies its sequence
and timing provisions to all methods of discovery and eliminates the
priority rule of Former Rules 405 c (depositions) and 417 e (interrogato-
ries with deposition). As with the federal rule, "[t]he principle effects of
the new provision are first, to eliminate any fixed priority in the se-
quence of discovery, and second, to make clear and explicit the court's
power to establish priority by an order issued in a particular case." 5 54
As under Former Rule 400 a, section (b) also permits the court to order
completion of discovery by a specified date.5 55
Derived from Former Rule 417 a 3, section (c) requires parties to
promptly supplement their responses to all discovery devices with the
exception of depositions. 556 Thus, answers to interrogatories are deemed
continuing in nature, and a party is required to supply any additional
information acquired between the time answers are filed and the time of
trial. The Committee was evenly divided on whether depositions should
be excepted from the rule, and the issue was only decided when the
Chairman voted and broke the tie. Comment in favor of the exception
noted that supplementing depositions would be a substantial departure
from current practice, would impose an additional burden on the sup-
plementing party, and would produce unnecessary confusion both at the
553. Comments of Mr. Nilson, Minutes, May 16-17, 1980, at 27-28.
554. ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTS ON SUBSTANTIVE ALTERATIONS IN FEDERAL
RULE 26 (1970). For cases explaining the federal rule, see George C. Frey Ready Mixed
Concrete, Inc. v. Pine Hill Concrete Mix Corp., 554 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1977); Burns v. Thickel
Chemical Corp., 438 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973); Rogers v. Tri-State Materials Corp., 51 F.R.D.
234, 241 (D.W. Va. 1970).
555. See Comments of Mr. Nilson, Minutes, May 16-17, 1980, at 28.
556. See, e.g., Klein v. Weiss, 284 Md. 36, 395 A.2d 126 (1978); Broadwater v. Arch, 267
Md. 329, 297 A.2d 671 (1972); Pare v. Rodrigues, 256 Md. 204, 260 A.2d 313 (1969).
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pretrial stage and at trial.55 7 Opposition to the exception noted the
important utility of depositions in the discovery process.5 58
It is important to note that one is only required to supplement a
response if further "material" information is discovered. The material-
ity standard is intended to be more limited than the general discovery
standard based on relevancy.5 59 Moreover, section (c)'s promptness re-
quirement is intended to be construed to allow flexibility and considera-
tion of individual circumstances. 56' Finally, it should be pointed out
that section (c) pertains to parties only. Non-parties are under no duty
to supplement their responses.56 '
The last two sections of Rule 2-401 also expand Maryland discov-
ery practice. In providing for the substitution of a party, section (d)
expands Former Rule 413 a 5 (depositions) to cover discovery generally
and states that substitution has no effect upon discovery. Section (e)
expands Former Rule 404 (depositions) to cover discovery stipulations
generally and brings Maryland practice into conformance with federal
practice under Federal Rule 29 by allowing the parties to agree to mod-
ify discovery practice. This section was not intended to affect the law of
evidence. 5
62
Rule 2-402---Scope of Discovety
Rule 2-402 is derived from Former Rule 400 and Federal Rules 26
and 33. Unchanged is Maryland's liberal philosophy allowing extensive
discovery on all matters that are relevant and nonprivileged.5 6 3 Profes-
sor Brown has noted that,
The definition of "relevancy" for discovery purposes is
much broader than its use in terms of admissibility of evidence
at trial. Information need not just have a tendency to establish
a material fact at issue in a case, the usual test of admissibility
at trial. Instead, information is relevant for discovery purposes
if it is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissi-
557. Comments of Judge McAuliffe and Mr. Lombardi, Minutes, June 20-21, 1980, at 30.
558. Comments of Professor Bowie, id.
559. See Comments of Mr. Nilson, id. at 28-29.
560. Comment of Mr. Brault, id at 29. This comment was received with the general con-
sensus of the Committee.
561. Comment of Mr. Nilson, i.
562. See id. at 31. Stipulations concerning discovery procedures other than depositions are
a common practice and have been given effect by the federal courts. See, e.g., United States v.
South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094 (D.S.C. 1977).
563. See Former Md. R.P. 400 c (noting that the "parties may obtain discovery regarding
any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action .... "); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (same).
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ble evidence . . . . Thus, an answer sought in an interro-
gatory is discoverable even if it may not later be admissible on
its own. It need only lead to potentially admissible evidence to
be discoverable.56 4
The rule retains the basic scope of Maryland discovery practice
while expanding it in several respects.
Section (a) extends the scope of interrogatory or deposition ques-
tions under Former Rule 400 c by allowing discovery of opinions and
contentions that relate to fact or the application of law to fact. In draft-
ing section (a), the Committee specifically modified the language of the
parallel federal provision56 5 by substituting the word "response" for the
word "answer. '56 6  Although the Committee did not explain this
change, the use of the word "response" implies something broader than
a literal direct answer to a question. In the course of their debate about
the scope of the changes to be effected by section (a), the Committee
considered in some detail how broad a change was desirable in regard to
opinion evidence. A motion to preclude depositions based on opinions
was defeated. 567 At the same time, the Committee rejected a more ex-
pansive discovery rule that would have allowed opinion evidence to be
discovered via requests for admission,568 or would have made the rule
applicable to all forms of discovery. 569 Section (a) also omits the provi-
sion in the federal rule that permits the court to allow an answer to be
withheld until after the designated discovery has ended.5 7 ° It was the
Committee's view that a protective order could serve the same
571purpose.
Section (b) changes Maryland practice by allowing the discovery of
insurance agreements. This section is identical to Federal Rule 26(b)(2)
and was intended to be interpreted as such.5 72 The purpose behind dis-
closure of insurance agreements is to "enable counsel for both sides to
make the same realistic appraisal of the case, so that settlement and
564. C. BROWN, supra note 4, § 4.11, at 119.
565. See FED. R. Civ. P. 33(b) ("An interrogatory otherwise proper is not necessarily objec-
tionable because an answer to the interrogatory involves an opinion or contention that relates
to fact or the application of law to fact .... ").
566. See Motion and Vote of Committee, Minutes, May 16-17, 1980, at 30.
567. See Comments of Mr. Braulh, id. at 29.
568. See Comments of Mr. Niemeyer, id. at 29-30.
569. Motion and Vote of Committee, id.
570. See FED. R. Civ. P. 33(b) ("[T]he court may order that such an interrogatory not be
answered until after designated discovery has been completed or until a pre-trial conference
or other later time.").
571. See Comments of Mr. Nilson, Minutes, May 16-17, 1980, at 30; see also MD. R.P. 2-
401(b) (sequence and timing of discovery).
572. See Minutes, May 16-17, 1980, at 30.
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litigation strategy are based on knowledge and not speculation. It will
conduce to settlement and avoid protracted litigation in some cases,
though in others it may have the opposite effect." '5 7 3 Section (b) is lim-
ited to insurance agreements. It does not cover other facts regarding a
defendant's financial status for several reasons: "(1) because insurance is
an asset created specifically to satisfy the claim; (2) because the insur-
ance company ordinarily controls the litigation; (3) because information
about coverage is available only from defendant or his insurer; and
(4) because disclosure does not involve a significant invasion of pri-
vacy."5 ' It should be stressed that the fact that insurance agreements
are discoverable does not necessarily make them admissible in evidence
at trial. 57 5
Section (c) covers trial materials protected by the work-product
doctrine.5 76 The section follows Former Rule 400 d in basic concept,
but employs a few stylistic changes to bring it into close conformity with
Federal Rule 26(b)(3).57 In drafting this section, the Committee evalu-
ated the troublesome phrase "prepared in anticipation of litigation or
for trial" '5 78 which was thought to be the source of excessive litigation.5 79
In retaining the phrase, the Discovery Subcommittee felt that the large
and well-defined body of federal and state case law construing the term
could not be displaced without devising a superior alternative phrase.58 °
As interpreted under existing Maryland case law, the party in possession
of the sought-after material has the burden of establishing that it was
"prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial." If the party resisting
discovery meets this burden, the party seeking discovery must establish
that there is a substantial need for the material and that undue hardship
prevents discovery of similar materials by other means.5 '
573. ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTS ON SUBSTANTIVE ALTERATIONS IN FEDERAL
RULE 26 (1970).
574. Id.
575. MD. R.P. 2-402(b).
576. See generaly Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
577. Cf Kelch v. Mass Transit Admin., 42 Md. App. 291, 400 A.2d 440 (1979) (noting that
while the Maryland and federal rules were substantially similar, the practice under the Mary-
land rule is less liberal).
578. MD. R.P. 2-402(c); cf. Former Md. R.P. 400 d (same); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(same).
579. See Minutes, May 16-17, 1980, at 30-31; see also Comments of Mr. Nilson, Minutes,
Oct. 10, 1980, at 4.
580. The Discovery Subcommittee considered and rejected as unworkable an alternative
approach of listing documents and tangible things "which would be automatically deemed as
having been prepared in anticipation of litigation." Minutes, Oct. 10, 1980, at 5. The Sub-
committee was unable to produce an acceptable alternative, and the Committee accepted the
Subcommittee's recommendation to retain the present language of Former Md. R.P. 400 d.
581. See Kelch v. Mass Transit Admin., 287 Md. 223, 229, 411 A.2d 499,453 (1980), cited ih
C. BROWN, supra note 4, § 4.14, at 121-22.
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Section (d) concerns a party's or witness' statement on the action or
its subject matter. The section retains the substantive scope of Former
Rule 400 e, but expands the application to all methods of discovery.
58 2
The Committee debated a number of issues including the need for a
definition of witness, whether a party should be able to obtain expenses,
and the extent to which a non-party could obtain his own statement.
58 3
However, in the end, the Committee decided that no substantive
changes should be made to the former rule.
58 4
Although the heading of section (d) refers to "Witness' Own State-
ment," the section's body refers to "[a] person who is not a party" with-
out expressly requiring witness status. Nevertheless, the advisory
committee notes on the similarly worded paragraph in Federal Rule
581526(b)(3) specifically refer to a non-party witness, and, presumably,
that is what the new Maryland rule means as well. Finally, it should be
noted that, despite section (d)'s failure to incorporate the provisions of
section (a), the relevancy standard still governs the permissible scope of
discovery. That standard is implied where section (d) provides for dis-
covery of "a statement concerning the action or its subject matter
Subsection (e)(l) concerns expert witnesses who are expected to be
called at trial and expands Maryland discovery practice. While retain-
ing the discovery of written reports found in Former Rule 400 f, this
subsection incorporates the federal practice permitting discovery of ba-
sic facts and opinions by interrogatory.58 6 Subsection (e)(1)(B) allows a
party to use any method of discovery to obtain the findings and opin-
ions, written or not, of experts expected to testify at trial. Although sub-
section (e)(1)(B) responds to the growing practice of frustrating
discovery by not having the expert prepare a written report, the Discov-
ery Subcommittee declined to adopt the practice of some states of per-
mitting motions to compel the preparation of a written report.58 7
While continuing the general policy of denying discovery of materi-
als and information from experts not expected to be called at trial, sub-
582. The Committee deleted as unnecessarily restrictive the language of Former Md. R.P.
400 e limiting the method of discovery statements concerning the action or subject matter to
interrogatory or deposition. The new language conforms with that of FED. R. CIv. P.
26(b)(3).
583. See Minutes, May 16-17, 1980, at 31.
584. See Minutes, Oct. 17-18, 1980, at 5.
585. ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTS ON SUBSTANTIVE ALTERATIONS IN FEDERAL
RULE 26 (1970).
586. Proposed Rule 2-402(e)(1) reporter's note; see FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (4) (A).
587. See Comments of Mr. Nilson, Minutes, Sept. 12, 1980, at 2 (responding to Comments
of Mr. Brault, Minutes, June 20-21, 1980, at 27).
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section (e)(2) incorporates federal practice, 5 8" qualified by the exception
from Former Rule U12 b for condemnation cases.5" 9 The identity of an
expert who will not testify may be discovered only if the discovering
party can meet the same burden necessary to discover materials pre-
pared in anticipation of trial-that there is a substantial need for the
materials and they cannot be obtained through any other means with-
out undue hardship. The original Discovery Subcommittee draft of sub-
section (e)(2) did not contain the condemnation exception; however, a
memorandum on the history of Former Rule U 12 b, submitted by Assis-
tant Attorney General Nolan H. Rogers, persuaded the Subcommittee
to recommend and the Committee to approve the exception. 590 The
policy behind this exception is to deter condemning authorities from
suppressing unfavorable expert reports or opinions.59 In a related con-
sideration, the Discovery Subcommittee chose not to recommend a rule
change addressing the holding of City of Baltimore v. Zell5 92 which allows
an appraiser, ultimately called to testify on behalf of a property owner,
to disclose his initial employment by the governmental unit.
5 93
Rule 2-403--Protective Orders
Rule 2-403 furthers the integration of Maryland and federal prac-
tice already found in Former Rule 406. Section (a) substantially retains
Former Rule 406 a, which was derived from Federal Rule 26(c), and
grants the court wide discretion to limit discovery in order "to protect a
party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense." Following the word "court" in the first sentence,
section (a) omits "in which the action is pending," language that is
found in both Former Rule 406 a and Federal Rule 26(c). In a state-
ment that is, perhaps, related to this omission, one member questioned
whether a court had authority to issue orders regarding depositions
taken in other states. 59 4 Although set aside for further subcommittee
study, the matter did not reappear before the Committee, and practical
jurisdictional problems remain for judicial interpretation. 595
Subsection (a)(2) is derived from Federal Rule 33(b) and reiterates
588. See FED. R. Civ. P. 36(b)(4)(B).
589. Proposed Rule 2-402(e)(2) reporter's note.
590. See Reference to Rogers' Memorandum and Committee Vote, Minutes, October 17-
18, 1980, at 5-7.
591. See Comments of Mr. Nilson, id.
592. 279 Md. 23, 367 A.2d 14 (1977).
593. See Reference to Rogers' Memorandum and Comments of Mr. Nilson, Minutes, Octo-
ber 17-18, 1980, at 7-8.
594. Comments of Judge Ross, Minutes, June 20-21, 1980, at 32.
595. See Comments of Mr. Nilson, id. at 32-33.
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the power of the court to direct the sequence and timing of all discov-
ery.596 The new rule eliminates as redundant Former Rule 406 b which
limited protective orders to the prevention of "genuine oppression or
abuse," but the Committee intended no change in the existing standards
for issuance of protective orders.59 7 Rather, the Committee incorpo-
rated the current provision in the language added from Federal Rule
26(c) concerning the prevention of "annoyance, embarrassment, oppres-
sion, or undue burden or expense."598
Overall, the modifications are designed to reduce abuses of discov-
ery. Although concern was expressed about the expense of discovery,
particularly for non-parties, the general reply was that protective orders
would alleviate cost problems.59 9 The order provision in section (b) is
derived from the second paragraph of Federal Rule 26(c). 6° Under the
new provision, the court may order compliance with discovery when de-
nying a protective order." Because the provision in Former Rule 406 c
for the payment of the opposing party's expenses has been omitted, ar-
guably expenses may no longer be available to parties successfully op-
posing a motion for a protective order.
Rule 2- 404-Perpetuation of Evidence 602
This rule substantially expands and seeks to clarify current Mary-
land practice. Section (a) applies broadly and allows all persons "who
may have an interest in an action" to perpetuate testimony or other
evidence. The Committee unanimously retained the scope of Former
Rule 402 rather than adopting the more restrictive federal approach,
which applies only to anticipated parties to an action,"o because it felt
that the new rule would better serve the need to preserve testimony.6 4
Although Former Rule 402 only allowed the use of depositions,
596. See MD. R.P. 2-401(b), dicussedat supra notes 553-62 and accompanying text.
597. See Minutes, June 20-21, 1980, at 33. The granting of a protective order is within the
sole discretion of the trial court and may be reversed only upon a clear showing of abuse of
discretion. See Galello v. Onasis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
598. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
599. See, e.g., Minutes, Oct. 17-18, 1980, at 14.
600. Proposed Rule 2-403(b) reporter's note.
601. For a discussion of the federal rule, see Rosenberg, Sanctions to Efectuate tetrzal Discov-
ery, 58 CoLo. L. REV. 480, 492-93 (1958).
602. The Committee deleted reference to "discoverable evidence" in the rule "since the
purpose of the rule is perpetuation of testimony, and not discovery." Comments of Judge
Ross, Consensus of Committee, Minutes, June 20-21, 1980, at 36.
603. The original draft of the rule followed the federal approach. See id. at 33; FED. R.
Civ. P. 27(a)(1)(1).
604. See Comments of Judge Ross, Voice Vote of Committee, Minutes, June 20-21, 1980,
at 36.
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subsection (a)(1) of the new rule allows perpetuation by deposition, by
production of documents, and by mental or physical examination. The
subsection retains the Maryland practice of not requiring, in all cases, a
motion, hearing, and order of court;6° 5 however, as under Rule 2-423,
mental and physical examinations will require an order.
60 6
In response to concern that disabled persons may be subject to the
hardship of examination in advance of litigation, one member stated
that protective orders should supplement the order requirement as a
remedy for abuse. 6 0 7 Further protection is provided by subsection (a)(2)
which requires inclusion of specified details in the notice, request, or
motion to avoid unfair surprise." 8 Indeed, subsection (a)(2)'s notice re-
quirement affords the potential defendant much more information than
did the former rule. Under Former Rule 402 a, a party seeking to take a
deposition before an action was instituted only had to notify potential
defendants of "the time and place for taking the deposition, the name or
descriptive title of the officer before whom the deposition [was] to be
taken, and the name and address of each person to be examined
.. 3..o Under Rule 2-404(a)(2), however, a party must give the
above stated information plus
a description of the subject matter of the expected action, a
description of the person's interest in the expected action, the
facts the person desires to establish through the evidence to be
perpetuated, the person's reasons for desiring to perpetuate the
evidence, and, in the case of a deposition, the substance of the
testimony that the person expects to elicit and a statement that
any person served has a right to be present.
The filing requirements of subsection (a)(3) also change Maryland
practice. Under Former Rule 402 d, the person seeking to perpetuate
evidence was required to designate the court in which that person pro-
posed to file the deposition. New Rule 2-404(a)(3) designates as the
proper court the circuit court in the county of residence of the expected
adverse party.6 1' This subsection also accelerates the time for indexing
by the clerk to the time when notice is filed, rather than the present
605. See Proposed Rule 2-402(a)(1) reporter's note. But cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 27(a)(1), (3)
(requiring petition and order).
606. See Proposed Rule 2-404(a)(1) reporter's note.
607. Comments of Mr. Lombardi, Mr. Brault, and Mr. Nilson, Minutes, June 20-21, 1980,
at 37.
608. Proposed Rule 2-404(a)(2) reporter's note. Although not so noted, the subsection re-
sembles the petition requirements found in FED. R. Civ. P. 27(a)(1).
609. Former Md. R.P. 405 a 2(a); see Former Md. R.P. 402 a.
610. MD. R.P. 2-404(a)(2).
611. See MD. R.P. 2-404(a)(3); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).
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practice of indexing when the completed deposition is filed.6 12 A new
provision that allows any party to request that the evidence to be per-
petuated be filed under seal comes from the standard practice in Balti-
more City.
New subsection (a) (4) governs service of the notice required by sub-
section (a)(2) and incorporates the Chapter 100 rules of Title 2.
Through this incorporation, the subsection retains some of the coverage
found in Former Rule 402 b 2 and c by requiring service "on each per-
son against whom the testimony or other evidence is expected to be
used."6 ' The subsection's new language requiring service "on any other
interested person" raises ambiguities about who must be served. It is
unclear who falls within this category, and the minutes reflect no discus-
sion of the question. The first portion of the subsection requires service
only on anticipated parties, because only parties could have testimony
used "against" them. However, because the rule comprehends preserva-
tion of evidence without regard to anticipated party status, the second
half of subsection (a)(4) seems to contemplate service on anyone "who
may have an interest in an action. '6 14 Narrowly read, the "interested
person" language could be limited to anticipated co-plaintiffs or co-de-
fendants who would not have the evidence used "against" them. Alter-
nately, the language could refer to standards applied in intervention.6"5
The Committee included subsection (a) (5) to allow the subpoena of
a non-party witness who refuses to appear.61 6 A proposal for a specific
provision to allow a non-party to recover expenses was not incorpo-
rated.6 17 Also new, subsection (a)(6) allows the general use of perpetu-
ated evidence against any person receiving notice and in any action
involving the same subject matter. This provision eliminates the previ-
ous requirement that permission of the court upon a showing of good
cause be obtained in order to use the perpetuated evidence in another
618
court.
Rule 2-404 (b) provides for the perpetuation of evidence after trial
612. Compare Former Md. R.P. 402 d ("Upon the filing of the deposition, the clerk shall
index the same .... "), with MD. R.P. 2-404(a)(3) ("The clerk shall index the notice, request,
or motion under the name of the person seeking to perpetuate evidence. ) (emphasis
added).
613. See Proposed Rule 2-404(a)(3) reporter's note. See Former Md. R.P. 402 b 2 (allowing
service upon an attorney, guardian, or committee of a person under a disability); id. c (pre-
scribing rule of service upon a nonresident).
614. See MD. R.P. 2-404(a)(1). Cf Former Md. R.P. 402 a (requiring notice only to "each
person against whom such deposition is expected to be used").
615. See MD. R.P. 2-214; Former Md. R.P. 208.
616. See Minutes, Sept. 12, 1980, at 41.
617. See Comments of Mr. Ryan, id.
618. See Former Md. R.P. 402 e; Proposed Rule 2-404(a)(6) reporter's note.
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and during appeal for use in the event of further proceedings at the trial
level. To prevent abuse, one seeking to perpetuate evidence pending
appeal is required to file a motion for leave to perpetuate evidence and
obtain an order of court. The court in issuing the order is empowered to
protect persons against annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or un-
due burden or expense.6 9
Rule 2-41I-Deposition-Right to Take
Rule 2-411 is derived from Former Rule 401 and slightly changes
Maryland practice by adding a third circumstance in which leave of
court is required prior to taking a deposition. As a general rule, leave of
court is not required. Under the former rules, leave was required to take
a deposition prior to the time when a defendant's initial pleading was
due, and to depose a prisoner. The new rule retains those requirements
but adds a third: Leave of court is now required before deposing "an
individual who has previously been deposed in the same action
"620
Rule 2- 412-Deposition-Nottice
In general, this rule consolidates and modifies various deposition
notice provisions found in a number of the former rules. Section (a)
expands to ten days the time for filing notice before oral deposition.
The Committee suggested that the five-day notice provision of Former
Rule 405 a 1 was too short and created hardship when judges could not
rule on protective orders within that time period. 62' By requiring that
notice and subpoena be served at least thirty days in advance of deposi-
tion when production of documents is required, section (c) eliminates
the inconsistency between Former Rule 419, which generally afforded a
party thirty days for production, and Former Rule 405 which required
production within five days when sought for a deposition.6 2
Because Rule 2-412 covers both oral and written depositions, sec-
tion (d) expands the methods available for discovery from a corporation,
partnership, association, or governmental agency. Practice under For-
mer Rule 405 a 2(b) allowed only oral deposition. In considering dis-
covery from organizations, the Committee addressed how the
organization should identify the individual who is designated to testify
619. See MD. R.P. 2-404(b); Proposed Rule 2-404(b) reporter's note.
620. MD. R. P. 2-411(b).
621. See Comments of Judge McAuliffe and Mr. Ryan, Motion of Judge McAuliffe, and
Unanimous Vote of Committee, Minutes, Oct. 17-18, 1980, at 45; see also discussion of MD.
R.P. 2-432(a), in/fa notes 696-98.
622. See Proposed Rule 2-424(c) reporter's note; Minutes, Sept. 12, 1980, at 25.
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on its behalf. A suggestion to require advance written designation of the
person to testify was withdrawn as too restrictive and unfair.6 2 3 One
member moved to require designation on the record, at the beginning of
the deposition of the subject matter about which each person appearing
for an organization will testify. Another member argued that this would
eliminate the incentive for earlier informal notification. The motion
was defeated.6 24 Thus, the rule does not specify in what manner a sub-
poened organization should designate the testifying individual. The
Committee notes indicate, however, that a telephone call or other rea-
sonable notice should be sufficient. Finally, although one member
noted current judicial uncertainty over the meaning of "managing
"1625 mmagent, other members noted that the term is useful to suggest that
senior corporate personnel generally should be designated.
626
Rule 2-413--Deposition-Place
Rule 2-413 essentially preserves Former Rule 408 in its entirety
with only minor stylistic changes. As under Former Rule 408 a 1 (b), the
nonresident forty-mile requirement in subsection (a)(l) does not con-
template service outside of Maryland.
6 27
Rule 2-414-Deposition- Ofjier Before Whom Taken
This rule represents a blend of current Maryland and federal prac-
tice. Section (a) expands the category of persons before whom in-state
depositions may be taken. A general definition of "any person author-
ized to administer an oath" replaces the specific officers listed in Former
Rule 403 a.62 8 Sections (b) and (e) retain Former Rule 403 b with stylis-
tic changes only. Section (b) allows depositions in other states to be
taken before any person authorized to administer an oath, or before any
person appointed by the court where the action is pending. Section (e)
continues the requirement that objections to the qualification of the of-
ficer be made before beginning the deposition or as soon as discovered.
Derived from Federal Rule 28(b),6 29 section (c) changes Maryland
practice on taking depositions in foreign countries in three respects:
First, section (c) expressly eliminates Former Rule 403 c's requirement
623. Motion of Mr. Ryan, Comments of Mr. Jones and Mr. Franch, Minutes, Sept. 12,
1980, at 13.
624. Motion of Mr. Bowen, Comments of Mr. Nilson, id.
625. Comments of Judge Ross, i.
626. Comments of Mr. Nilson, Mr. Niemeyer, id.
627. Comments of Mr. Ryan, id. at 15.
628. See id. at 14-15; Comments of Reporter, Mr. Bowie, Minutes, Oct. 17-18, 1980, at 11-
12.
629. Proposed Rule 2-414(c) reporter's note.
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that "[a] commission or letters rogatory shall be issued only when neces-
sary and convenient." New section (c) allows the court to issue commis-
sions or letters rogatory "on motion and notice and on terms that are
just and appropriate."6 3 Second, the section incorporates the general
definition of any person authorized to administer an oath from section
(a) rather than the specific officers listed in Former Rule 403 c. Finally,
the last sentence of section (c) expressly grants the court the discretion to
admit irregular responses to letters rogatory.6 3 '
Section (d), covering disqualification for interest, eliminates refer-
ence to the option under Former Rule 403 d that the parties may agree
to take a deposition before an interested person. This change will not
affect Maryland practice, however, because Rule 2-401 (e) allows parties
to stipulate, unless otherwise ordered by the courts, before whom a
desposition will be taken.
63 2
Rule 2-41---Deposition---Procedure
This rule consolidates various procedural provisions found in a
number of the former discovery rules and effects several changes. The
only changes to sections (a), (b), (c), (f), and (g) are stylistic. 63 3 The
Committee considered whether "cross-examination" in section (b) was
an inappropriate term because "cross-examination" at deposition fre-
quently comes from counsel for the witness, 634 but it later noted that
the terms are currently employed in federal and Maryland practice
without confusion.
635
Section (d), providing for correction and signature, does not materi-
ally alter Maryland practice. One minor change is that corrections are
now to be made by the deponent on a separate sheet and attached as
part of the deposition transcript. Although this was the procedure cus-
tomarily followed in the past, Former Rule 411 a 2 provided that correc-
tions were to be noted in the transcript itself. In addition the language
allowing the officer to sign the transcript if the deponent fails to sign is
slightly changed to cover expressly all possible reasons for the deponent's
failure to sign, including simple inadvertence.6 3 6 Under Former Rule
630. MD. R.P. 2-414(c).
631. Judge Ross and other members expressed concern, but the provision was not
amended. See Minutes, Sept. 12, 1980, at 15.
632. See MD. R.P. 2-401 (e); cf. Former Md. R.P. 403 d (providing that depositions shall not
be taken before an interested party "unless the parties agree thereto").
633. See Proposed Rule 2-415 reporter's note.
634. See Minutes, Sept. 12, 1980, at 26.
635. Comments of Reporter, Minutes, Oct. 17-18, 1980, at 12.
636. See Proposed Rule 2-415(d) reporter's note; Comments of Mr. Weiner, Minutes, Sept.
12, 1980, at 16.
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411 a 4, the officer was to sign for the deponent only under certain enu-
merated, albeit fairly inclusive, circumstances. Finally, as under the for-
mer rule, the new rule requires that both the deponent and the parties
waive signing. One member suggested that only the deponent should be
required to waive signature. Another member replied that the parties
have legitimate interests in the matter, since the deposition is part of
their litigation and they will be bound by it.
63 7
Section (e), governing certification, filing, and notice, substantially
changes one aspect of Maryland practice: Under the new rule, the tran-
script will be filed only upon request of a party. Former Rule 411 b 2
required the officer to file the transcript unless the parties agreed other-
wise. 638 The new rule retains the former requirements that the officer
give notice of filing to the party taking the deposition and that that
party, who may, or may not be the party requesting the filing, notify all
other parties.63 9 Motions to shift all notice burdens to the officer and to
limit notice to parties who attend the deposition both failed.6" With
respect to the latter proposal, the Committee noted that parties who
were not in attendance have a strong interest because they must rely on
the transcript and may not have a chance to depose the witness them-
selves."4 Notice was retained on the consensus of the Committee that
filing was an exception under the former rules and that its occurrence
deserved notice.64 2
Sections (h) and (i) slightly modify prior practice. In the event of a
refusal to answer a question, section (h) now requires that the deposition
be completed before filing a motion to compel. This procedure was op-
tional under former practice.6 3 Former practice for objections to correc-
tions is relaxed by section (i). The new rule requires "a motion to
suppress all or part of the corrections [to be] filed within sufficient time
before trial to allow for ruling by the court ... 644 Under Former
Rule 412 e, such a motion was required to be made "with reasonable
promptness after the corrections have been filed with the transcript." '6 45
637. Comments of Mr. Weiner, Minutes, Sept. 12, 1980, at 15-16.
638. See Proposed Rule 2-415(e) reporter's note; Minutes, Sept. 12, 1980, at 16. Deposi-
tions will not become part of a public record until filed. Comments of Dean Kelly and Mr.
Ryan, id.
639. See Minutes, Sept. 12, 1980, at 16-17.
640. See id.
641. See id.
642. See id
643. See Former Md. R.P. 422 a 2; Proposed Rule 2-415(h) reporter's note; Comments of
Chairman, Minutes, Oct. 17-18, 1980, at 44.
644. MD. R.P. 2-415(i).
645. Former Md. R.P. 412 e. See Proposed Rule 2-415(i) reporter's note.
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Rule 2- 4I6-Deposition-- Videotape and Audiotape
This rule retains the provisions recently adopted by the Court of
Appeals under Former Rules 409 and 4 10.646 The only change is that
the new rule allows "any deposition" to be recorded by videotape or
audiotape whereas the prior rule restricted the rule's coverage to "[a]ny
deposition to be taken upon oral examination." This change should
have no effect on the depositions that may be recorded by either of these
methods.6
47
Rule 2-417-Deposition-- Written Questions
This rule expands Maryland practice. Section (a) is derived from
Former Rule 405 b and enlarges the period for filing redirect and recross
questions from ten to fifteen days.648 Although the Committee minutes
do not reflect any comment on this specific change, it parallels the en-
largement of the time period for filing notice of oral depositions from
five to ten days effected by Rule 2-412(a).
When read with Rule 2-415(e), which requires a request by a party
before the officer files the transcript, Rule 2-417(b) changes former
Maryland practice, which required the officer to automatically file the
transcript unless the parties agreed otherwise.6"9 Now, the official need
only file the transcript if one of the parties requests. Derived from For-
mer Rule 412 c 3, section (c) enlarges the time for filing an objection to
recross questions from three days to seven days.650 The requirement of a
statement of grounds is new.
6 51
Rule 2-418--Deposition-By Telephone
This rule is new to Maryland practice and allows for discovery by
phone upon stipulation by the parties or court order. The new rule
adopts Federal Rule 30(b)(7).65 2
646. Adopted Oct. 1, 1980, effective January 1, 1981. Discussion by the Committee prior
to adoption of the former rules focused on general concerns about allowing videotape and
audiotape deposition as a matter of course, cost considerations, the added expense of requir-
ing typed transcripts, procedural and technical safeguards, utility of such depositions with
expert testimony, who should be present, and notice and correction provisions. See Minutes,
March 8, 1980, at 4-22; id., May 16-17, 1980, at 4-23.
647. Proposed Rule 2-416 reporter's note.
648. Proposed Rule 2-417(a) reporter's note.
649. See Former Md. R.P. 411; id. b 2.
650. Proposed Rule 2-417(c) reporter's note.
651. Id.
652. Proposed Rule 1-418 reporter's note.
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Rule 2-419--Deposition-Use
Rule 2-419 retains much of Former Rule 413 with stylistic changes
and some reorganization. The new rule eliminates the introductory lan-
guage of Former Rule 413, which limited use to specified proceedings.
Thus, it seems that depositions now may be used in any evidentiary pro-
ceeding. The Committee considered replacing the language "or upon
hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding" of Former Rule 413
with "or any proceeding at which evidence is to be taken." '6 5 3 Instead,
all introductory language was eliminated. Given the Committee's in-
tent to broaden deposition use, the alternate language appeared unnec-
essary. The Committee also eliminated part of Former Rule 413 a 5,
which provided for the substitution of parties, because that provision
was enlarged, under Rule 2-401(d), to cover all discovery. The express
requirement of dismissal of another action before use of depositions
taken therein is similarly eliminated.6 54
The Committee disagreed over how to assess the costs of a deposi-
tion. Originally, the Committee discussed including a provision on costs
patterned after Former Rule 415.655 Consistent with practice under
Former Rule 415, a draft provision required that costs of depositions
admitted into evidence be assessed as costs of the case, and allowed the
court discretion in assessing the costs of other depositions.6 56 After dis-
cussion and a variety of motions,6 5 7 the Committee narrowly voted to
delete the mandatory provisions and make the provision entirely discre-
tionary.658 That provision, however, did not emerge as part of the pro-
posed discovery rules. Instead, the Committee later reconsidered
assessing deposition costs as part of the general provision on costs in
Rule 2-603(c). After debating whether such costs were reasonably neces-
sary for trial or solely for discovery, and whether the standard under
Former Rule 415 was artificial, the Committee voted to eliminate any
express reference to the court's power to assess deposition CoStS. 6 5 9 On
motion of a party and after hearing, Rule 2-603(c) now allows the court
to "assess as costs any reasonable and necessary expenses, to the extent
permitted by rule or law."6" The new rules contain no general provi-
sion on deposition costs, either mandatory or discretionary. 661 Rule
653. Minutes, Sept. 12, 1980, at 30.
654. Compare MD. R.P. 2-419(c) with Former Md. R.P. 413 a 5.
655. Minutes, Sept. 12, 1980, at 29-30.
656. Id.; see Former Md. R.P. 415.
657. Minutes, Sept. 12, 1980, at 31.
658. Id
659. Minutes, Nov. 20-21, 1981, at 32.
660. See Comments of Mr. Nilson, Mr. Niemeyer, Mr. Brault, and Mr. Bowen, 1.
661. MD. R.P. 2-603(b); cf Former Md. R.P. 415.
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2-415(a), however, allows the court discretion to assess transcription
costs and Rule 2-433(c) provides for expenses incurred in compelling
discovery.
Rule 2-421-Interrogatories to Parties
With a few changes, Rule 2-421 retains the former Maryland prac-
tice with respect to interrogatories. Section (a) combines Former Rule
417 a 1 and 2 governing availability and number. The limit of one set
of thirty questions is retained. 662 Although some Committee members
expressed dissatisfaction over retaining the thirty question limit, one
member explained that even though arbitrary, the rule has proven
workable in practice. The limit seems consistent with the general policy
of countering discovery abuse which the Committee expressed in discus-
sion of other rules. The requirement derived from Former Rule 417 a I
that all parties be furnished copies of interrogatories does not appear in
the language of this rule, but it survives under Rule 1-321(a).6 63
With several changes, section (b) retains the practice under Former
Rule 417 b 1 and b 2.664 Objections no longer need to be stated under
oath.6 6 5 Response time is expanded to the later of thirty days after ser-
vice of the interrogatories or fifteen days after the time for filing the
initial pleading.6 66  And the rule adopts the local Maryland federal
practice of restating each interrogatory before answering it. 6 6 7
Section (c) retains the option contained in Former Rule 417 f that
in response to interrogatories, a party may specify that the answer may
be found in certain business records and may allow the party serving the
interrogatories to inspect those records. In addition to the conditions
found in the former rule, section (c) adds a specificity requirement from
Federal Rule 33(c) to curb discovery abuse. 6 6 8 The section requires that
the party answering the interrogatory specify the records from which the
answer may be obtained with sufficient detail to allow the "interrogat-
ing party to locate and to identify [the records], as readily as can the
662. Comments of Judge Ross, Minutes, Sept. 12, 1980, at 34.
663. Proposed Rule 2-421 (a) reporter's note. See MD. R.P. 1-321 (a) (requiring that "every
pleading and every other paper filed subsequent to the original pleading shall be served upon
each of the parties").
664. See Minutes, Sept. 12, 1980, at 34.
665. Id.
666. Compare Former Md. R.P. 417 b I (answer within 30 days "or by the day on which
defendant's initial pleading is required"), with MD. R.P. 2-421 (b) (answer within 30 days "or
within 15 days after the date on which that party's initial pleading or motion is required").
667. D. MD. LOCAL R. 6(c).
668. Proposed Rule 2 -421(c) reporter's note.
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party served.1
6 69
Rule 2- 422-Discovety of Documents and Property
In substance, this rule retains the practice under Former Rule 419
but adopts language from Federal Rule 34.670 Additional language in
section (a) specifies that multiple requests may be made and that the
respondent may be required to translate data into "reasonably usable
form." '67 1 Section (d) has been borrowed from the federal rule "to avoid
obfuscation in document production," '67 2 and requires the producing
party to produce the records as they are kept in the ordinary course of
business or organize and label them in accordance with the request.
Rule 2- 423--Mental or Physical Examination of Persons
Rule 2-423 substantively follows Former Rule 420 with changes in
style and organization. Former Rule 420 required that the mental or
physical condition be "material to any matter involved in any action
.... ,673 This language has been changed to parallel the federal re-
quirement that the condition be "in controversy. ' 6 74 In addition to the
separate availability of a protective order, the requirement of an order
before examination protects against successive examinations and exami-
nations by a physician to whom the party or person to be examined
objects. 675
Rule 2-424-Admission of Facts and Genuineness of Documents
This rule incorporates aspects of both Former Rule 421 and federal
practice to create a new provision. Under section (a), when a party re-
quests an admission of the genuineness of a document, copies of the orig-
inal document need not be filed. Such copies must, however, be served
with the request for an admission unless they have been provided other-
669. MD. R.P. 2 -42 1(c).
670. Proposed Rule 2-422 reporter's note.
671. See MD. R.P. 1-422(a); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a).
672. Proposed Rule 2-422 reporter's note. This provision in FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b) became
effective on August 1, 1980, and was "designed to avoid the practice of some litigants deliber-
ately to mix critical documents with many others in the hope of obscuring significance." FED.
R. CIv. P. 34(b) advisory committee note.
673. Former Md. R.P. 420.
674. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a). While the committee materials reflect no discussion of this
change, the federal rule imports a more specific and particular requirement. See Schlagen-
hauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 121-22 (1964); Winters v. Travia, 495 F.2d 839, 841 (2d Cir.
1974).
675. Comments of Judge Ross, Mr. Nilson, and Professor Bowie, Minutes, Oct. 17-18,
1980, at 15.
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wise.6 76 Section (a) also adds a provision borrowed from Federal Rule
36(a) which requires that each matter requested for admission be sepa-
rately stated. Unlike the federal rule, however, this section retains the
Maryland practice of limiting admissions to facts.
Section (b) combines the substance of Former Rule 421 with addi-
tional provisions from Federal Rule 36(a).6 77 In a minor change from
the former rule, the party need only sign the response to a request for an
admission rather than provide a statement under oath. More signifi-
cantly, the new section adds an affirmative duty for the respondent to
make "reasonable inquiry" before basing failure to admit or deny upon
lack of information or knowledge. The Committee intended that the
"reasonable inquiry" standard impose the minimal requirement upon a
party to gather the information necessary to respond to a request for an
admission. The requirement entails more than merely reviewing docu-
ments in the respondent's possession; however, if after inquiry the re-
spondent cannot readily obtain the information, the requirement is
satisfied.67 Language added from the federal rule clarifies the obliga-
tion to respond with specificity and provides that a request presenting a
genuine issue for trial is not objectionable on that ground alone.
Section (c) retains the practice under Former Rule 421 d for deter-
mining the sufficiency of the response. It adds, however, new require-
ments for the form of the motion.6 79 The motion must recite the request
and the anwer or objection, and give reasons for challenging the answer
or objection. If the court determines that an answer is insufficient, it
may order that the matter is admitted or that the answer must be
amended.
While abolishing as unnecessary the distinction between actual and
implied admissions, section (d) continues to limit the effect of admissions
to the pending action.6"' The section adopts the more specific federal
standard for withdrawal or amendment. 61 ' A two-part test now replaces
the "injustice" standard of Former Rule 421 f: First, the mo-
vant/respondent must demonstrate that the admission undermines pres-
entation of the merits. Second, the party who obtained the admission
must fail to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will be prej-
676. Comments of Judge Ross, Mr. Nilson, id. at 18.
677. See Proposed Rule 2-424(b) reporter's note.
678. See Comments of Mr. Sykes, Mr. Nilson, and Consensus of Committee, Minutes, Oct.
17-18, 1980, at 18-19.
679. See Proposed Rule 2-424(c) reporter's note. FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a) does not have
similar requirements.
680. See Proposed Rule 2-424(d) reporter's note; Comments of Mr. Ryan and Mr. Nilson,
Minutes, Oct. 17-18, 1980, at 20.
681. See FED. R. Civ. P. 36(b).
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udicial. The Discovery Subcommittee felt that the two-part test states
more succinctly the elements found in the former standard.68 2 One
member noted that the former practice placed the entire burden on the
party moving to withdraw the admission, while the new rule places a
burden on both the movant and the party who obtained the
admission.6"3
Section (e) expands Former Rule 421 e by incorporating more spe-
cific grounds for denying a request for expenses, which are borrowed
from federal practice. a4 The most significant ground for not awarding
expenses under the new rule is if the party had a "reasonable ground to
expect to prevail." Under the former rule, a party must have had "good
reasons" for refusing to admit." 5 The addition of reasonable grounds
(the "good reason" exception is retained) apparently relaxes the stan-
dard by which a party may avoid an assessment of attorneys' fees.
Rule 2-431-Certiicate Requirement
The new rule expands Former Rule 442 d and eliminates the re-
quirement that an attorney requesting the court's intervention in a dis-
covery dispute actually consult with the opposing attorney. Instead the
rule requires that the attorney file a certificate describing the "good
faith attempts" to discuss the resolution of the dispute. The Committee
discussed this change in light of the Standing Committee's recent pro-
mulgation, at the request of the Court of Appeals, of Former Rule 422
d.68 6 The Committee viewed the rule as an attempt by the court to
encourage more effort by attorneys to settle discovery disputes without
court involvement.6"7 After some discussion, the Committee agreed that
the rule should make clear that no absolute requirement of personal
consultation exists, provided that the party makes a good faith attempt
to consult. 68a
The rule reduces the judicial work load by omitting the require-
ment of a hearing; the court, in its discretion, may rule on the dispute
with or without a hearing." 9 One member of the Committee expressed
concern that the new rule might have the opposite effect of increasing
682. Comments of Mr. Nilson, Minutes, Oct. 17-18, 1980, at 19.
683. Comments of Judge McAuliffe, i. at 20.
684. See Proposed Rule 2-4 2 4(e) reporter's note; FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c).
685. Former Md. R.P. 421 e.
686. Comments of Mr. Nilson, Minutes, Oct. 17-18, 1980, at 20.
687. See Comments of Judge Ross, id. at 21. Judge Ross implied by example that mere
writing of a letter to which no response was received would not satisfy "good faith attempts."
d.
688. See Comments of Mr. Sykes and Judge McAuliffe, id.
689. Proposed Rule 2-431 reporter's note.
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the number of hearings, because the former rule imposed a certificate
requirement only to obtain a hearing, and thus, allowed the court to
dispose of many discovery matters without a hearing.6 90 But, the Com-
mittee intended that the new rule should enable the discovery judge to
use discretion in denying a hearing and ruling on the record.6 9 1 This
intent parallels the new approach of Rule 2-311 (f) on motions generally,
which provides that the court may decide any motion without a hear-
ing, unless the motion would be dispositive of a claim or defense or un-
less a rule expressly provides for a hearing.6 92
Although Rules 2-431 and 2-311 (f) may reduce the number of hear-
ings, the removal of the actual consultation requirement may produce a
greater number of disputes over whether or not "good faith attempts"
have been made.69 3 The specific facts required in the second sentence of
Rule 2-431, therefore, become important objective criteria for establish-
ing "good faith attempts."
The certification requirement serves an important function in pro-
moting earlier resolution of discovery disputes. Reliance on sanctions
alone would allow dilatory behavior on both sides until a sanction was
imminent.69 4 Although the rule does not so state, two members of the
Committee thought that the new rule contemplates filing of a motion, in
accordance with Rule 2-432, in advance of filing the certification.69 5
Rule 2-432-Motions Upon Failure to Provide Discovery
Section (a) of this rule preserves prior practice by allowing an im-
mediate motion for sanctions in three situations.6 96 Section (a) modifies
Former Rule 422 c 3 so that the court may excuse failure of discovery on
the basis of an objection only if "a protective order has been obtained
under Rule 2-403.""' 7 The prior rule allowed excuse upon appl'cation for
690. Comments of Judge Ross, Minutes, Oct. 17-18, 1980, at 22.
691. Minutes, Oct. 17-18, 1980, at 22-23.
692. MD. R.P. 2-311(0 departs from the practice under Former Md. R.P. 321 d where a
hearing was mandatory upon request. See Melnick v. Ammerman, 38 Md. App. 635, 382
A.2d 337 (1978); see also discussion of MD. R.P. 2-311, supra notes 386-400 and accompanying
text.
693. For example, parties seeking to avoid adjudication of the discovery dispute may seek
to have the certification stricken under MD. R.P. 1-311 (c).
694. Comments of Judge Ross, Minutes, Oct. 17-18, 1980, at 22.
695. Comments of Mr. Ryan and Mr. Sykes, id. at 23.
696. A party may move for sanctions without first obtaining an order compelling discovery
if the person designated to appear for an organization under MD. R.P. 2-412(d) fails to ap-
pear, if a party fails to respond to interrogatories, or if a party fails to respond to a request for
production or inspection under Rule 2-422. MD. R.P. 2-432 (a).
697. Proposed Rule 2-432(a) reporter's note; Minutes, Oct. 17-18, 1980, at 44-46; cf. FED.
R. Civ. P. 37(d).
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a protective order.69 8
Section (b) expands the grounds for compelling discovery by order
in Former Rule 422 a 2 by adding provisions that allow a court to order
discovery if a party fails to comply with a request for production of doc-
uments or fails to supplement a prior response. Provisions covering the
form of the motion are adopted from Former Rule 417 c 2 (exceptions to
interrogatories). To promote practicality and convenience, the new rule
allows the moving party to attach the relevant transcript pages from
depositions and does not require the duplication of interrogatories when
no response has been made.
Rule 2-433--Sanctions
Section (a) is derived from portions of Former Rule 422 covering
discovery failures and outlines some of the actions a court may take if it
finds that one party has failed to comply with the discovery rules. Sec-
tion (b) requires a motion by a party to impose sanctions for failure to
comply. Section (c) adopts former practice and allows the prevailing
party in a discovery dispute to seek to recover costs and attorneys' fees in
certain circumstances. However, section (c) intentionally alters the pre-
sumptions to favor the party seeking expenses by providing that the
court shall require the payment of such expenses unless it finds that the
opposing party's stance was "substantially justified" or that an award of
expenses would be "unjust." '6 9 9 This shift seeks to deter frivolous mo-
tions and oppositions to motions.70  An opportunity for a hearing is
required before award of expenses.7 0
Rule 2-434-Expenses for Failure to Pursue Deposition
With minor stylistic changes, Rule 2-434 retains Former Rule
414.702 Although Rule 2-433 (c) provides for a hearing prior to award-
ing expenses concerned with sanctions and protective orders, Rule 2-434
has no hearing requirement. 70 3 Nevertheless, an award of expenses is
698. See Comments of Ms. Ogletree, Minutes, Oct. 17-18, 1980, at 44. Ms. Ogletree indi-
cated that the current five-day notice requirement for depositions would create a hardship in
her county under the obligation to obtain a protective order because judges might not be
available to rule on requests on short notice. To accommodate, Judge McAuliffe moved to
change the notice period to 15 days and to make excuse conditioned on obtaining a protective
order. Id. at 44-45.
699. See Proposed Rule 2-433(c) reporter's note.
700. Id.
701. The Committee felt strongly that a hearing must be held before an award of expenses
is granted. See Minutes, Oct. 17-18, 1980, at 32, 33.
702. See Proposed Rule 2-434 reporter's note; FED. R. Civ. P. 30(g)(1), (2).
703. See MD. R.P. 2-311 (f) (providing that the court may decide any motion without hear-
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discretionary with the court when a party noting a deposition fails to
attend.
E Chapter 500-TRIAL
Rule 2-501-Motion for Summary Judgment
Rule 2-501 is principally derived from and intended to clarify For-
mer Rule 610. The new rule is also more streamlined, omitting provi-
sions more appropriately included in rules of general application, such
as those dealing with hearing requirements,7 0 ' bad-faith sanctions,70 5
and consequences of failure to respond to a motion.70 6
Unlike the former rule, the new rule expressly requires the party
opposing a motion for summary judgment to file a response to the mo-
tion.7" 7 By clearly requiring a motion and a response to it, the new rule
prevents a court from entering summary judgment entirely on its own
initiative.70 8 Cases construing the former rules suggest that a court may
enter summary judgment on its own motion.70 9
The new rule also eliminates present confusion regarding when op-
ing, unless the motion is dispositive of a claim or defense, or unless a rule expressly provides
for a hearing. But cf. Comments of Judge McAuliffe and Consensus of Committee, Minutes,
Oct. 17-18, 1980, at 33 (expenses cannot be awarded without a hearing).
704. Former Md. R.P. 610 d I required that "there [be] no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and that [the movant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Similar
requirements now appear in MD. R.P. 2-501(a), applicable to all hearings in civil actions,
regardless of the hearing's subject. See MD. R.P. 1-101 (MD. R.P. Title 2 applies to all civil
matters in circuit courts).
705. Compare Former Md. R.P. 610 e with MD. R.P. 1-311(c), (sanctions for signing plead-
ing or paper with intent to defeat purpose of rule).
706. Under the former rule, an opponent's failure to respond to a motion for summary
judgment "constitute[d] an admission for purposes of the motion of all statements of fact in
the affidavit of the moving party, but did not constitute an admission that such motion or
affidavit was legally sufficient." Former Md. R.P. 610 a 3.
707. See MD. R.P. 2-311(b) (response required to all motions to shorten or extend time
requirements, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, for new trial, or to alter or amend
judgment). Moreover, Rule 2-501(b) requires the response to "identify with particularity the
material facts that are disputed." MD. R.P. 2-501(b). Thus, the rule will ensure presentation
to the court of all the information necessary to rule on the motion. In some cases, the new
rule's requirement of a full response may, in addition, facilitate disposition of the motion
without a hearing. See MD. R.P. 2-31 1(f) (no hearing required before denying motion). Even
in cases in which a hearing is required, the response should shorten the hearing by identifying
in advance the precise issues to be resolved. Hence, the new rule should both improve the
quality of practice on motions for summary judgment and speed the disposition of those
motions.
708. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Oct. 16, 1981, at 48-49.
709. E.g., Preissman v. Harmatz, 264 Md. 715, 720-21, 288 A.2d 180, 184 (1972); Hunt v.
Montgomery County, 248 Md. 403, 411, 237 A.2d 35, 39 (1968). But see Brown, Summary
Judgment in Maryland, 38 MD. L. REV. 188, 199-201 (1978) (cases suggesting motion is not
required do so in dictum and without analysis of the question).
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position to a motion for summary judgment must be supported by
affidavit.71 °
[I]f [current] rule 610 is taken at face value, an opposing party,
in cases in which no affidavit is required [of the moving party],
could merely rest on the more general denials of his pleadings
... . In numerous reported cases, Maryland attorneys ap-
pear to have followed just such a procedure but have paid
dearly for it, losing their cases.7 1'
The new rule requires affidavit support for a response whenever the mo-
tion is supported by an affidavit, whether or not affidavits were re-
quired for the motion.7 2 The rule thus follows the cases that have
imposed demands on parties "beyond those literally required by Rule
6 10. '7 13
Section (e) of the new rule incorporates the procedure of Rule 2-602
into the court's decision to enter a partial summary judgment for some,
but not all of the parties, claims, or relief.7 '1  Under that procedure, the
court may determine whether its grant of partial summary judgment is
a final judgment and thus appealable.7 15 Under Former Rule 610, the
granting of a motion for summary judgment was not a final judgment.
Section (f) of the new rule, although otherwise quite similar to For-
mer Rule 610 d 4, expressly provides for modification of an "order speci-
fying the issues or facts not in genuine dispute ' 716 when that is necessary
"to prevent manifest injustice."' 7
Rule 2-502--Separation of Questions for Decision by Court
Rule 2-502 is not meant to change the substance of Former Rule
502, from which it is derived, but only to limit its applicability clearly to
710. Former Md. R.P. 610 required an affidavit in support of a motion for summary judg-
ment only when the motion was filed with an initial pleading or before the defendant filed an
answer. The former rule required a supporting affidavit to accompany the response to a
summary judgment motion only if the movant was required to submit a supporting affidavit.
711. Brown, supra note 709, at 204.
712. MD. R.P. 2-501(b).
713. Brown, supra note 709, at 204-05.
714. Compare MD. R.P. 1-501(e) with MD. R.P. 2-602.
715. If the court "expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay and expressly
directs the entry of judgment," it may direct the entry of a final judgment as to fewer than all
parties or claims. MD. R.P. 2-602 (emphasis added). Only if the court does so is a partial
summary judgment final and immediately appealable under the new rules.
716. MD. R.P. 2-501(0. This section of the rule clearly indicates that, unless entered pur-
suant to MD. R.P. 2-602, a ruling on a motion for summary judgment has the same effect as
any other pre-trial order.
717. Id. Such an order might be used to dispose of the issue of liability, allowing a trial on
the amount of damages alone. Minutes, Oct. 16, 1981, at 50. However, the new rule's use is
not limited to orders of that nature, as Former Md. R.P. 610 d I apparently was.
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questions of law.7 ' The former rule allowed a court, when deciding a
separated question, to draw all inferences that a jury could have
drawn.7" 9 The Committee feared that that language might encourage a
court to act in derogation of a party's right to trial by jury.72 ° To elimi-
nate that possibility, the rule is worded to apply only to questions
"within the sole province of the court to decide," 72 ' and the court's find-
ings of fact or factual inferences must relate to the separated question."'
The separate-question procedure thus could be used to determine, for
example, whether a contract is so ambiguous that parol evidence will be
admissible in the trial before a jury,72 but could not be used to impair a
litigant's right to have the ultimate issues of fact determined by the
jury.724
The Committee took the unusual step of appending a Committee
Note to Rule 2-502 to distinguish its function from those of related
rules.7 25 When an issue or claim arises as to which there is no genuine
dispute regarding any material fact, the court should direct the parties
to move for summary judgment and should proceed under Rule 2-
50 1.726 When an issue is not within the sole province of the court, but
ought to be tried separately for convenience or to avoid prejudice, the
court should proceed under Rule 2-503(b)7 27 and may do so on its own
motion.
Rule 2-503-- Consolidation,- Separate Trials
Rule 2-503 is neither intended nor expected to change prior Mary-
718. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Mar. 6-7, 1981, at 26. That rule stated that "[tihe court
may draw all inferences of facts or law that the court orju ycould have drawn... " Former
Md. R.P. 502 b (emphasis added). Thus, the rule did not clearly limit the scope of the court's
action to questions of law.
719. Former Md. R.P. 502 b.
720. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Mar. 6-7, 1981, at 25; Explanatory Note, Minutes, June
19-20, 1981, at 11.
721. Thus, the rule will prevent trial courts from using the separate question technique to,
in effect, enter a summary judgment on its own motion. Cf Harris v. Stefanowicz Corp., 26
Md. App. 213, 217-18, 337 A.2d 455, 458 (1975) (trial court relied on Former Md. R.P. 502 to
effectively enter summary judgment on its own motion).
722. MD. R.P. 2-502.
723. Comments of Judge McAuliffe, Minutes, Mar. 6-7, 1981, at 26.
724. Minutes, Mar. 6-7, 1981, at 27. The technique could also be used to decide at an
early stage questions of law arising in a nonjury trial.
725. The Note is not intended to be any part of the rule. Indeed, the Committee generally
avoided appending notes to avoid the notes becoming de facto rules. However, in this case,
the Committee believed the need for clarification outweighed that concern. Minutes, Mar. 6-
7, 1981, at 27-28; Explanatory Note, Minutes, June 19-20, 1981, at 11.
726. MD. R.P. 2-502 committee note.
727. Id
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land practice.7 28 Section (b) completes the triad of rules providing for
expedited or separate proceedings on particular aspects of an action, by
allowing separate trial of any claim or issue whenever such a proceeding
would be more convenient or less prejudicial.7 29 Section (a) directs at-
tention to Maryland Code, Courts Article, § 6-104(b), which provides
for consolidation of District Court with circuit court cases. Under that
statute, an action may be removed from the District Court to a circuit
court for consolidation with an action instituted in the circuit court.7 30
Neither the statute nor the rule, however, expressly states whether the
District Court action, once transferred, automatically would be or must
be consolidated with the circuit court action.7 3 While automatic con-
solidation might deprive some circuit court litigants of an opportunity
to be heard on the appropriateness of consolidation of particular ac-
tions, 73 2 the circuit court's refusal to consolidate the actions would ap-
pear to defeat the purpose of the removal from the District Court.73 3
Rule 2-504-Pretrial Conference
Rule 2-504 changes practice under Former Rule 504 in three prin-
cipal ways. First, the rule allows the court to direct all the parties to
prepare statements of the matters to be addressed at a pretrial confer-
ence.7 3 1 Second, the list of matters to be considered at a pretrial confer-
ence has been expanded. 735 Third, the rule requires a pretrial order
reciting the decisions reached at the conference; the former rule left the
making of such an order to the discretion of the court.73 6
Some confusion regarding the necessary content of pretrial state-
ments may arise from the wording of the new rule. Section (a) requires
each party to file "a written statement addressing the matters listed in
section (b) . . . ." Section (b) indicates that the listed "matters may be
considered," but presumably not all of them need be, at the pretrial
conference. The intent of the rule is to require parties' pretrial state-
728. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Apr. 21, 1981, at 4.
729. Cf MD. R.P. 501(a).
730. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-104 (1984).
731. At least one member of the Committee felt that a circuit court could deny a consoli-
dation motion after a hearing, despite the District Court's grant of the transfer motion. Auto-
matic consolidation in contrast, might deprive circuit court litigants of an opportunity to be
heard on the issue of consolidation. Minutes, Apr. 21, 1981, at 5-6.
732. The parties so deprived could be those who had not been involved in the District
Court action and who consequently had not been heard on the transfer motion.
733. Under MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-104 (1984), consolidation may itself
be the sole ground for a removal.
734. The former rule did not provide for such statements. See Former Md. R.P. 504.
735. Compare Former Md. R.P. 504 b with MD. R.P. 2-504(b).
736. Former Md. R.P. 504 c.
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ments to address those matters they intend to raise at the pretrial confer-
ence and any others that the court directs them to address.7 37
Rule 2-504 itself does not expressly require parties to exchange their
pretrial statements before the conference. But Rule 1-321 requires ser-
vice of all papers filed after the original pleading.7 38 Thus, the require-
ment that parties exchange their pretrial statements is embodied in the
more general rule.
The expanded list of matters that may be considered at a pretrial
conference is derived substantially from subparts 1 through 10 of Rule
35(B) of the United States District Court for Maryland.7 39 The new
rule, unlike Former Rule 504, expressly authorizes consideration in con-
ference of the facts on which the parties intend to rely,740 the details of
the damage claimed or other relief sought, 7 4  and the documents or
records the parties will offer as primary evidence.74 2 The new rule also
adds "limitation" of issues to the former rule's "simplification of the is-
sues" 7 4 3 and provides for consideration of stipulations as well as requests
for admissions.14 4 At the same time, the new rule deletes the former
rule's express provision for considering a reference of matters to an audi-
tor.7 45 Instead, the procedures for referrals to masters, examiners, and
auditors are governed by the rules pertaining to those officers.74 6
Under Former Rule 504, the court "may make an order which re-
cites the action taken at the conference . . . . ,,74' The new rule man-
dates issuing an order, which will control the subsequent course of the
action, subject to the court's modification.7 48 A pretrial order requiring
amendments to the pleadings would also apparently supersede Rule 2-
341(a), which allows a party to amend a pleading.749 The Committee
agreed that the pretrial order should, in such a case, limit the general
right of amendment granted by that rule.750
737. Minutes, Apr. 21, 1981, at 13-14.
738. The pretrial statements must be filed, and proof of service is a prerequisite to all
filings. MD. R.P. 1-323.
739. Minutes, Apr. 21, 1981, at 14.
740. MD. R.P. 2-504(b)(1)-(3).
741. MD. R.P. 2-504(b)(7).
742. MD. R.P. 2-504(b)(8).
743. Compare MD. R.P. 2-504(b)(5) with Former Md. R.P. 504 b 1.
744. Compare MD. R.P. 2-504(b)(6) with Former Md. R.P. 504 b 3.
745. Former Md. R.P. 504 b 5.
746. For a discussion of MD. R.P. 2-541, 2-542 and 2-543, see infra notes 939-67 and accom-
panying text.
747. Former Md. R.P. 504 c (emphasis added).
748. Id.
749. For a discussion of MD. R.P. 2-341 (a), see supra notes 537-49 and accompanying text.
750. Minutes, Apr. 21, 1981, at 15-16.
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Rule 2-505---Removal
Former Rule 542 provided for removal of actions at law from one
court to another when necessary to obtain a fair and impartial trial."'
Rule 2-505 extends the availability of removal to all actions, in accord-
ance with the proposed merger of law and equity.75 2 However, the ex-
tension may conflict with article IV, section 8 of the Maryland
Constitution, which grants a right of removal "in all suits or actions at
law . . . ." The constitutional provision, in existence in some form
since 1806,TM is designed to protect litigants from possibly prejudiced
juries.75 5 Therefore, the Court of Appeals has held the right of removal
under previous constitutional language inapplicable, by its nature, to
suits in equity.7 56 At the same time, the court has concluded that the
right is applicable to nonjury actions at law.7 57 Thus, the question re-
mains whether the proposed rule properly can make the right of re-
moval available in all actions.
Rule 2-506-Voluntaiy Dismissal
Rule 2-506 replaces the procedure for dismissal in Former Rules
541 a and 582 with that embodied in Federal Rule 41(a)(1). Under the
former rules, any party to an action at law could dismiss the action or
claim without leave of court at any time before the introduction of evi-
dence.7 58 In contrast, parties to suits in equity were required to obtain
leave of court to dismiss their actions or claims.7 59 The new rule re-
quires a plaintiff in any action to obtain leave of court for dismissal after
the adverse party files an answer or a motion for summary judgment. 76 °
Similarly, Rule 2-506 would allow dismissal of a counterclaim, cross-
claim, or third-party claim without leave only until the filing of an
answer. 
761
751. Former Md. R.P. 542 a 1.
752. MD. R.P. 2-301. See supra text accompanying notes 354-62.
753. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 8 (emphasis added).
754. See Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 64 n.5, 344 A.2d 422, 429 n.5 (1975)(history of
constitutional provision).
755. Id. The right, being concerned with the possible bias ofjuries and not with the quali-
fications of judges, does not include the right to a different judge.
756. Olson v. Love, 234 Md. 503, 504, 200 A.2d 66, 67 (1964); Ezersky v. Ezersky, 40 Md.
App. 713, 715, 394 A.2d 1225, 1226 (1978).
757. See Greenberg v. Dunn, 245 Md. 651, 656-57, 227 A.2d 242, 246-47 (1967) (interpret-
ing former section).
758. Former Md. R.P. 541 a. The same right applies to any counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party claim. Id
759. Former Md. R.P. 582.
760. Mo. R.P. 2-506(b).
761. The Subcommittee that proposed the rule reasoned that rights may accrue to a de-
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Because the new rule extends the right of dismissal without leave to
claimants in equity-type actions, it also imposes the "two dismissal" rule
on those claimants.7 62 Thus, a unilateral notice of dismissal filed by a
party who had previously dismissed an action on the same claim would
operate as an adjudication on the merits, regardless of the nature of the
action.7 63 A Committee member questioned whether the parties were
permitted to stipulate that a second dismissal would be without preju-
dice. Another member indicated that the two dismissal rule does not
apply to stipulations of dismissal or to dismissals granted by order of
court. Only a unilaterial "notice of dismissal" operates as an adjudica-
tion on the merits. 6
Rule 2-507-Dismissal for Lack ofJurisidiclzon or Prosecut'on
Rule 2-507 is not intended to change substantially prior practice
under Former Rule 530 for automatic dismissal of inactive cases. 76 5
Rule 2-507(a) does not, however, include the ambiguous reference to
guardianships "of disabled persons" contained in Former Rule 530 a.7 66
Thus, the rule clearly exempts from its operation all continuing guard-
ianships. 76" There was considerable Committee discussion regarding the
use of docket entries as the triggering mechanism in the dismissal proce-
dure. For example, a letter from counsel to the clerk that inquires
whether a docket entry has been made within the past year is itself a
docket entry within the meaning of section (c). Even this amount of
interest will serve to keep a case alive. 7 ' Despite this loose construction
of the rule, the rule provides a simple mechanism that counsel may use
to correct problems resulting from the operation of Rule 2-507. For ex-
ample, if lengthy delays in setting a trial date cause the clerk to serve a
fendant in an equity case by virtue of the filing of an answer. To protect those rights, a
plaintiff should be required to obtain leave of the court or the consent of the other parties to a
dismissal. Minutes, May 22-23, 1981, at 47. See also Byron Lasky & Assocs., Inc. v. Cameron-
Brown Co., 33 Md. App. 231, 236, 364 A.2d 109, 112-13 (1976) ("The obvious reason for the
requirement is to prevent unilateral dismissal of cases in which a defendant has acquired a
right to affirmative relief.").
762. So long as a plaintiff may dismiss only with leave of court, there is no need for the
rule, because the order of dismissal would state whether the dismissal was with prejudice.
Therefore, the "two dismissal" rule applies only to situations in which dismissal is unilateral,
by the filing of a notice of dismissal. MD. R.P. 2-506(c).
763. Id.
764. Comments of Professor Bowie and Mr. Brault, Minutes, May 22-23, 1981, at 48-49.
765. Minutes, May 22-23, 1981, at 50; Former Md. R.P. 530.
766. Former Md. R.P. 530 a provided for its application to "all actions except actions
involving . . . guardianships of the person or property of disabled persons."
767. Minutes, May 22-23, 1981, at 52-53.
768. Comments of the Reporter and Judge McAuliffe, id. at 51.
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notice of dismissal, the parties may move, under section (e) for a deferral
of dismissal for good cause shown.
Rule 2-508-Conltnuance
Rule 2-508 retains the substance of Former Rules 526 and 527,769
but eliminates the present two term limit on continuances, requires
greater specificity in supporting affidavits, and increases the trial court's
discretion in certain cases.
Former Rule 527 precluded continuances beyond the second term
of court after service of process upon the defendant, unless there was an
agreement of the parties, a showing of good cause, or another rule pro-
viding for longer continuances. 770 That restriction was intended to pro-
mote "the orderly and prompt dispatch of business." 1' 7 7  Rule 2-508 lifts
that restriction, leaving prevention of undue delay in proceedings to the
exercise of the trial court's discretion to deny continuances.7 72
Rule 2-508(c) enumerates the content requirements for an affidavit
supporting a continuance motion based on the absence of a necessary
witness. While Former Rule 527 c 2 was, in general, satisfied by con-
clusory statements of belief,773 the new rule requires that specific facts be
set forth to support a conclusion that the proceeding should be contin-
ued.77" For example, the former rule requires a statement "that the affi-
ant believes that the action cannot be tried with justice to the party
without such evidence"; 775 the new rule requires a statement of "the rea-
sons why the matter cannot be determined with justice to the party with-
out the evidence. ' '776
Under Former Rule 527 c 4, the trial court must deny a motion for
a continuance to obtain an absent witness' testimony if the opposing
party stipulates that the witness would testify as set forth in the affida-
vit. 7 7 7 Rule 2-508, in contrast, would give the court discretion to grant
769. Explanatory Note, i. at 38.
770. Former Md. R.P. 527 a 2.
771. Marsh v. Johns, 49 Md. 569, 570 (1878).
772. The Committee apparently did not discuss this change, however. See Minutes, May
22-23, 1981, at 38-41.
773. However, the rule did require the affiant to "show what facts the affiant believes the
witness will prove." Former Md. R.P. 527 c 2.
774. "The affidavit shall state ... (4) the facts that show that reasonable diligence has
been employed to obtain the attendance of the witness, and (5) the facts that lead the affiant
to conclude that the attendance or testimony of the witness can be obtained within a reason-
able time." MD. R.P. 2-508(c)(4), (5).
775. Former Md. R.P. 527 c 2.
776. MD. R.P. 2-508(c)(3) (emphasis added).
777. The former rule allowed the court to grant a motion for continuance unless the oppos-
ing party "[would] admit that the absent witness would, if present, testify to the facts alleged
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or deny the motion in such a case.77
Rule 2-509---Ju Tral---Special Costs in First, Second, and Fourth Judicial
Circuits
Rule 2-509 is intended to make only stylistic changes in the word-
ing of Former Rule 548, without affecting practice under the former
rule.77 9 When a case is removed from the assignment shortly before a
jury trial is scheduled to begin, the county may incur substantial costs,
and the jurors may suffer considerable inconvenience.7 0 The rule is in-
tended to deal with those problems by imposing special costs in the ac-
tion on the party responsible for the removal.7 8 At the same time, the
rule has been criticized for discouraging settlements and for being
counter to the goal of statewide uniformity in rules of procedure.
78 2
Rule 2-510--Subpoenas
Rule 2-510 changes former practice most substantially by authoriz-
ing the issuance of blank subpoenas. Section (b) of the rule requires the
clerk to provide on request a blank subpoena form to be completed and
returned to the clerk for signing and sealing.'8 3 The rule also would
allow the clerk to issue signed and sealed but otherwise blank subpoenas
upon request of an attorney or other officer of the court."8 Committee
members feared that this procedure might lead to abuse of judicial pro-
cess, decrease the accountability of court clerks and unnecessarily impair
a clerk's ability to determine trial length by the number of witnesses to
be called."8 5 Apparently, however, the similar federal rule' 86 has had no
in the affidavit." Former Md. R.P. 527 c 4. The wording of the new rule is, thus, much
clearer.
778. The new rule requires the court to grant the motion unless the opposing party will
stipulate that the absent witness would testify as alleged. In that case, the court may, but is
not required to, deny the motion. MD. R.P. 2-508(c).
779. Explanatory Note, Minutes, June 19-20, 1981, at 20.
780. Minutes, June 19-20, 1981, at 21.
781. Thus, in case of a settlement, costs are to be assessed either against the plaintiff or as
the parties agree. In all other cases, costs are to be assessed against the party initiating the
dismissal. MD. R.P. 2-509(b).
782. MinutesJune 19-20, 1981, at 21. Many committee members wished to eliminate the
rule, but because of its recent adoption by the Court of Appeals, they felt constrained to
include it. Id.
783. MD. R.P. 2-510(b). Under the rule, anyone entitled to have a subpoena issued would
be entitled to request a blank form.
784. Cf FED. R. Cv. P. 45(a) (clerk must issue subpoena in blank on request of any party).
785. See Minutes, Mar. 23, 1982, at 58 (discussing poll of clerks of court in which opposi-
tion to issuance of blank signed and sealed subpoenas was unanimous); Minutes, Nov. 20-21,
1981, at 46-47.
786. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(a).
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such ill effects.7" 7
The new rule also changes Maryland practice by requiring personal
service of subpoenas.78 8 Under Former Rule 104, a summons could be
served by registered mail.7"9 However, the severity of the sanction for
failure to obey a subpoena, which is body attachment and fine, 7" makes
personal service more appropriate than service by mail.7 '
Section (g) of the rule, which is derived in part from Supreme
Bench Rule 528N,79 2 facilitates hospitals' compliance with subpoenas of
their records. The section allows a hospital's records to be authenticated
by a certificate of the records' custodian; in-court testimony is not neces-
sarily required.7 93 At the same time, the new rule makes a custodian's
certificate only prima facie evidence of the records' authenticity 9 4 and
provides for subpoena of the custodian when necessary.7 9 5 Thus, the
rule would not operate to preclude appropriate inquiry into the records'
authenticity.
The remaining sections of Rule 2-5 10 bring together and clarify the
provisions of various former rules relating to summonses.7 9 6 For exam-
ple, section (a) makes it clear that a subpoena may be issued to a party,
as well as a non-party, to compel attendance or the production of tangi-
ble evidence.7 97 Under section (f), as under the federal rules,7 98 a person
who wishes to avoid giving a deposition must seek a protective order of
the court, while one who wishes to avoid producing documents at the
deposition need only file a written objection to shift the burden of ob-
taining a court order to the party seeking production.7 99
Rule 2-511-Trial y Ju
Rule 2-511 is intended neither to enlarge nor to diminish the right
787. Comments of Judge McAuliffe, Minutes, Nov. 20-21, 1981, at 46.
788. MD. R.P. 2-510(d).
789. Former Md. R.P. 104 b 2.
790. MD. R.P. 2-510(h). The same was true under Former Md. R.P. 114 d.
791. Minutes, Nov. 20-21, 1981, at 49-50.
792. Id. at 45.
793. The rule provides that the records must be accompanied by a certificate of the custo-
dian "that they are the complete records for the patient for the period designated in the
subpoena and that the records are maintained in the regular course of business of the hospi-
tal." MD. R.P. 2-510(g).
794. Id.
795. Id
796. Those provisions are Former Md. R.P. 104, 114, 115, 116, 405, and 407.
797. However, the phrase "may be used" implies that a subpoena is not necessary to com-
pel a party to submit to deposition. Former Md. R.P. 407 a stated expressly that this is the
case.
798. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1).
799. MD. R.P. 2-510(l); Minutes, Nov. 20-21, 1981, at 47-48.
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to trial by jury granted in articles 5 and 23 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights,8"' despite the merger of law and equity.8 °1 The Committee
noted a potential problem related to jury trials created by the merger of
law and equity. The rule does not address the method by which the
jury right is to be preserved, in a merged action, on a question of fact
that is common both to a claim or defense triable of right by a jury and
to a claim or defense triable by the court.8 0 2
Law and equity claims formerly could not be consolidated in
Maryland courts.80 3 Instead, a plaintiff had to bring a mixed action in
equity to obtain both equitable and legal remedies,80 4 and no jury was
available to decide questions relating to legal claims or defenses in such
an action.80 5 In contrast, under Federal Rule 58(a), upon which Rule 2-
511 (a) is modeled, 0 6 common facts must be determined first by a jury,
except "under the most imperative circumstances."' 0 7 The Subcommit-
tee decided against formally addressing the problem and the Committee
was confident that the Maryland Declaration of Rights and state stat-
utes would provide a sufficient basis to answer accurately the ques-
tion. One commentator has suggested that the Court of Appeals of
Maryland might follow the reasoning of Supreme Court decisions inter-
preting Federal Rule 38(a).80 9 If that were so, Rule 2-511(a) would al-
low jury determination of facts relating to legal claims or defenses that
presently must be tried in equity without a jury. 1 0
In all other respects, Rule 2-511 makes only stylistic and other mi-
nor changes to prior Maryland practice. For example, section (b) differs
from the former provision for juries of less than twelve8"' by stating ex-
pressly that parties may stipulate to a smaller jury at any time.812 The
explicit provision in the new rule is intended to permit such an agree-
800. Minutes, Apr. 21, 1981, at 17.
801. See supra notes 354-62 and accompanying text.
802. Minutes, Apr. 21, 1981, at 17.
803. Brown, supra note 360, at 470 n.269.
804. Id
805. Village Brooks, Inc. v. State's Att'y, 263 Md. 76, 94, 282 A.2d 126, 136 (1971).
806. Minutes, Apr. 21, 1981, at 17.
807. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 511 (1959). The Court also stated
that those circumstances cannot be anticipated, given the flexible procedures under the fed-
eral rules. Id. (citing Ring v. Spina, 166 F.2d 546, 550 (2d Cir. 1948)).
808. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Apr. 21, 1981, at 17.
809. Brown, supra note 360, at 471.
810. Thus, in Professor Brown's view, the merger of law and equity would curtail plain-
tiffs' present ability to circumvent defendants' right to a jury trial by suing in equity. See id.
(discussing Dormay Constr. Co. v. Doric Co., 221 Md. 145, 156 A.2d 632 (1959)).
811. Former Md. R.P. 544.
812. MD. R.P. 2-522(b).
[VOL. 43:669
MARYLAND RULES
ment between the parties even after deliberations begin."1 3
Rule 2-5I2-Juy Selection
The procedure for jury selection contemplated by Rule 2-512
should not be substantially different from practice under the analogous
former rules.' 1 4 The new rule incorporates some language from present
criminal rules,8" 5 but that language, while clearer or more explicit than
the wording of the former civil rules, generally has the same effect in
practice.8 1 6 In addition, the jury-selection provisions in the new rule are
organized to follow the actual chronology of the steps in selecting a jury
more closely than the former rule did." 7
The rule changes some details of prior practice. First, the jury list
released to parties must include all the public information on the "juror
qualification form,"8' except that the election precincts of jurors' resi-
dence can be substituted for their addresses.8 " 9 The former rule ex-
pressly required release of only the jurors' names.8 2 0
Second, the rule expressly mandates a roll call of the jurors upon
the request of any party. 21 The former rule did not provide for a roll
call, leaving the matter to the court's discretion in the exercise of its
control of the examination. 22 Under the new rule, parties would have
an apparently absolute right to a roll call.
Third, the rule eliminates the former requirement that the jury list
consist of at least twenty persons.8 23 Instead, the list of jurors who have
qualified after examination in an action need be only a number suffi-
cient to provide the number of jurors needed for the action, after the
exercise of the parties' preemptory challenges.8 2 4 The new rule thus rec-
ognizes that the parties may have agreed on a lesser number of jurors
than twelve. 25
Finally, the rule would give each party a number of peremptory
813. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Apr. 21, 1981, at 17.
814. Those rules were Former Md. R.P. 541, 543, and 544.
815. MD. R.P. 2-512 source note.
816. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Apr. 21, 1981, at 21-22.
817. Id. at 21. For example, the provisions concerning challenges to the array now appear
at the beginning, rather than the end, of the rule.
818. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROc. CODE ANN. § 8-202(c)(1984).
819. This provision reflects the Committee's concern for possible harassment of jurors.
Minutes, Feb. 12, 1981, at 13.
820. Former Md. R.P. 543 a 1.
821. MD. R.P. 2-512(d).
822. Former Md. R.P. 543 d.
823. Former Md. R.P. 543 a 1, 5.
824. MD. R.P. 2-512(g).
825. See MD. R.P. 2-511(b).
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strikes proportional to the number of alternate jurors to be impan-
eled.8 2 6 Former Rule 543 b gave each party one additional strike if al-
ternate jurors were to be impaneled, regardless of the number of
alternates.8 2 7 The new rule instead gives each party one additional
strike for each group of three or fewer alternate jurors.8 2
Section (h) is drafted in a somewhat confusing manner. Under this
section, if the court determines that co-parties have adverse or hostile
interests, it may "allow to each of them separate preemptory challenges
not exceeding the number available to a single party." That passage
could be construed to provide four challenges to each adverse co-
party. 29 Although the Committee voted unanimously against that in-
terpretation of the rule,8 3 ° the rule's language does not foreclose it.83" '
Rule 2-513--Exclusion of Witnesses
Under Former Rule 536 a trial court must exclude non-party wit-
nesses, other than expert witnesses who will give opinions based on testi-
mony, upon the request of a party made at any time.83 2 Rule 2-513(a)
makes exclusion mandatory only if requested before testimony begins; at
any later time an exclusion order is discretionary with the court.83 3 Fur-
ther, the new rule would clearly allow a court to exclude an expert wit-
ness during testimony that will not form the basis of the expert's
8134opinion, in contrast to the former rule, which absolutely exempted
expert witnesses from its operation.8 35 Practice under the new exclusion
rule for civil actions would thus conform to practice under the analo-
gous rule of criminal procedure.
836
826. MD. R.P. 2-512(h).
827. Former Md. R.P. 543 b.
828. MD. R.P. 2-512(h).
829. Comments of Mr. Weiner, Minutes, Apr. 21, 1981, at 24.
830. Committee Vote, id.
831. The ambiguity could easily be eliminated by substituting "the total of which shall not
exceed" for "not exceeding."
832. Former Md. R.P. 536. But see State Roads Comm'n v. Creswell, 235 Md. 220, 226,
201 A.2d 328, 330 (1964) ("Rule 546 was adopted in September 1961, as the civil counterpart
of the sequestration rule for criminal causes .... "). The purpose of the rule is to prevent
witnesses from being taught or prompted by each other's testimony. However,
even though the rule is now mandatory upon the trial court where the exception [for
expert witness] is not applicable, violation is not per se reversible error. Even in
criminal cases where an allegation of deprivation of the defendant's rights is always
closely scrutinized, we have required a showing of prejudice to those rights.
Id
833. MD. R.P. 2-513(a).
834. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Apr. 21, 1981, at 20; Minutes, Apr. 21, 1981, at 21-22.
835. "An expert witness, who is to render an opinion based on testimony given at the trial,
shall be exempted from the operation of this rule." Former Md. R.P. 536.
836. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Apr. 21, 1981, at 25.
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The provisions of Rule 2-513 also change former practice by elimi-
nating the requirement of court approval before a party that is not a
natural person may designate a representative to remain in the court-
room.8 37 Thus, the rule leaves to the party the determination of who is
an appropriate representative for a party such as a corporation.838 The
rule additionally broadens the right to designate such a representative
by extending it to any "party that is not a natural person," '39 in contrast
to the former rule's more restrictive reference to "a corporation or
association.'"40
Sections (b) and (c) add to the exclusion rule for civil actions ex-
plicit provisions for nondisclosure orders and a sanction for disobedience
that formerly appeared only in the exclusion rule for criminal trials.84 1
Section (b) empowers, but does not require, the court to order that evi-
dence not be disclosed to excluded witnesses.8 42 By leaving the issuance
of a nondisclosure order to the court's discretion, the rule has enough
flexibility to allow limited disclosure of particular evidence to an ex-
cluded witness, when that is necessary. Section (c) expressly allows a
court to prevent a witness from testifying, in whole or in part, when that
witness has received information in violation of an exclusion or nondis-
closure order.
Neither of the two new sections appears to effect any major change
in current practice. The Court of Appeals has held that a trial court
may impose reasonable conditions on an expert witness to maintain se-
crecy.8 43 The Court of Appeals also has held, at least by implication,
that the trial court may prohibit a witness from testifying, as a sanction
for violating an exclusion order.8 4
4
Rule 2-514- When Court May Require Production of Evidence
Rule 2-514 makes only stylistic changes from the wording of For-
837. Compare Former Md. R.P. 536 with MD. R.P. 2-513(a).
838. Minutes, Apr. 21, 1981, at 29.
839. MD. R.P. 2-513(a).
840. Former Md. R.P. 536; see Explanatory Note, Minutes, Apr. 21, 1981, at 20.
841. Compare MD. R.P. 2-513(b) with Former Md. R.P. 755 b; compare MD. R.P. 2-513(c)
with Former Md. R.P. 755 d.
842. The Committee discussed the question whether such an order should be mandatory,
but concluded that flexibility is necessary. Minutes, Apr. 21, 1981, at 22.
843. Space Aero Prod. Co. v. R.E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 121-22, 208 A.2d 74, 89
(1965).
844. "As stated in Frazier v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 206 Md. 434, 446, 112 A.2d 221, 226
"'The ascertainment of the truth is the great end and object of all the proceedings in a
judicial trial,' we think that the complete exclusion of the testimony of witnesses for a viola-
tion of the sequestration rule is not lightly to be imposed as a penalty upon even an offending
party." Gwaltney v. Morris, 237 Md. 173, 176, 205 A.2d 266, 268 (1964)(citation omitted).
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mer Rule 521.845 It should, therefore, effect no change in practice.
Rule 2-515--Vew
Rule 2-515 consolidates, under one heading, all of the provisions for
views of property in civil actions, which previously appeared in Former
Rules 550 and U18.846 Sections (a) and (c) of the new rule differ only
stylistically from Former Rule U18 and should not alter practice in emi-
nent domain proceedings.8 4 7
In other actions the new rule alters prior practice. First, the rule
allows the trial court to order a view on its own motion, as well as on the
motion of a party. 48 Second, the rule permits views in cases tried to the
court without a jury, in contrast to Former Rule 550 which provided
only for views by juries."49 Third, the new rule requires the judge to
attend and supervise a jury view.8 5 ° These changes generally increase
the role of the trial judge in views of property.
The third change is particularly interesting. Under Former Rule
550 b the trial judge could appoint another person to supervise the
view; moreover, both the former and new rules concerning views in
condemnation proceedings permit the parties to waive the judge's at-
tendance at the view. 52 Rule 2-515(b) does not allow such a waiver in
other proceedings. The difference between the provisions for views in
condemnation and other actions may be derived from the difference be-
tween provisions of specific and of general applicability. The general
rule in section (b) applies to views ordered for a variety of purposes in a
variety of cases. Section (a) applies only to views for the purpose of
determining the value of property, a subject with which the jury may be
presumed to have some familiarity. Judicial supervision of the view
may be unnecessary in a substantial number of condemnation cases, but
in virtually no other cases.8 53
845. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Feb. 12, 1981, at 23.
846. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Apr. 21, 1981, at 26.
847. Id. For a discussion of Maryland's eminent domain procedure, see Baker & Atfeld,
Mfaryand's New Condemnation Code, 23 MD. L. REV. 309 (1963). See also MD. REAL PROP. CODE
ANN. §§ 12-101 to-112 (1981); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 8-301 to -339 (1977 & Supp.
1984) (specific eminent domain statutory provisions).
848. Compare MD. R.P. 2-515(b) with Former Md. R.P. 550 a.
849. Id.
850. MD. R.P. 2-515(b).
851. Former Md. R.P. 550 b.
852. Under both the former and the new rules, the waiver must be in writing and signed
by all the parties. Former Md. R.P. U18; MD. R.P. 2-515(a).
853. This may have been the Committee's reasoning, but it did not fully explain the au-
thorization of waivers in eminent domain proceedings, but not for views in other actions. See
Minutes, Feb. 12, 1981, at 26-27 (discussing draft of new rule).
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Rule 2-516-Exhibits
By the wording of Former Rule 635 b and c, only exhibits offered in
evidence were part of the record, 54 and parties were not required to
deposit all exhibits with the court clerk until an appeal was noted.
8 55
Rule 2-516 includes in the record all exhibits marked for identification,
whether or not they are offered in evidence, and requires that all exhib-
its ordinarily be kept in the clerk's custody. 5 6 The language of the rule
apparently reflects actual practice under the former rule, and thus
would not effect a change in Maryland practice.
8 57
One Subcommittee member noted that the rule covered only those
exhibits marked for identification by the court clerk, not the exhibits
that are pre-marked for identification by parties. Although the Com-
mittee directed the Style Subcommittee to ensure that the language of
the rule reflected that intent, the Style Subcommittee made no pertinent
change in the rule.
8 5 8
Rule 2-517-Method of Making Objections
Rule 2-517 changes prior practice most significantly by introducing
a provision for continuing objections to the admission of evidence. 5 9 By
permitting continuing objections, the rule may obviate the need to re-
new at trial objections that were overruled as pretrial motions,"' a re-
quirement formerly imposed under the contemporaneous objection
rule. 6 1
The rule further changes Maryland practice by expressly permit-
ting a party to request that the court direct an opponent to state the
grounds for an objection to evidence. 62 The former rule made no pro-
vision for such a request;8 63 thus, the new rule should increase the likeli-
hood that the grounds of an objection will be clearly stated on the
record for appeal. 8"
854. Former Md. R.P. 635 b.
855. Former Md. R.P. 635 c.
856. MD. R.P. 2-516.
857. Explanatory Note, Minutes, June 19-20, 1981, at 13.
858. Committee Discussion, id.
859. MD. R.P. 2-517(b).
860. Id.; Explanatory Note, Minutes, Apr. 21, 1981, at 31; Minutes, Feb. 12, 1981, at 26-27.
861. Minutes, Apr. 21, 1981, at 32.
862. MD. R.P. 2-517(a).
863. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Apr. 21, 1981, at 31.
864. This appears to have been the Committee's intent. See Minutes, Feb. 12, 1981, at 25-
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Rule 2-519-Motion for Judgment
Rule 2-519 replaces both Former Rule 535, dealing with motions
for dismissal in a nonjury trial, and Former Rule 552, dealing with mo-
tions for directed verdict in a jury trial.86 5 Like each of the motions
under the former rules, the new "motion for judgment" allows the par-
ties to test expeditiously the legal sufficiency of their opponents' evi-
dence.8 6 6 Under the new rule the form of the motion will be the same
whether made in an action tried with or without a jury.8 67
The new rule also makes a major change in the substance, as well as
the form, of the motion, by changing the nature of the trial court's con-
sideration of the evidence. Formerly, the court was required to view the
evidence and all reasonable inferences from it in the light most
favorable to the party against whom the motion was directed, whether
the motion was to dismiss or for a directed verdict.8 68 The new rule
empowers the court to act as the trier of fact in ruling on a motion for
judgment offered at the close of the plaintiff's evidence in a nonjury
trial.8 69 Thus, a court can weigh the evidence presented and assess the
credibility of the witnesses in the same way it would do at the close of all
the evidence.8 7 ' Under "any other circumstances" the court must con-
sider the evidence in the light most favorable to the movant's opponent,
as under the former rules. 71 The dual standard of the new rule follows
the approach of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, under which a
defendant's motion to dismiss in a nonjury trial may be granted
although the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case that would have
been sufficient to require denial of a motion for directed verdict in ajury
865. Minutes, Mar. 6-7, 1981, at 31.
866. Explanatory Note, id. at 30-31; Explanatory Note, Minutes, Apr. 21, 1981, at 36. See
J. Whitson Rogers, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 285 Md. 653, 660, 402 A.2d 608, 612
(1979) (purpose of Former Md. R.P. 535 is to allow party to test legal sufficiency of oppo-
nent's evidence); Impala Platinum, Ltd. v. Impala Sales (U.S.A.), Inc., 283 Md. 296, 328, 389
A.2d 887, 905-06 (1978) (motion for directed verdict under Former Md R.P. 552 tests legal
sufficiency of opponent's evidence).
867. Hence, the new rule should prevent the confusion that has in the past led to the
making of motions for directed verdict in nonjury trials. E.g., Hooten v. Kenneth B. Mumaw
Plumbing & Heating Co., 271 Md. 565, 571, 318 A.2d 514, 517 (1974); Isen v. Phoenix Assur-
ance Co., 259 Md. 564, 569, 270 A.2d 476, 479 (1970).
868. See, e.g., J. Whitson Rogers, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 285 Md. 653, 660, 402
A.2d 608, 612 (1979) (Former Md. R.P. 535); Impala Platinum, Ltd. v. Impala Sales (U.S.A.),
Inc., 283 Md. 296, 328, 389 A.2d 887, 905-06 (1978) (Former Md. R.P. 552).
869. MD. R.P. 2-519(b).
870. Cf United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1343 (D.D.C. 1981) (under FED. R.
Civ. P. 41(b), court may weigh evidence).
871. MD. R.P. 2-519(b). The "other circumstances" referred to are jury trials and motions
by the plaintiff at the close of the defendant's evidence. Minutes, Apr. 21, 1981, at 36-37.
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trial.8 7
2
Finally, the rule clarifies Maryland practice by stating expressly
that a party's introduction of evidence during the presentation of an
opponent's case is not a waiver of the right to move for judgment in the
action. 7 3 That provision is intended to eliminate the uncertainty re-
garding such a waiver that existed under the former rules.8 74
Rule 2-520-Instructions to the Juy
Rule 2-520 differs from Former Rule 554 most obviously by ex-
pressly designating the time at which the court is to instruct the jury.8 75
Under the former rule, which contained no similar provision, a court
could instruct the jury either before or after the parties' closing argu-
ments; the new rule requires the court to give its instructions before the
arguments.8 7 6 The Committee believed that a majority of Maryland
judges instruct the jury before closing arguments.8 77 Moreover, the rule
permits the court to supplement its instructions later.8 78 This aspect of
the rule, therefore, should not effect a major change in Maryland
practice.
The change that the rule institutes is its requirement that parties
make their objections to the instructions "promptly after the court in-
structs the jury.) 8 79 The former rule required the parties to object
"before the jury retires to consider its verdict."8 8" Although the lan-
guage of the former rule was closer to the language of Federal Rule 51
than is the language of the new rule, the new rule's effect will resemble
more closely that of the federal rule. The federal rule requires the court
to instruct the jury after closing arguments;8 8 ' consequently, objections
made before the jury retires in a federal court are made promptly after
the instructions. Because the former Maryland rule allowed the court to
instruct the jury before the closing arguments, that rule's provision for
872. See also Klein v. District of Columbia, 409 F.2d 164, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Huber v.
American President Lines, Ltd., 240 F.2d 778, 779 (2d Cir. 1957).
873. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Apr. 21, 1981, at 36.
874. Id. That clarification is surely an improvement. There seems little utility in a rule
that would put a party into the position of choosing between conducting a fully effective
cross-examination and having the action disposed of expeditiously--particularly inasmuch as
the court also has an interest in expeditious disposition of litigation.
875. MD. R.P. 2-520(a). The former rule had no such provision.
876. The Committee concluded that the most logical course is to enable parties to argue on
the way the facts fit, or fail to fit, the law. Minutes, Apr. 21, 1981, at 40.
877. Explanatory Note, id. at 39.
878. MD. R.P. 2-520(a).
879. MD. R.P. 2-520(e).
880. Former Md. R.P. 554 d.
881. FED. R. Civ. P. 51.
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objection after the arguments did not effectively require prompt
objection.88 2
The new rule also changes former practice by allowing parties to
file requests for instructions before the close of the evidence without the
court's having directed that filing.88 The former rule provided for fil-
ing instruction requests only at the close of the evidence, unless the court
directed the parties to file earlier.88 4 In addition, the rule is intended to
permit parties to supplement, during the course of the trial, requests
filed at the beginning of the trial.8 8 Thus, a party could file requests for
instructions at the beginning of the trial without filing any requests that
would unduly reveal the party's theory of the case.8 86
Rule 2-521-Ju--Review of Evidence- Communications
Under Former Rule 558, the jurors could take with them into the
jury room, aside from their own notes, only those items that the court
deemed necessary to a proper consideration of the case, which could
include the pleadings and instructions as well as exhibits in the case.88 7
Rule 2-521(a) makes two changes in that practice. First, the rule per-
mits the jurors to take into the jury room all exhibits other than deposi-
tions, unless the court orders otherwise for good cause.88 8 Second, the
rule does not permit the jurors ordinarily to have the pleadings with
them during their deliberations." 9 Only if the pleadings actually have
been admitted into evidence as exhibits will the jurors be permitted to
take them into the jury room.8" The rule is intended to prevent the
jury from giving undue weight to the pleadings.8 9'
Sections (b) and (c) of the rule are new to Maryland civil proce-
dure, having been derived from Former Rule 758 pertaining to criminal
procedure.8 9 2 Those sections establish the procedure by which a court
882. The requirement of prompt objection allows the court to correct its error, if one exists,
immediately. The new rule is intended, therefore, to correct the present system.
883. Explanatory Note, Minutes, May 22-23, 1981, at 19.
884. Former Md. R.P. 554 a provided: "At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time
during the trial as the court reasonably directs, any party may file with the court written
prayers that the court instruct the jury ....
885. Minutes, May 22-23, 1981, at 20-21.
886. Id. The new rule does not contain the requirement of Former Md. R.P. 554 a that the
court furnish copies of instruction requests to all adverse parties. That requirement is now
covered by MD. R.P. 1-321(a). See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
887. Former Md. R.P. 558 a, b.
888. MD. R.P. 2-521(a).
889. Explanatory Note, Minutes, May 22-23, 1981, at 22.
890. Minutes, May 22-23, 1981, at 23.
891. Id.
892. Explanatory Note, id. at 22.
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responds to jury requests to review evidence and other communications.
In addition to requiring that any communication between judge and
jury be on the record or in writing and filed in the action ,893 the rule
also requires the court to notify the parties of the receipt of any commu-
nication from the jury before responding to it.8 94
Rule 2-522- Court Decison-Juiy Verdict
Rule 2-522 changes prior practice by requiring the judge in an ac-
tion tried to the court to state the reasons for the decision before or at
the time of entering judgment.8 9 5 Former Rule 18 b allowed the judge
to make such a statement as much as fifteen days after entry of the judg-
ment. 89 6 The rule ensures that parties know the reasons for a judgment
as soon as it is entered and the time for filing post-trial motions begins to
run.89 7 At the same time, the rule does not mandate the formal state-
ment of the analogous federal rule, under which the court must "find
the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law,"89 8 but
could be satisfied by a fairly brief statement of a court's reasons. For
example, if an immediate order is necessary to prevent irreparable harm
to a litigant, a brief statement might be preferable, in the interest of
speed, to the more definitive statement the federal rule requires.89 9
Section (b) of the rule incorporates into civil procedure an express
provision for polling the jury, similar to that which appears in the rules
of criminal procedure.' In addition, the section states explicitly that
the parties may agree at any time during the course of an action to
accept a less than unanimous verdict."° Although Former Rule 544
provided for stipulations to accept majority verdicts, it did not expressly
permit polling the jury or expressly state when the parties may enter
into such a stipulation.
893. MD. R.P. 2-521(c).
894. Id. (b), (c).
895. MD. R.P. 2-522(a).
896. Former Md. R.P. 18 b.
897. The Committee believed that a party needs to and is entitled to know the reasons for
a judgment before the time for post-trial motions begins to run. Explanatory Note, Minutes,
June 19-20, 1981, at 15.
898. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
899. Minutes, June 19-20, 1981, at 16.
900. Former Md. R.P. 759.
901. Cf Former Md. R.P. 544; MD. R.P. 2-511(b). Such a stipulation, under the broad
wording of the new rule, could even be entered into after the jury has found itself unable to
reach a unanimous verdict.
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Rule 2-532-Moton for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
Under Former Rule 563, if the court denied a party's motion for a
directed verdict at the close of the evidence, that party could subse-
quently move for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict "in accord-
ance with his motion for a directed verdict."9 2 Rule 2-532 explicitly
limits the grounds for the later motion to those previously advanced in
support of the motion for judgment at the close of the evidence. 90 3
Thus, under the new rule a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict would operate as a renewal of motion for judgment, just as a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under the federal rules
operates as a renewal of a motion for a directed verdict.9 4
Rule 2-532 changes prior Maryland practice most clearly by
lengthening the time during which a party may move for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. The former rule allowed only three days
from receipt of the verdict or, if the jury failed to return a verdict, from
the jury's discharge.9 "5 The new rule allows a party ten days from the
entry of a judgment on the verdict or from the jury's discharge.90 6 The
change in the time limit on the motion brings Maryland practice in line
with practice under Federal Rule 50(b).9 "7
Section (c) of the new rule continues the Maryland practice of al-
lowing parties to join a motion for a new trial with a motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict, but does not allow the motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict to include a request for a new
trial.9 "8 Although not expressly mandated by the rule, the motion for
new trial, made in accordance with Rule 2-533, should be a separate
motion joined as alternative relief with the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.90 9
Former Rule 563 c stated the appellate court's power to order a
new trial when the court reversed an order granting or denying a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict."' Section (f) of Rule 2-532 adds ex-
902. Former Md. R.P. 563 a 1.
903. MD. R.P. 2-532(a).
904. Johnson v. Rogers, 621 F.2d 300, 305 (8th Cir. 1980); House of Koscot Devel. Corp. v.
American Line Cosmetics, 468 F.2d 64, 68 (5th Cir. 1973). It is not entirely clear that the new
rule will effect a change in Maryland practice, however. See NuCar Carriers, Inc. v. Everett,
33 Md. App. 310, 312, 364 A.2d 71, 73 (1976) ("Maryland Rule 563 does not create a right of
appeal greater than those granted in [the Maryland] Code .... ").
905. Former Md. R.P. 563 a 1.
906. MD. R.P. 2-532(b).
907. Explanatory Note, Minutes, May 22-23, 1981, at 27. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
908. Compare Former Md. R.P. 563 a 3 with MD. R.P. 2-532(b).
909. This was the Committee's apparent intent. See Minutes, Mar. 6-7, 1981, at 41.
910. Former Md. R.P. 563 c.
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plicit provisions, derived from Federal Rule 50(c) and (d), regarding a
party's right on appeal to assert the grounds for a new trial.9 "1 One
member of the Committee questioned the logic of permitting the appel-
late court to order a new trial when it reverses the trial court's granting
of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Nevertheless,
subsection (f) (2) allows the party whose motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict was granted at trial to argue for a new trial on
appeal. The new provisions appear only to incorporate and clarify the
appellate courts' existing power to grant new trials when "it shall ap-
pear. . . that a new trial ought to be had,"'9 1 2 without affecting Mary-
land practice.
Rule 2-533---Mot'on for New Trial
In line with the general merger of law and equity, Rule 2-533 re-
places Former Rule 690, which governed petitions for rehearing in eq-
uity, as well as Former Rule 567, which governed motions for new trial
in actions at law.9" 3 The time limit for filing the motion for a new trial
under the new rule is ten days from the entry of judgment, in conform-
ity with federal practice and with the rule concerning the motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.9 14 In addition, Rule 2-533 per-
mits a motion for a new trial within ten days after the entry of a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict or an amended judgment. 91 5 The
former rules did not include such a provision.
Rule 2-534-Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment-Court Trial
Rule 2-534, which is derived from Federal Rules 52 and 59,916
grants a trial court broad discretion to correct its findings or judgment
in a nonjury trial without the need for a complete new trial of the ac-
tion.9 17 Federal Rule 52(b) allows the court to expand, clarify, or cor-
rect its findings of fact or conclusions of law in a nonjury action,9 18 but
does not allow the court to conduct a new hearing on the merits.9 9 Fed-
911. Minutes, May 22-23, 1981, at 28; Explanatory Note, id.
912. Former Md. R.P. 874.
913. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Mar. 6-7, 1981, at 49; Minutes, Mar. 6-7, 1981, at 51;
Explanatory Note, Minutes, May 22-23, 1981, at 53.
914. FED. R. Civ. P. 59; see supra note 906 and accompanying text.
915. See z nza notes 988-1014 and accompanying text (discussing MD. R.P. 2-601, 2-602).
916. Minutes, Sept. 11, 1981, at 2.
917. Id. at 3.
918. Matyas v. Feddish, 4 F.R.D. 385, 386 (D. Pa. 1945).
919. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(b), permitting a party to request additional findings of fact and
conclusions of law, is not intended as a vehicle for securing a rehearing on the merits.
Zeeman v. United States, 275 F. Supp. 235, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), modifiedon other grounds and
renanded, 395 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1968). Instead, the rule is designed primarily to correct find-
19841
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
eral Rule 59(a) allows the court in an action tried with or without a jury
to take additional testimony and enter a new judgment, 920 but only in a
new trial.9 2 ' On a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Federal
Rule 59(e), as under Federal Rule 52(b), the court may not re-examine
facts found by a jury.922 The new Maryland rule, more expansively
worded than the federal rules, allows the court to receive additional evi-
dence, revise its statement of the basis for the judgment, and enter a new
judgment in response to a motion to amend the judgment.9 23
The rule thus permits the trial court to correct expeditiously any
error in its decision without conducting a new trial of the action. A
party opposed to amendment or alteration of the judgment is protected
against unfairness in the granting of the motion by the requirement in
Rule 2-311 (e) that the court hold a hearing before granting a motion to
amend the judgment.9 2 4 Moreover, the party against whom a motion to
amend the judgment has been granted may subsequently file a motion
for a new trial.9 25
The motion to amend a judgment will not supplant the motion for
a new trial as a means of challenging the original judgment. A party
against whom the original judgment was entered may make both mo-
tions simultaneously, and the court's granting of either will operate dif-
ferently from granting of the other.926 In granting a motion for a new
trial, the court would require the parties to submit anew, for considera-
tion as in an original trial, all the evidence on the issues to be retried.92 7
In granting a motion to amend the judgment, the court would retain the
evidentiary record, adding to or reinterpreting it rather than retrying
ings of fact that are central to the ultimate decision. David v. Mathews, 450 F. Supp. 308,
318 (E.D. Cal. 1978).
920. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a).
921. However, the court may order a new trial of only some of the issues, when appropri-
ate. Id.
922. Davis v. Naviera Aznar S.A., 37 F.R.D. 223, 255 (D. Md. 1965) (FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e)
does not allow court to reexamine facts found by jury in contravention of seventh amend-
ment); accord Robinson v. Watts Detective Agency, 685 F.2d 729, 742 (1st Cir. 1982).
923. MD. R.P. 2-534. However, the new rule does not contemplate a court's granting such
a motion when the movant was negligent in failing to introduce the evidence at the trial.
Minutes, Mar. 7, 1981, at 45. Cf Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Baldridge, 544 F. Supp. 667, 668
(D. Wis. 1982) (FED. R. Civ. P. 59 does not contemplate relief when the issue presented could
have been, but was not, raised previously).
924. See supra notes 400 and accompanying text.
925. MD. R.P. 2-533(a). The court must hold a hearing on that motion for a new trial,
under MD. R.P. 2-311(e).
926. MD. R.P. 2-534; Minutes, Mar. 6-7, 1981, at 45; Explanatory Note, Minutes, May 22-
23, 1981, at 30.
927. MD. R.P. 2-533(c).
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any issues. 928
The motions to amend a judgment and for a new trial apparently
will have the same effects on the enforceability and appealability of a
judgment. Under Rule 2-632(b), the trial court has the discretion to
stay the enforcement of a judgment pending disposition of either mo-
tion.9 2 9 Rule 1012 was amended to state explicitly that both a motion
to amend the judgment and a motion for new trial stay the time for
filing an appeal.93 ° If a party files an appeal prior to the disposition of
those motions, the appeal has no effect and must be refiled after
disposition.9 3 1
Rule 2-535-Revisory Power
Under Rule 2-535 a court's revisory power over the judgment in a
case tried without a jury encompasses any action the court could have
taken in response to a motion to amend the judgment.932 Rule 2-535 is
not intended to change the prior practice under which a motion for revi-
sion does not stay the running of the time for filing an appeal. 933 Thus,
under the new rules a party who seeks an alteration of the judgment
more than ten days after its entry generally must choose between filing a
motion for revision and filing an appeal.
934
Only section (d) of the rule significantly changes Maryland prac-
tice. Former Rule 681 permitted a court of equity to correct clerical and
similar errors at any time, but only upon petition.9 35 The new rule,
which closely parallels Federal Rule 60(a), applies to any action and
allows the court to correct clerical errors on its own initiative, as well as
on motion.93 6 In addition, the rule limits the trial court's power to cor-
rect mistakes after an appeal is docketed by requiring the appellate
court's permission to make the correction.93 7
928. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Mar. 6-7, 1981, at 44; Explanatory Note, Minutes, May
22-23, 1981, at 30.
929. See infha notes 1114-23 and accompanying text.
930. MD. R.P. 1012(d).
931. Id.
932. MD. R.P. 2-535(a). Thus, the new rule clearly allows the court to hear additional
evidence. Minutes, Sept. 11, 1981, at 6.
933. See, e.g., Tiller v. Elfenbein, 205 Md. 14, 19-20, 106 A.2d 42, 44-45 (1954). Under the
former rules, "[i]f the losing party files an appeal that is pending when his motion for revision
(Rule 625) is to be heard, the trial court has no power to hear it; the power over the case
would have passed to the appellate court." C. BROWN, supra note 4, § 6.10.
934. C. BROWN, supra note 4, § 6.10.
935. "Clerical mistakes in a decree or decretal order, or errors arising from any accidental
slip or omission, may at any time be corrected . upon petition ..... Former Md. R.P.
681.
936. MD. R.P. 2-535(d).
937. Explanatory Note, Minutes, June 19-20, 1981, at 26.
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Rule 2-536-Do sabiliy ofJudge
Rule 2-536 makes only minor stylistic alterations in the wording of
Former Rule 528 and does not change prior practice regarding the sub-
stitution of one judge for another.938
Rule 2-541-Masters
Rule 2-541 is very little different from Former Rule 596 and appar-
ently makes no change in Maryland practice.93 9 The former rule ap-
plied only to actions in equity, while the new rule applies to all actions;
however, the rule allows only those issues not triable of right before a
jury to be referred to a master.94 The other additions introduced by the
rule clarify certain aspects of the former rule. Section (d) adds to the list
of master's powers the powers to make factual findings and legal conclu-
sions and to recommend contempt proceedings; 9 4' those powers were
previously given by implication in other provisions of the former rule.942
Section (e) of the new rule adds to the provisions concerning the con-
duct of a master's hearing an express requirement that written notice of
the time and place for the hearing be sent to the parties.943
Rule 2-542-Examiners
Rule 2-542 makes several changes from the former rule concerning
examiners,944 some of which formalize the link between examiners and
courts. First, the rule requires that a standing examiner be appointed
by a majority of the judges of a circuit court 945 and specifies that any
938. Explanatory Note, Minutes, May 22-23, 1981, at 44.
939. However, the Committee considered proposals that would have required an auto-
matic mistrial if the judge died during a trial and would have required counsels' consent to
substitution of a new judge. Minutes, May 22-23, 1981, at 44-45.
940. The Committee proposed little change because the former rule had been revised very
recently. Minutes, Sept. 11, 1981, at 8.
941. MD. R.P. 2-541(d)(6), (7).
942. Under Former Md. R.P. 596 f 1, the master was required to file a report "including
• . . findings of fact and conclusions of law." Thus, although the master's enumerated powers
did not include those powers, the master was clearly intended to make both factual and legal
conclusions. Similarly, Former Md. R.P. 596 g 2 authorized a court to hold a contempt
hearing upon the recommendation of a master at any time. Thus, the additions to the rule
only make explicit what was formerly implicit.
943. MD. R.P. 2-541(e).
944. While masters may rule on objections and make conclusions of law, examiners have
no power to do either. Bris Realty v. Phoenix Say. and Loan Ass'n, 238 Md. 84, 88, 208 A.2d
68, 69 (1964). Historically, masters have been used only in uncontested cases. Comments of
Judge McAuliffe, Minutes Sept. 11, 1981, at 19. However, the new rule is not expressly so
limited.
945. MD. R.P. 2-541(a)(1).
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examiner serves at the pleasure of the appointing court.94 6 The former
rule was silent on both the method of appointment and the tenure of
examiners."' Second, the rule requires that matters be referred to the
examiner by court order, rather than by parties themselves as under the
former rule.948 Moreover, the court's referral order may prescribe the
conduct of the examination; 949 thus, the rule clearly gives the ap-
pointing court full control over an examiner's taking of evidence.
The rule also clarifies certain aspects of procedure involving exam-
iners, matters that were not explicitly addressed by the former rule. 95 °
Thus, the rule provides expressly that failure to object to a question
before the examiner is a waiver of the right to file an exception on that
ground.9 5" ' In addition, the rule sets forth explicitly the grounds for ex-
ceptions to the examiner's record and the requirement that exceptions
be in writing.952 Finally, the rule expressly authorizes an examiner to
report to the court special matters or irregularities in the examination in
any case; the former rule clearly authorizes such a report only in an
action for divorce or annulment.953
Rule 2-543--Auditors
Designed in part to strengthen the auditor's role in the judicial pro-
cess,95 4 Rule 2-543 allows auditors to determine the necessity for a hear-
ing9 55 and to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. The
Committee, over some dissent because auditors are not always attor-
9516neys, granted auditors the power to make legal conclusions on the
ground that in analogous situations, such as in Orphan's Court and ad-
ministrative agencies, non-lawyers make conclusions of law.957
The rule also implements several requirements not found in the for-
mer rules. First, it requires the court to set time limits within which the
946. Id. (3).
947. The former rule merely provided that the circuit courts "shall appoint experienced
and competent examiners .... ." Former Md. R.P. 580 a.
948. Compare Former Md. R.P. 580 d wtdh MD. R.P. 2-542(b).
949. Because the former rule did not provide for referral by court order, it gave the court
no opportunity to prescribe the examination's conduct.
950. In addition, the new rule omits some provisions the Committee considered unneces-
sary, such as those permitting examination by written interrogatories and the taking of testi-
mony exparle under certain circumstances. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Sept. 11, 1981, at 18.
951. MD. R.P. 2-542(d)(3). However, under the new rule, as under the former rule, an
examiner has no power to rule on the objection. Id.
952. Id. (g).
953. Former Md. R.P. 580 g 3.
954. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Sept. 11, 1981, at 26.
955. Committee discussion, Minutes, Nov. 20-21, 1981, at 38.
956. Committee discussion, Minutes, Sept. 11, 1981, at 29.
957. Comments of Judge McAuliffe and Mr. Lombardi, id.
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auditor must file the account or report.9"8 The rule also requires the
court to hold a hearing on exceptions to the auditor's report. 95 9 Former
Rule 595 is silent on the first requirement; and on the second, it states
that when exceptions are filed the court "shall take such action as may
be appropriate."
The rule underwent considerable change in language before receiv-
ing final committee approval. Much of the Committee discussion fo-
cused on whether provisions of the rule cover both parties and
claimants. Provisions have been added to assure claimants adequate no-
tice of a hearing ((d)(1)), to allow claimants to subpoena witnesses and
documents ((d)(2)), and to notify claimants of the amount allowed in
the account or report ((e)). 9 6 °
An earlier version of the rule contained a provision that a waiver of
the requirement that the proceedings be recorded constituted a waiver
of the right to file exceptions. 961 One member commented that this pro-
vision effected a waiver of the right to file exceptions before the parties
know what will occur at the proceeding. Additionally, a party may wish
to file an exception to a question of law and should not be prevented
from so doing because he waived the making of a record.9 62 Another
member noted that, when parties submit an agreed statement of facts,
the court does not need a record to review exceptions.963 In its final
form, the rule provides that only those exceptions "which would require
review of the record" are waived. 9
64
Although a previous draft of the rule permitted the court in a hear-
ing on exceptions to accept additional evidence whenever it desired,965
the Committee deleted that language because it was too broad.96 6 The
Committee inserted in section (g) the language from Former Rule 596
h 6 relating to masters. Thus, the excepting party must convince the
court to admit the evidence and give reasons why the evidence was not
958. Committee discussion, id. at 30; Explanatory Note, Minutes, Nov. 20-21, 1981, at 37.
959. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Nov. 21, 1981, at 37. An earlier draft left the need for a
hearing to the discretion of the court. Minutes, Sept. 11, 1981, at 26.
960. Committee discussion, Minutes, Sept. 11, 1981, at 30-31; Explanatory Note, Minutes,
Nov. 20-21, 1981, at 37.
961. Committee discussion, Minutes, Sept. 11, 1981, at 25.
962. Comments of Mr. Niemeyer, id. at 29.
963. Comments of Mr. Herrmann, id.
964. Comments of Mr. Brault, id. at 29-30; Explanatory Note, Minutes, Nov. 20-21, 1981,
at 37. Judge McAuliffe noted in committee discussion that the making of a record can be
waived only if all parties and claimants, including ones absent from a hearing, agree. Min-
utes, Nov. 20-21, 1981, at 40.
965. The language of the draft precluded the submission of additional evidence "[u]nless
otherwise ordered by the court." Proposed Rule 2-535(k), Minutes, Nov. 20-21, 1981, at 36.
966. Comments of Mr. Niemeyer, id. at 41.
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offered before the auditor. The Committee did not include in the new
rule the provision in Former Rule 596 that a court may hold a de novo
hearing, believing that the court should not make findings which re-
quire an auditor's expertise.96 7
Rule 2-551-In Bane ReveuP
68
Rule 2-551 attempts to eliminate many of the former uncertainties
surrounding Maryland's in banc review process. 969 When permitted, a
party may obtain either an appeal or an in banc review by three judges
of the circuit,97 but not both.971 To some extent, in banc review func-
tions as a "poor man's appeal. 9 72 The rule attempts to provide a sim-
plified and inexpensive procedure while generating an adequate record
for an in banc court to proceed as an appellate court.9 73
Section (a) states that the constitutional standard for obtaining in
banc review governs. 974 The Committee discussed two situations in
which invoking in banc review, although arguably justifiable, might be
improper. The first situation involves an application for review from
the Orphan's Court where, by statute, an appeal to the circuit court
may be taken in lieu of an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. 9 75
The Committee concluded that no in banc review should be allowed
directly from the Orphan's Court, but that in banc review would be
allowed from the de novo circuit court trial of a case appealed from
Orhpan's Court.97 6 The second situation involves the rule's applicabil-
ity to Baltimore City. It is generally understood that in banc review is
unavailable in Baltimore City mainly because of the complexity of the
city's court system.97 7 The Committee felt that because the Baltimore
967. Committee discussion, id.
968. The spelling is in conformity with MD. CONST. art. IV.
969. See Explanatory Note, Minutes, Nov. 20-21, 1981, at 4, noting that "[t]he constitu-
tional provision requiring 'reservation' during the 'sitting' at which the ruling was made has
been particularly troublesome." Thus, under the new rule, it is clear that an objection pre-
serves the point for review.
970. Id. at 7. (citing Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 404 A.2d 1027 (1979)).
971. Comment of Judge McAuliffe, Minutes, Mar. 12, 1982, at 65. Exercising one's right
to in banc review does not preclude a party from petitioning for certiorari to the Court of
Appeals for review of the in banc decision.
972. Id.
973. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Nov. 20-21, 1981, at 4; Comments of Judge McAuliffe,
i. at 8.
974. MD. CONsT. art. IV, § 22; see also Explanatory Note, Minutes, Nov. 21, 1981, at 4
(relying upon Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 404 A.2d 1027 (1979)).
975. Committee discussion, Minutes, Mar. 12, 1982, at 66. Judge Invernizzi noted some
express exceptions to this statutory provision in Harford and Montgomery Counties. Id
976. Comments of the Chairman, id. at 67 (summarizing Committee consensus).
977. Comments of Judge McAuliffe, Minutes, Nov. 20-21, 1981, at 8-9 (citing
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City court system would be consolidated soon, this question should be
left to judicial resolution.9 78
The new rule facilitates the assertion of a party's constitutional
right to in banc review.9 79 To preserve a point for consideration by a
court in banc, a party no longer is required specifically to except to or-
ders or to rulings of the court. According to section (a), any objection
sufficient to permit review by the Court of Special Appeals apparently
will satisfy the requirements of article 4, section 22 of the Maryland
Constitution, the provision governing in banc review.980
Section (b) reflects the Committee's concern that in banc proce-
dures be simple and straightforward. This section requires a party to set
forth his position in a memorandum rather than in a brief.98 An oppos-
ing memorandum is necessary only if the respondent disagrees with
either the statement of the question or the facts as presented. Otherwise,
the respondent may file a memorandum of argument.
Section (c) attempts to balance the reviewing panel's need for a
complete record against the monetary burden accompanying transcript
production. 98 2 To minimize the incidence of this burden, the rule leaves
the decision to require a transcript within the discretion of ajudge of the
panel. The judge also may assess the costs of transcript production on
either party, to discourage parties from making unnecessary demands
for a transcript.98 3 Finally, the rule instructs the judge to confer with
counsel, if necessary, to determine whether a transcript is required.9 84
Section (d) by using the word "hearing" rather than "oral argu-
ment" '98 5 emphasizes that the in banc procedure resembles motions
practice and is less formal than the normal appellate practice.98 6 Simi-
larly, parties may waive the hearing requirement.
Section (g) paraphrases the passage from article 4, section 22 of the
Maryland Constitution concerning the finality of the reviewing panel's
Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 404 A.2d 1027 (1979), for the proposition that
even if in banc review does not apply to Baltimore City, there is no violation of the equal
protection clause).
978. Id. at 9.
979. Id.
980. Comments of Judge McAuliffe and Mr. Sykes, id?. (citing Washabaugh v.
Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 404 A.2d 1027 (1979)).
981. Comments of Mr. Niemeyer, Minutes, i. at 11.
982. Comments of Judge McAuliffe and Mr. Sykes, id. at 10.
983. Comments of Mr. Brault, Judge McAuliffe, and Mr. Niemeyer, Minutes, Mar. 12,
1981, at 68.
984. Comments of Mr. Sykes, Minutes, Nov. 20-21, 1981, at 11-12. Judge McAuliffe
pointed out that this conference could be held by telephone. Minutes, Mar. 12, 1981, at 68.
985. Minutes, Nov. 20-21, 1981, at 12.
986. Comments of Mr. Niemeyer, id. at 11.
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decision and an opponent's right to appeal. 98 7 It does not address, how-
ever, situations in which a plaintiff brings two claims, winning on the
first claim and losing on the second claim. If the defendant seeks in
banc review on the first claim, the rule does not address whether the
plaintiff must await the in banc decision before taking his appeal.
F Chapter 600-JUDGMENT
Rule 2-601-Ent~y ofJudgment
Rule 2-601 preserves prior practice, while seeking to eliminate un-
certainty concerning both what constitutes the entry of a judgment 988
and when a judgment becomes operative.9 89 The question of what con-
stitutes a judgment has occasioned confusion and difficulty, partly be-
cause not all counties follow the same procedure. Some counties
maintain a minute book, in which any judgment pronounced in open
court is recorded. In other counties, the clerk notes the entry of a judg-
ment in the docket file. 9" Some Committee members expressed doubt
as to whether, as in the federal system, a separate form, paper, or order
constitutes a judgment when the judge signs it.9" Under prior equity
practice, a decree is not effective until the judge signs a written order.992
Section (b) of the new rule specifies the permissible methods of en-
try of judgments, each of which is intended to further the policy that
judgments should not be effective unless recorded in a manner such that
interested persons may find the entry.99 3 Each court may decide
whether to record the judgment in the case's file jacket, a docket that is
contained in the file, or a docket book. Section (b) also makes clear that
the effective date of a judgment is the actual date of entry. This is in-
tended to codify but not alter former law.99 4 The date of entry of a
judgment is important for determining post-trial time periods, such as
the period within which motions must be filed for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, 995 to amend or alter the verdict, 996 for a new
987. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 22; Explanatory Note, Minutes, Nov. 20-21, 1981, at 7-8.
988. See Minutes, June 19-20, 1981, at 23; Minutes, June 18-19, 1982, at 49-50 (Committee
debates regarding whether judgments must be written and how judgments should be
recorded).
989. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Mar. 6-7, 1981, at 35.
990. See Minutes, Mar. 6-7, 1981, at 36.
991. See Minutes, June 19-20, 1981, at 23 (referring to FED. R. Civ. P. 58(a)).
992. Id. at 2.
993. See Comments of Judge McAuliffe, Minutes, June 18-19, 1982, at 50 (regarding fair-
ness and consistency).
994. See Eberly v. Eberly, 253 Md. 132, 134, 251 A.2d 900, 901 (1969) (judgment not effec-
tive until made part of public records).
995. See MD. R.P. 2-532.
996. See MD. R.P. 2-534; MD. R.P. 2-535.
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trial.99 7 The date of entry also determines the beginning of the period
within which an appeal must be noted.998
The new rule displays the Committee's concern for promptness and
certainty. Because of the significance of the entry date, section (a) re-
quires the clerk to enter the judgment "forthwith" upon the rendition of
a jury verdict or upon a decision by the court, or upon the court's ap-
proval of the form of the judgment. If a clerk fails to enter a judgment
promptly, the clerk's bond may be needed to cover damages caused by
any delay. 999 Federal Rule 58, from which section (a) is derived, also
specifies that entry of judgment not be delayed for taxing of costs.' 00 0
Although Rule 2-601 does not contain such language, the Maryland
courts should uniformly follow this practice to ensure that judgments
are entered promptly. Section (c) restates the indexing and filing re-
quirements of Former Rule 619 a.
Rule 2-602-Judgment-Mulliple Claims
The new rule continues the present policy of avoiding the confu-
sion, delay, and expense caused by piecemeal appeals.'0° ' Former Rule
605 a generally barred an immediate appeal from an adjudication of
one or more but fewer than all claims in an action. The trial court was
empowered to certify a partial judgment as final and appealable, but
only upon fulfillment of two conditions: (1) an express determination
that there was no just reason for delay and (2) upon an express request
for entry ofjudgment."° 2 Rule 2-602 continues this general policy with
minor additions and clarifications.
Although the title of Rule 2-602, like that of Former Rule 605 a,
refers only to multiple claims, the new rule also expressly applies to situ-
ations involving multiple parties. Former Rule 605 a referred only to
"multiple claims," but courts had interpreted the term to include multi-
ple defendants." °°3 The addition of "multiple parties" to the language
of the old rule brings Rule 2-602 more closely into line with Federal
Rule 54(b),'0 ° 4 which was amended in 1961 to expressly include multi-
997. See MD. R.P. 2-533.
998. See MD. R.P. 1012; see also MD. R.P. 2-551 (in bane review).
999. Minutes, June 19-20, 1981, at 23.
1000. See supra notq 991.
1001. See, e.g., Harford Sands, Inc. v. Levitt & Sons, 27 Md. App. 702, 711-12, 343 A.2d
544, 549 (1975); Parish v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 98, 242 A.2d
512, 553 (1968); Durling v. Kennedy, 210 Md. 549, 554, 123 A.2d 878, 880 (1956).
1002. Former Md. R.P. 605 a, cited bi Parish, 250 Md. at 97-98, 242 A.2d at 553.
1003. Eg., Picking v. State Fin. Corp., 257 Md. 554, 557-58, 263 A.2d 572, 574 (1970).
1004. The language of Former Md. R.P. 605 a is in all other respects essentially the same as
FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Accord Parish, 250 Md. at 97, 242 A.2d at 553.
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ple parties. 1005
Rule 2-602 also expressly provides that partial summary judgments
obtained pursuant to Rule 2-501(d) must be certified as final in order to
be appealable. This modification of the language of Former Rule 605 a
incorporates current Maryland case law. 10 6 By including partial sum-
mary judgments within the scope of Rule 2-602, the Committee tacitly
rejected the federal practice of considering such judgments as interlocu-
tory and not immediately appealable.' °
Rule 2-602 also adds to the language of Former Rule 605 a by
including "consolidated actions" within the type of actions for which a
partial judgment must be certified to be appealable. It is important to
recognize that "consolidated actions" as used in the rule merely refers to
situations involving a merger of cases dealing with common questions or
subject matter into a single action.'0 0 8 Thus, the Committee did not
intend to change current practice and to apply the certification require-
ment to trials of separate actions that are consolidated solely for the
purpose of convenience, but are not truly consolidated into one
action. "°9
Considerable Committee debate centered on the interplay between
Rule 2-602 and certain Chapter 500 trial motion rules."1 0 As originally
drafted, Rule 2-602, unlike Former Rule 605, barred entry of a partial
judgment whenever the court failed to certify that just cause for an ex-
pedited appeal existed.' 0 ' The rule thus required all non-certified or-
ders to be titled something other than a judgment. That result was
apparently designed to conform with the general Chapter 600 policy of
precluding judgments from being entered unless final and appeala-
ble. 112 The problem with such strict adherence to the purist concept of
1005. See FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) advisory committee note (1961 amendment). The addition
of "multiple parties" to Federal Rule 54(b) was necessitated by a line of cases which devel-
oped in the circuits holding that the language with respect to "multiple claims" in Rule 54(b)
was inapplicable to the dismissal by the trial court of one or more but fewer than all defend-
ants joined in an action. See, e.g., Mull v. Ackerman, 279 F.2d 25, 26 (2d Cir. 1960).
1006. See, e.g., Shpak v. Oletsky, 280 Md. 355, 359-60, 373 A.2d 1234, 1237-38 (1977).
1007. Cf Comments of Professor Bowie, Minutes, June 18-19, 1982, at 42-43; see also FED. R.
Civ. P. 56(c).
1008. See Minutes, Apr. 16, 1982, at 35-36; Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 3.
1009. Id. Maryland courts have consistently noted that separate cases consolidated for pur-
poses of trial, as a matter of convenience as permitted by Former Md. R.P. 503, are not
covered by Former Md. R.P. 605 a. See, e.g., Coppage v. Resolute Ins. Co., 264 Md. 261, 263-
64, 285 A.2d 626, 628 (1972). Separate judgments in such cases from which an appeal may be
taken were provided for by Former Md. R.P. 606. See id; see also Leach v. Citizens Bank, 17
Md. App. 391, 302 A.2d 634 (1973).
1010. See generally Minutes, June 18-19, 1982, at 42-48.
1011. Id. at 33. For the original draft of the rule, see Minutes, Apr. 16, 1982, at 34-35.
1012. Minutes, June 18-19, 1982, at 41.
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judgments contemplated by the new rules is that the Chapter 500 rules
tie the period for filing certain motions to the date of entry of judgment.
Thus, the original draft of 2-602, when read together with the Chapter
500 trial motion rules, could have postponed consideration of post-trial
motions until many months after the pertinent decisions.'0 1
The Committee considered two options to rectify the problem.
One suggestion was that the relevant Chapter 500 rules could be
amended to allow entry of an order from which post-judgment motions
periods would commence to run when multiple parties or claims are
involved." 4 The Committee instead chose the second option, which
was to amend the wording of 2-602 to permit entry of partial judgments,
but to provide that any order or judgment entered is not final and ap-
pealable unless certified. 15 As a result, the language of 2-602, in its
final form, is nearly identical to that of Former Rule 605, with the addi-
tion of the express references to multiple parties, consolidated actions,
and partial summary judgments as previously discussed.
Rule 2-603--Costs
Rule 2-603 modifies current practice by expanding the court's dis-
cretion to assess costs, and at the same time narrowing the clerk's role in
assessment. Section (a) restates the general standard set forth in Former
Rule 604 a: The prevailing party is entitled to costs, absent a rule, stat-
ute, or order of court to the contrary. Section (a) also expressly permits
the court to allocate costs among the parties. That is intended to change
current law, under which costs are seldom divided.0 6
1013. Id. at 47.
1014. Id.
1015. See id.
1016. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Nov. 20-21, 1981, at 29. Under certain unusual circum-
stances, however, application of the former rule resulted in allocation of costs. See, e.g., Hoff-
man v. Glock, 20 Md. App. 284, 295, 315 A.2d 551, 558 (1974), in which division of costs
between the parties was held within the court's discretion. One party was awarded costs for
the action, and the other for the counterclaim upon which it had prevailed. Division of costs
have been used in other circumstances. For example, Former Md. R.P. 882 permitted such
an allocation in appeals. Also, Former Md. R.P. 415 permitted the costs of depositions taken
into evidence to be apportioned among the parties.
For examples of other new rules expressly allowing allocation costs among the parties,
see MD. R.P. 2-433 (Sanctions), 2-541 (Masters), 2-542 (Examiners), and 2-543 (Auditors).
By contrast MD. R.P. 2-509 contains an exception to the general inclination towards permit-
ting allocation. This rule addresses special costs of jury trials in the First, Second, and Fourth
Judicial Circuits. Rule 2-509(b) states: "If the reason for removal from the assignment is
settlement of the action, the costs shall be assessed against the plazttiffor as the parties agree.
Otherwise, they shall be assessed against the initiating party. . . . [The] judge may waive assess-
ment of these costs for good cause shown." MD. R.P. 2-509(b) (emphasis added). Therefore,
MD. R.P. 2-509(b) provides that costs may be assessed or denied, but not allocated. An ex-
ception arises if the parties agree to allocate the costs. Likewise MD. R.P. 2-506(d), governing
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The major change incorporated in the new rule is the diminution of
the clerk's role in determining costs. Under section (b) the clerk assesses
only standard costs; all other costs are to be assessed by the court under
section (c). Former Rule 604 provided for the clerk to determine nearly
all costs. Costs recoverable comprise those expenses necessarily incurred
in prosecuting or defending the action. 10 1 7 Thus, under the old rule
court clerks might have been called upon to decide, at least prelimina-
rily, contested issues between attorneys that could have required analy-
sis of the case and of the trial. 0° 8 The new rule alleviates the
undesirable aspect of clerk determination by limiting the clerk's role to
assessing standard costs and by providing for mandatory judicial review
of contested assessments.
Section (c) provides for court assessment of certain costs and ex-
penses. Upon motion, the court may assess any reasonable and neces-
sary expenses permitted by rule or law. The Committee did not intend
that parties recover virtually all expenses incurred at trial; only those
costs permitted by statute, rule, or case law are allowed.'01 9 The court
also may assess the expenses of experts or interpreters that the court ap-
points on its own initiative 0 20 and the costs of court-requested tran-
scripts. This includes interpreters for the deaf, and for other disabled
persons, regardless of whether the purpose is to aid a disabled person to
understand events occurring at trial or to enable the court to understand
a disabled person's testimony. The court has the discretion to assess the
costs against any party, including prevailing parties, or to order pay-
ment of some or all the expenses from public funds.
Section (d) rewords Former Rule 604 c and explicitly states that
voluntary dismissal, permits the parties to stipulate as to costs. See also MD. R.P. 1-341,
prescribing that if unjustified proceedings are instigated, costs may be assessed against the
nonprevailing party and that party's attorney.
1017. This could include, for example, bond premiums (see MD. R.P. 1-406), transcripts of
master's, examiners, or auditor's proceedings (see MD. R.P. 2-541, 2-542, 2-543), witness com-
pensation fees (see MD. CTS. & JUD. PROc. CODE ANN. § 9-202 (1984)), costs of videotaped
depositions taken into evidence (see MD. R.P. 2-416), or attorneys' fees (see MD. R.P. 1-341, 2-
433, 2-434, 2-626, 2-646). It should not include expert witnesses' fees. See Freedman v. Seid-
ler, 233 Md. 39, 47, 194 A.2d 778, 783 (1963) (expert witnesses' fees not taxable as costs).
1018. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Nov. 20-21, 1981, at 29. An illustration of this problem is
the determination of witness costs. The clerk may be called to determine, in effect, the rele-
vance of a particular witness' testimony.
1019. See Minutes, Nov. 20-21, 1981, at 30.
1020. Id. at 31. The Committee noted that experts and interpreters may at times be consid-
ered "court-appointed" even when they are requested by a party and approved by the court.
Section (c) seeks to make clear that only when the court acts on its own initiative is an expert
to be considered "court-appointed" for purposes of assessing costs. Cf. FED. R. EvID. 706(b),
which appears to permit complete discretion in assessing the costs of court-appointed experts.
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both a person bringing an action for the use or benefit of another and
the person for whose benefit the action is brought are liable for costs.
Rule 2-604-Interest
Rule 2-604 is a simplified version of Former Rule 642 and Mary-
land District Rule 642.1121 Section (a), which is consistent with present
practice and case law, 0 2 2 distinguishes between pre- and post-judgment
interest. 1023 Moreover, the rule does not necessarily apply the current
legal rate of interest to all cases involving pre-judgment interest. In
some instances, interest will be computed using the rate set forth in the
document upon which suit is brought. 0 24 Section (a) also makes clear
that although pre-judgment interest is included in the judgment, it must
be stated separately. Separation is necessary so that the sum constitut-
ing interest may be easily determined. The separation does not affect
the computation of post-judgment interest. That is, if the judgment is
not paid in a timely manner, post-judgment interest will accrue on both
the principal and interest components of the judgment. Section (b) re-
quires post-judgment interest to be computed at the rate prescribed by
law. This rate is determined by reference to section 11-107 of the Mary-
land Code, Courts Article. 0 2
5
Rule 2-611-ConfessedJudgment
Although a number of modifications serve to clarify and improve
existing procedures, the substance of Rule 2-611 derives from Former
Rule 645 without major changes. The changes are unlikely to place the
constitutionality of the confessed judgment process in jeopardy. Section
(a) preserves the current requirements for entry of confessed judgment.
The creditor must file a complaint, together with the written instrument
authorizing confession of judgment, and an affidavit stating the amount
due. Nothing in the rule changes the right to attorneys' fees for recovery
on a confessed judgment note. 1026
Section (a) also incorporates three notable changes. First, it is in-
1021. Explanatory Note, Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 17.
1022. See I.W. Berman Properties v. Porter Brothers, 276 Md. 1, 15-21, 344 A.2d 65, 74-77
(1975) (trial court may award both pre-judgment and post-judgment interest).
1023. MD. R.P. 2-604(c).
1024. Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 17; see Kronovet v. Lipchin, 288 Md. 30, 52-56, 415
A.2d 1096, 1109-11 (1980) (pre-judgment interest assessed at contract rate).
1025. The current interest rate on a judgment is 10% per annum. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 11-107(a) (1984). Exceptions exist, e.g., id § 11-107(b) (rent judgments).
1026. The right to attorneys' fees was confirmed in Webster v. People's Loan Bank, 160 Md.
57, 61, 152 A. 815, 817 (1931); see also Meyer v. Gyro Transp. Sys., Inc., 263 Md. 518, 531-32,
283 A.2d 608, 614-15 (1971).
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tended to establish Rule 2-611 as the exclusive means of obtaining a
confessed judgment. Former Rule 645 h permitted the court to enter a
confessed judgment pursuant to procedures not described in the rule. 1027
Second, it establishes the plaintiff's absolute right to have confessed
judgment entered if the plaintiff complies with the rule. Former Rule
645 a at least appeared to allow the clerk to exercise discretion over the
entry ofjudgment. 0 2' Third, the new rule abolishes the distinction be-
tween instances in which the plaintiff's affidavit furnishes the defend-
ant's address, and those in which it states that the defendant's address is
unknown. Under section (c), the clerk must enter judgment in either
case. Former Rule 645 f distinguished between those two situations by
allowing the court's order to be entered before judgment if the defend-
ant's address was unknown. The Committee considered that the former
rule created an incentive for plaintiffs to furnish some address, even if
the likelihood of the defendant's being served at that address was
remote. 1029
Section (b) governs notice. First, it provides that if given an ad-
dress, the clerk must issue a "notice" to the defendant, instead of a
"summons" as under the former rule. ° "0 The Committee changed the
language because Rule 2-611 does not require the defendant to appear
before the court; the defendant may simply move to open, vacate, or
modify the judgment. 10 3 ' Traditionally, a summons mandates the ap-
pearance of the person named in the instrument, which appearance
would not be necessary, should the defendant choose not to defend, or to
defend solely by filing a motion in response. 0 3 2 Moreover, Rule 2-114,
governing the content of summonses, requires the inclusion of a warning
to the defendant of the risk of default. Such notification would not be in
accord with the procedures of Rule 2-611, which result in confessed
judgment, not default judgment.10 3 3
Section (b) also consolidates the notice provisions of Former Rule
645 e and f, without substantial changes. Former Rule 645 e allowed
the plaintiff to petition the court to permit notice by mail, publication,
1027. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Oct. 16-17, 1981, at 26. Although the court may exercise
its authority to enter judgment without following the directives of the new rule, the circum-
stances under which it would are unclear.
1028. Id.
1029. Id.
1030. Former Md. R.P. 645 b required the clerk, upon entering the judgment, to issue a
summons both to notify the defendant and to require him "to appear and show cause, if any,
why the judgment should be vacated, opened or modified." The summons was served under
Former Md. R.P. 104, 106, or 107 a.
1031. MD. R.P. 2-611(c).
1032. See Minutes, Oct. 16-17, 1981, at 28.
1033. Id
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or posting, 0 3 4 if the summons could not be served.0 3 5 Former Rule
645 f provided for notice by publication if the defendant's address was
unknown.'0 36 Section (b) of the new rule deals with both of these situa-
tions. If the court is satisfed from the plaintiffs affidavit that either the
defendant cannot be served, or that the defendant's whereabouts are
unknown, it must provide for notice by mail and posting or publication
pursuant to Rule 2-122. 1037
Section (c) is essentially the same as Former Rule 645 c. It permits
the defendant to move to open, modify, or vacate the judgment within
the time period prescribed by Rule 2-321(a) and (b), which governs the
time for filing answers. 0 3' The defendant's motion must set forth the
"legal and factual basis for the defense to the claim."1 0 3 9 The language
is somewhat different from that in Former Rule 645 c, which permitted
motions "on the ground that the defendant has a meritorious defense to
the cause of action." But, the new section appears merely to have em-
ployed terminology similar to that of Federal Rule 12(b) 0 40 without
working any substantive change in the law. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland has held under the former rule that a showing of a meritori-
ous defense requires only persuasive evidence of substantial and suffi-
1034. Former Md. R.P. 645 e, incorporating by reference Former Md. R.P. 105 b.
1035. The new rule substitutes a notice for the summons. See supra note 1030 and accompa-
nying text.
1036. Former Md. R.P. 645 f, incorporating by reference Former Md. R.P. 105 b.
1037. MD. R.P. 2-611(b), incorporating by reference MD. R.P. 2-122. A potential ambigu-
ity discussed in Committee meetings was the conflict between MD. R.P. 2-611 (b) and 1-323.
Under Rule 2-611(b), the plaintiff must file a motion, together with an affidavit, in order to
request substituted service pursuant to MD. R.P. 2-122. Rule 1-323, however, bars the clerk
from accepting any pleading or other paper requiring service, other than an original plead-
ing, unless it is accompanied by an admission, waiver, or proof of service. A literal reading of
the two rules, therefore, would be that the plaintiff can obtain substituted service if the origi-
nal complaint states that the defendant's whereabouts are unknown. However, the plaintiff
can not obtain substituted service if the plaintiff first attempts personal service and fails to
effect it, because the clerk may not accept the request. See MD. R.P. 1-321(a) (every paper
filed shall be served); id. 1-323; Minutes, Oct. 16-17, 1981, at 28. Despite this ambiguity, the
new rules should be harmonized rather than read to conflict. There is no serious question
that plaintiff's request for notice pursuant to MD. R.P. 2-122 should be accepted. See Min-
utes, Oct. 16-17, 1981, at 28.
Additionally, unlike Former Md. R.P. 105 b, MD. R.P. 2-122(a) provides for notice to
be mailed to the defendant's last known address in cases where the defendant's whereabouts
are unknown. Furthermore, both MD. R.P. 2-122(c) and 2-611(b) require the clerk to include
in the notice the latest date for the defendant to file a motion to open, vacate, or modify the
judgment. This is intended to assist the defendant, who may be uncertain as to when the 30
day period in which to respond commences. See Minutes, Oct. 16-17, 1981, at 28-29.
1038. See supra text accompanying notes 403-10.
1039. MD. R.P. 2-611(c).
1040. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) states that "[e]very defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in
any pleading . . . shall be asserted .... "
[VOL. 43:669
MARYLAND RULES
cient grounds for an actual controversy as to the merits of the case.' 0 4
Moreover, the court held that a meritorious defense is not limited to
defenses to the merits of the underlying transaction; it is merely a de-
fense that has merit, 1012 and thus includes limitations or set off.
10 4 4
Section (c) dispenses with the language of Former Rule 645 c and d,
which states that a confessed judgment "shall stand to the same extent
as a judgment absolute entered after trial." The deletion of that phrase
should have no effect, as the principle is well-founded in common law
and is still operative.' Finally, Former Rule 645 g, providing for ex-
tensions of time in which to file motions, has been obviated by Rule 1-
204.
Section (d), governing disposition of the defendant's motion, closely
follows Former Rule 645 d, although the requirement of a hearing has
been eliminated. 0 4 6 The test for evaluation of the motion remains the
same: whether the defendant raises "a substantial and sufficient basis for
an actual controversy as to the merits of the action . . ,1o47 If the
defendant surmounts this obstacle, the court must alter the judgment
and permit the defendant to file a responsive pleading in anticipation of
trial.
Section (e) clarifies Former Rule 645 i by prohibiting execution
sales, pursuant to Rule 2-644, and remittances by garnishees, pursuant
to Rule 2-646(i), until either the defendant's time for filing a motion in
opposition has passed, or the disposition of any motion so filed. The
former rule contained confusing language with regard to the finality of
confessed judgments. A confessed judgment is final and enforceable, de-
spite the defendant's right to challenge it within the specified time pe-
riod.0 48 By implication, the present practice of filing writs of
attachment simultaneously with entry of judgment is preserved. Even
though execution is delayed, attachment preserves the creditor's priority
interest in the debtor's property.
1041. Billingsley v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank, 271 Md. 683, 689, 320 A.2d 34, 37-38 (1974). See
also MD. R.P. 2-611 (d) (governing disposition of motions); Former Md. R.P. 645 d (same).
1042. Young v. Mayne Realty Co., 48 Md. App. 662, 666, 429 A.2d 296, 298 (1981).
1043. E.g., id.
1044. E.g., Gelzer v. Scamoni, 238 Md. 73, 74, 207 A.2d 655, 655 (1965).
1045. S.W. Barrick & Sons, Inc. v. J.P. Councill Co., 224 Md. 138, 140, 166 A.2d 916, 917
(1961).
1046. Although a hearing is not mandatory, either party may request a hearing pursuant to
MD. R.P. 2-311(0.
1047. MD. R.P. 2-611 (d). This means raising a jury question. It does not mean the defend-
ant must surmount the preponderance of the evidence test in order for the court to alter the
judgment. Billingsley v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank, 271 Md. 683, 689, 320 A.2d 34, 38 (1974).
1048. S.W. Barrick & Sons, Inc. v. J.P. Councill Co., 224 Md. 138, 140, 166 A.2d 916, 917
(1961).
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It is well settled that a cognovit clause does not violate per se the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 0 49 A debtor may
waive in advance the due process rights of notice and opportunity to
present a defense prior to the rendition of a civil judgment on a note.'°50
Generally the court must determine, in any given case, whether the
waiver was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made." 5' In mak-
ing this determination the court will consider whether the contract is
one of adhesion, whether there is great disparity in bargaining power,
and whether the debtor received any consideration for agreeing to the
cognovit provision. 0 52 Realistically, therefore, such clauses will with-
stand attack only if corporate parties are involved. In Maryland this
will almost always be the case, because lenders in consumer credit trans-
actions are forbidden to take judgment by confession as security. 1053
Moreover, the Court of Appeals has established that the defendant need
only pose a jury question in order to open the judgment and proceed to
trial."0 5 4 The defendant does not bear the burden of proof by the pre-
ponderance of the evidence at two separate stages.
Rule 2-611 does not place the constitutionality of the confessed
judgment procedure in jeopardy. Indeed, section (e) clarifies that prop-
erty may not be sold in execution, and garnishees may not remit wages
or other debts, until the time for the defendant to file a motion in re-
sponse and the disposition on that motion entered has expired. Hence
the rule aids in affording the defendant procedural due process.
Rule 2-612- Consent Judgment
Rule 2-612 governs the authority of the court and of the clerk to
enter judgments by consent of the parties. The rule provides general
authority for the court to enter judgments by consent, and empowers
the clerk to enter consent judgments with certain limitations. Former
Rule 601 only pertained to the entry of consent judgments by the
clerk. 1055
On its face, Rule 2-612 alters the clerk's authority to enter judg-
ments by consent of the parties. Former Rule 601 permitted the clerk to
enter a consent judgment only "in the absence of the judge," and fur-
1049. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972); Billingsley v. Lincoln Nat'l
Bank, 271 Md. at 687, 320 A.2d at 37; Meyer v. Gyro Transp. Sys., 263 Md. 518, 533, 283
A.2d 608, 616 (1971).
1050. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. at 185.
1051. Id.
1052. Id. at 188.
1053. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-311 (1983).
1054. Billingsley v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank, 271 Md. at 689, 320 A.2d at 37.
1055. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Oct. 16-17, 1981, at 31.
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ther specified that the clerk could act only during a "term of court."
The new rule dispenses with both of these limitations." 56 Rule 2-612's
restrictions as to when the clerk may enter a judgment by consent are
consistent with new Rules 2-601 and 2-602. Closely following Rule 2-
601, which governs the entry of judgment by a clerk after a verdict,
Rule 2-612 provides that the clerk can enter judgment only if it is for a
sum certain, or for costs, or if it denies all relief.1 o5 7 Additionally, entry
may not be made unless the judgment disposes of all of the claims in the
action. That accords with Former Rule 605 and new Rule 2-602, which
require the express direction of the court to enter a judgment on fewer
than all claims in an action. 1058
Committee members suggested that the new rule changes former
practice by granting the clerk some discretion to refuse to enter the judg-
ment.'0 59 The discretion apparently arises from the limitations in the
new rule relating to when the clerk is allowed to enter judgment, and
from the language of the rule, which provides that the clerk "may enter
judgment."'0 6 ° Presumably, the clerk may refuse to enter judgment if
not satisfied that the judgment disposes of all claims in the action, or
that the judgment is for sum certain, or for costs, or that it denies all
relief. The language of Former Rule 601, however, also appeared to
give the clerk some discretion by providing, like the new rule, that the
clerk "may enter judgment." But in frequently repeated dicta Mary-
land courts have consistently stated that a clerk's function, upon receiv-
ing a request from the parties to enter a consent judgment, is purely
ministerial, not discretionary. 10 6 1
Rule 2-613---Default Judgment
Rule 2-613 substantially revises the default judgment procedures
embodied in Former Rules 310 b, 611, 648, and 675 c. While the new
rule simplifies present practice, the procedure by which a default judg-
ment is obtained remains a two-step process: entry of an order of de-
fault and its attendant notice and an opportunity to vacate, followed by
the actual entry of judgment.
Under the former scheme, if a party against whom a claim is as-
1056. Id.
1057. Id.
1058. Id
1059. Minutes, Oct. 16-17, 1981, at 32.
1060. MD. R.P. 2-612 (emphasis added).
1061. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Wroten, 35 Md. App. 359, 370 A.2d 577 (1977) (citing Corey v.
Carback, 201 Md. 389, 94 A.2d 629 (1953)). While the dicta in Corey to which Dorsey refers
predates Former Md. R.P. 601, Dorsey clearly implies that the language is equally applicable
to that rule. See id at 361 n.1, 370 A.2d at 579 n.l.
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serted failed to comply with the time requirements for pleading, the
party pressing the claim could move that a judgment by default be en-
tered at law, or that the bill be taken pro confesso in an equity proceed-
ing.' °6 2 After entry of a judgment by default or of a decree pro confesso,
notice was mailed to the defaulting party by the clerk.0 6 3 The default-
ing party at law could then seek to have the judgment vacated within
thiry days after entry, pursuant to the court's general revisionary
power.' 06 Immediately after the judgment by default had been en-
tered, the prevailing party at law was entitled to have the court or a jury
assess the amount of damages by means of an inquisition."0 6 5 The initial
judgment by default was then "extended" in accordance with the spe-
cific determination of the inquisition, and a final judgment by default
was entered. 0 66 In an equity proceeding, after a decree pro confesso had
been entered, the defendant had thirty days in which to move to set
aside the decree, after which time a final decree could have been
entered. 1067
Rule 2-613 dispenses with some of the formalities of present default
judgment practice. For instance, the plaintiff need not file a motion
praying entry of judgment; section (a) merely requires that the plaintiff
file a written request.' 0 6 Section (a) also eliminates the court's discre-
tion as to whether to enter the default, by providing that, upon receipt
of the plaintiff's request, the court "shall" enter an order of default.
10 69
Section (b) alters prior practice regarding notice given to the de-
fendant upon entry of an order of default. While the notice provisions
of Former Rule 611 were mandatory,' 70 the clerk was not obligated to
issue notice if the defendant's address was not specified in the pleadings
and was otherwise unknown.'0 7  Rule 2-613 seeks to insure that the de-
1062. Former Md. R.P. 310 b.
1063. Former Md. R.P. 611.
1064. Former Md. R.P. 625 a. This rule was generally applicable to both law and equity.
See, e.g., Hughes v. Beltway Homes, Inc., 276 Md. 382, 384, 347 A.2d 837, 839 (1975). How-
ever, Former Md. R.P. 675 a addresses situations in which a defendant in an equity proceed-
ing could move to set aside a decree pro confesso. See infra note 1077.
1065. See Former Md. R.P. 648. In nonjury actions, the court made an inquiry as to dam-
ages. In cases in which a jury trial was requested, ajury was empaneled and a trial or "inqui-
sition" was conducted to assess damages. See also 3 J. POE, supra note 136, §§ 368-369.
1066. Former Md. R.P. 648. The rule did not require that notice of the inquisition be given
to the defendant. See Kaplan v. Bach, 36 Md. App. 152, 156, 373 A.2d 71, 75 (1977); Explan-
atory Note, Minutes, Oct. 16-17, 1981, at 34.
1067. Former Md. R.P. 675.
1068. The request must be served on the defaulting party, see MD. R.P. 1-32 1, and it should
state the defendant's last known address.
1069. Former Md. R.P. 310 b provided by implication for the exercise of discretion.
1070. E.g., Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Reick, 39 Md. App. 620, 628, 387 A.2d 789, 793 (1978).
1071. Former Md. R.P. 611.
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fendant receives adequate notice of the order of default. First, section
(a) requires that the plaintiff's request include the defendant's last
known address." 72 Second, section (b) requires the clerk to issue notice
to both the defendant and to the defendant's attorney of record, if any.
Finally, the rule provides that the court can require that additional no-
tice be given to the defendant if necessary.
0 73
To enforce the time limits for filing responsive pleadings, Rule 2-
613(c) restricts a defendant's ability to have a default judgment vacated
or modified. Under the former rule, in an action at law, the court had
discretion to set aside or modify a default judgment during the thirty
day period after entry, under its general revisory power, pursuant to
Former Rule 625 a. 10 74 Maryland courts interpreting that rule have
consistently stated that the court's discretion should be liberally exer-
cised. 10 75 Thus, in general, a defendant was entitled to have a default
judgment set aside during this period merely by showing a "reasonable
indication of a meritorious defense, or other equitable circumstances
that would justify striking the judgment."' 1 7 6 Likewise, in an equity
proceeding, the court had discretion to set aside a decree pro confesso,
upon a defendant's motion or on its own initiative, within thirty days
after entry; 10 7 7 and the Court of Special Appeals has held that "leave to
file an answer in such cases should be freely granted when it appears
that a colorable meritorious defense has been shown."'
0 7 8
Rule 2-613(c) now limits the discretionary power. First, to vacate
the order of default, the defendant must file a motion within thirty days
after its entry. There is no provision for the court to set aside or revise
the default on its own initiative. 0 79 Second, section (c) provides that
the motion must specify "the reasons for the failure to plead and the
legal and factual basis for the defense to the claim." For the defendant
to prevail, the court must find that there is both "a substantial and suffi-
1072. This provision was the result of a late revision adopted by the Committee upon the
recommendation of the court. See Letter from the Hon. John F. McAuliffe to the Judges of
the Court of Appeals (Sept. 19, 1983).
1073. This would include notice by mailing and publication or posting. See MD. R.P. 2-122.
1074. The court's revisory power stems from MD. CTS. & JUD. PROc. CODE ANN. § 6-408
(1984), which mirrors Former Md. R.P. 625 a. See Maryland Lumber Co. v. Savoy Constr.
Co., 286 Md. 98, 101, 405 A.2d 741, 743 (1979).
1075. Ma/landLumber, 286 Md. at 102, 405 A.2d at 743; Weaver v. Realty Growth Inves-
tors, 38 Md. App. 78, 82, 379 A.2d 193, 195 (1977).
1076. Abrams v. Gray Inv. Co., 253 Md. 121, 123, 251 A.2d 876, 877 (1969) (quoting Clarke
Baridon v. Union Co., 218 Md. 480, 483, 147 A.2d 221, 222-23 (1958)).
1077. Former Md. R.P. 625 c; see Fritz v. Fritz, 34 Md. App. 600, 368 A.2d 502 (1977).
1078. Fritz, 34 Md. App. at 608, 368 A.2d at 507. However, the defendant is not entitled as
a matter of right to file an answer during the 30 day period after entry of the decree pro
confesso. Guerriero v. Friendly Fin. Corp., 230 Md. 217, 222, 186 A.2d 881, 883 (1962).
1079. See supra text accompanying notes 1074 & 1077.
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cient basis for an actual controversy as to the merits of the action and
that it is equitable to excuse the failure to plead."'1 °8 Thus the new rule
establishes a stricter standard by requiring a "substantial and sufficient
basis" as opposed to a "reasonable indication" of a meritorious defense,
and by making the requirements of a meritorious defense and an equita-
ble excuse conjunctive. Although the Committee indicated that it did
not intend to overide the precedent interpreting Former Rule 625 a,
which allowed a judgment to be set aside solely because of "equitable
circumstances,"10 8 ' the language of Rule 2-613 clearly requires that the
defendant must additionally demonstrate that there is an actual contro-
versy as to the merits of the action.
If the defendant either fails to file a motion to vacate the order of
default, or if the motion is denied, the plaintiff can request that the
court enter a judgment by default pursuant to 2-613(e). Before the
court can enter a final judgment, however, section (e) requires that the
court be satisfied that personal jurisdiction was obtained over the de-
fendant, and that the defendant received proper notice. 1082
Section (e) also dispenses with the formal requirements of an adver-
sarial hearing or inquisition to determine the amount or character of
relief, 108 3 in favor of a more flexible, exparle approach essentially derived
from Federal Rule 55(b)(2). Although the court can conduct informal
hearings when appropriate, the new rule provides that in certain cir-
cumstances, such as if damages are for a sum certain or a sum which can
be made certain by computation, the court may rely on affidavits or on
the pleadings to establish the amount of the judgment. 8 4
Section (f) establishes the finality of the default judgment by deny-
ing the court its general revisory power under Rule 2-535(a) once the
judgment has been properly entered. However, the section qualifies the
apparent denial of authority by providing an exception allowing the
court to exercise its general revisory power over the relief granted. Sec-
tion (f) thus codifies present law, because the cases indicate that the
1080. MD. R.P. 2-613(d). As originally drafted, the rule required a showing of "good
cause" to execute the defendant's failure to plead, instead of an "equitable" excuse. Minutes,
Oct. 16-17, 1981, at 33; Minutes, Nov. 20-21, 1981, at 13.
1081. Minutes, Nov. 20-21, 1981, at 17.
1082. These requirements, which were not contained in the original draft of the rule, were
apparently added by the Committee to provide further safeguards to ensure that the rights of
defendants are adequately protected. See id. at 16.
1083. See Former Md. R.P. 648.
1084. The initial draft of the rule went much further and allowed the clerk to enter the
judgment in such circumstances. Thus the plaintiff could obtain judgment upon written re-
quest that included an affidavit stating the amount due; however, the Committee decided
that final judgment by default should not be entered without the involvement of the court.
Minutes, Nov. 20-21, 1981, at 14-16.
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court, pursuant to its revisory power, cannot examine the validity of the
plaintiff's cause of action, due to the fact that a judgment by default is
conclusive of the question of liability. 1085
The two-step process for obtaining a default judgment was the
product of substantial debate by the Committee. The original draft of
the rule sought to establish a one-step process in which the initial deter-
mination of default and the entry of the judgment were combined. The
defendant was to be given notice only after the precise amount of the
judgment had been determined. At that point the defendant could
move to modify or vacate the judgment."8 6 The Committee abandoned
this scheme in favor of the more traditional two-step process; neverthe-
less, the final version of 2-613 is significantly different from former
Maryland practice, yet at the same time, only somewhat similar to Fed-
eral Rule 55. The revision of present default judgment practice contem-
plated by the new rule reflects the Committee's desire to encourage
compliance with the time requirements for pleading, while at the same
time ensuring that the rights of defendants are sufficiently protected.
Rule 2-614-Judgment of Contributzon or Recovery Over
This provision restates Former Rule 605 d. The changes are stylis-
tic, 1° 8 7 except that the former provision requiring fifteen days notice to
the defendant against whom contribution is sought is deleted. Rule 2-
311 (b) now governs responses to all motions; it prescribes the same time
period as did the former rule.
Rule 2-615--Judgment on Claim and Counlerclaim
This provision restates Former Rule 605 b, with stylistic changes
and allows the court to enter judgment for the amount by which a claim
or counterclaim exceeds the other. The prior requirement that the court
not enter a judgment for less than the jurisdictional amount is
eliminated.
Rule 2-621-Lien ofJudgment
The value of a judgment depends on the creditor's ability to en-
force it. One of a creditor's most powerful enforcement tools, which
arises automatically out of a money judgment, is a lien on the defend-
ant's interests in real property. Rule 2-621 restates the substance of For-
1085. See, e.g., Millison v. Ades of Lexington, Inc., 262 Md. 319, 328, 277 A.2d 579, 584
(1971).
1086. Minutes, Oct. 16-17, 1981, at 32-35.
1087. Explanatory Note, id. at 54.
1984]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
mer Rule 620 a, which provided that a judgment constitutes a lien on
interests in land located in any county where the judgment is en-
tered.'0 8 The changes are stylistic and the new rule makes clear that
liens do not arise for judgments providing relief other than a sum cer-
tain, such as injunctions or declaratory judgments.'0 8 9
A special statutory procedure currently requires that judgments
against plaintiffs for costs in equity must be entered in a special index.
Under the statute, section 3-302 of the Real Property Article,'0 90 the
special lien cannot arise unless the plaintiffs name is entered in the in-
dex. The continued vitality of this practice is questionable after the ab-
rogation of the law/equity distinction under the new rules.' 0 9 ' This
problem should be addressed by the legislature.
The cumbersome provisions of Former Rule 620 b through f, detail-
ing the operation of liens in each court of the Maryland court sys-
tem, 10 9 2 have been replaced by Rule 2-621(b). The new section
incorporates the recording procedure of Rule 2-623 to achieve the same
result as the former rule. The rules, together with Rule 2-622, provide a
simple mechanism by which a judgment in one county becomes a lien
on interests in land in another.
Rule 2-622-Transmittal to Another Court
The transmittal procedure outlined in Rule 2-622 fills a gap left by
the former rules. Former Rules 620 and 621, which set forth procedures
for obtaining liens on real estate in more than one county, stated that
judgments "shall be filed" in the appropriate court, but provided no
means for so doing. The lack of guidance left counsel the task of ob-
taining a certified copy of the judgment from the court of origin and
delivering the copy to the clerk of the court of the county in which the
real estate was located.'0 9
Rule 2-622(a) specifies that the clerk of the court of rendition of
1088. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-402(b) (1984) defines interests subject to
lien as any interest except a lease from year-to-year, or for a non-renewable term of not more
than five years.
1089. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Nov. 20-21, 1981, at 20. The provision reflects current
practice in that liens arise only from money judgments, and not from equitable relief. Specifi-
cation of judgment for a "sum certain" also avoids ambiguities such as those encountered in
Prince George's County v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 47 Md. App. 380, 383, 423
A.2d 270, 273 (1980) (judgment lien on property does not arise until an amount has been
specified).
1090. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 3- 3 02(c) (1981).
1091. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
1092. Maryland District Court judgment liens are now treated separately. See infra note
1095 and accompanying text.
1093. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Oct. 16-17, 1981, at 55.
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judgment will transmit a certified copy of the judgment upon request.
Section (b) sets forth a method for updating the status of judgments
recorded in other courts, thus inhibiting possible attempts to enforce
liens no longer effective according to their original terms. 1094
Rule 2-623--Recordzig of Judgment of Another Court
Rule 2-623, in conjunction with Rules 2-621(b) and 2-622, com-
pletes the process by which interests in land outside the court of original
jurisdiction are attached. The new rule is consistent with the scheme set
forth in Rule 2-622, in that the clerk must notify the clerk of the court of
original jurisdiction when a judgment is received from a person other
than that clerk. This ensures that, when satisfaction is later recorded in
the court of origin of the judgment, liens in other counties will be
released.
The new rule retains most of the language of Former Rule 619 a,
which listed the courts whose recorded judgments would create liens in
Maryland. The rule eliminates the category of minor court judgments
rendered before the establishment of the district court system. Judg-
ment liens of district courts are not governed by Rule 2-623, but are
treated separately in the Maryland District Rules.0 "5
The rule does not apply to foreign judgments. 10 96 Any judgment
issued by a foreign court, or a state, or federal court outside of Maryland
must be sued upon in a Maryland court and must be reduced to a
Maryland judgment before becoming a lien. This requirement is consis-
tent with present practice.'0 97
Rule 2-624-Assignment of Judgment
Rule 2-624 covers any assignment of a judgment, including an as-
signment to a subrogated surety. As such it combines aspects of Former
Rules 240 a and 617 a.'0 98 Former Rule 240 a permitted any assignee to
issue execution in his own name, and Former Rule 617 a conditionally
granted the same privilege to sureties, subject to the filing of the assign-
ment in the court of origin to the judgment.
1094. Id at 56.
1095. See MD. DIST. R. 621..
1096. Minutes, Oct. 16-17, 1981, at 57.
1097. Minutes, May 16-17, 1980, at 3.
1098. Although the language of Former Md. R.P. 617 a contemplated a formal suretyship
relation, subrogation has traditionally been available to all persons who agree to pay the debt
of another. See Dinsmore v. Sachs, 133 Md. 434, 437, 105 A. 524, 525 (1919). The subroga-
tion statute codified in MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 15-401 (1983), is merely declaratory of
the common law. Watkins v. Worthington, 2 Bland 509 (1828).
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The new rule does not significantly change former practice,
although it requires the assignee seeking enforcement to produce a writ-
ten assignment. °"' Recording of assignments is permissive, with the
burden of recording left to those benefitted by the assignment. In most
instances this would be the assignee." 00 Thus, an assignee who elects
not to record his assignment runs the risk that the original judgment
creditor will make collections after the assignment, because only the rec-
ord holder of the judgment can obtain enforcement." 0 ' A solution lies
in the transmittal scheme of Rules 2-621, 2-622 and 2-623, which to-
gether establish a channel for communicating information between all
courts. Nevertheless, this was not incorporated into Rule 2-624.
The new rule likewise does not parallel Rule 2-626, governing the
satisfaction of judgments. Under Rule 2-626, the creditor who receives
full payment must file a notice of satisfaction. Pursuant to Rule 2-
622(b), the clerk then transmits the notice to all courts in which the
judgment has been recorded. But this procedure is not followed for as-
signments. Because Rule 2-624 is permissive, both as to the recording in
the court of rendition of the judgment, and as to recording elsewhere,
confusion may arise. 112
Rule 2-62_5--Expiraton and Renewal ofJudgment
Rule 2-625 largely eliminates the adversarial process for renewal of
a judgment, which was obtained through the use of the writ of scire
facias. Under the former rules, the writ was in the nature of a declara-
tion; thus, service of process was required and the defendant was enti-
1099. Arguably Former Md. R.P. 240 a permitted execution to be issued on an oral
assignment.
1100. See Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 7-8.
1101. Presumably the assignee failing to record would be estopped to enforce against the
debtor who had paid the original judgment creditor in good faith and without knowledge of
the assignment, although this outcome is far from certain.
The omission of a recording requirement is problematic. The Committee voted
against requiring recording, but the reasons for its decision are unclear. Some concern was
expressed that the requirement would create a pitfall for assignees. See id. at 9. This is illogi-
cal, in that recording promotes the desirable goal of furthering accuracy and consistency in
the public records, while not recording merely saves the assignee minimal expense. Thus, the
failure to require recording benefits neither debtors nor assignees.
1102. For example, a judgment may be entered in Howard County, transmitted to Carroll
County, and then assigned. If the assignee obtains satisfaction, the assignee must file notice
with the Howard County clerk's office or else risk the penalties provided by MD. R.P. 2-
626(c). The clerk must then transmit the notice to Carroll County in accordance with MD.
R.P. 2-622(b), which might result in the receipt of a notice of satisfaction for which there is no
recorded judgment, unless the clerk also transmits an explanation of the assignment at the
same time.
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tied to plead to it. 110 3
The new rule incorporates the twelve-year limitations period of
Former Rule 622 a. It also specifies that the limitations period applies
only to judgments for a sum certain, and not to injunctive or declaratory
relief. Finally, it requires the clerk to enter the renewal, unless more
than twelve years have passed since the judgment was entered or most
recently renewed. If more than twelve years have elapsed, the clerk
should not renew the judgment, even if no objection to renewal is filed.
This differs from prior practice in which the limitations period was only
an affirmative defense which could be waived.°"0 4 Since service of pro-
cess upon the debtor is no longer required for renewal, a limit on the
judgment holder's ability to renew is an appropriate quid pro quo. De-
spite the elimination of the scirefacias procedure, defenses against en-
forcement of the judgment are not foreclosed. For example, if payment
has been made, the debtor may move, under Rule 2-626, to compel the
entry of an order of satisfaction; alternatively, the debtor could attack
the judgment collaterally by resisting enforcement. 1105
Rule 2-626---Satisfaction ofJudgment
This rule drastically alters prior practice. Under Former Rule 603,
the judgment creditor had the right, but not the obligation, to file an
order of satisfaction after receiving payment in full from the debtor. 1106
The new rule coerces the creditor into recording satisfaction by the
threat of economic sanctions for failure to record.
Section (a) requires the judgment creditor to furnish both to the
debtor and to the clerk a written statement of satisfaction. The clerk
then must enter the judgment satisfied. Section (b) provides the debtor
a mechanism for compelling the entry of satisfaction." 7 The rule
requires a motion, service, and, perhaps, an adversarial proceeding.1 0 8
If the judgment debtor prevails, and the creditor's failure to act is found
to have been unjustified, the court must order the creditor to pay the
debtor the costs incurred in obtaining the order of satisfaction, including
1103. See MD. R.P. Subtitle BT; 4 J. POE, supra note 136, § 585.
1104. O'Neill & Co. v. Schulze, 177 Md. 64, 68, 7 A.2d 263, 265 (1939); 4J. POE, supra note
136, § 590.
1105. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Nov. 20-21, 1981, at 24.
1106. In practice, debtors often insist on an order of satisfaction as a condition of settlement
or payment.
1107. Arguably the judgment debtor already has a right to obtain, by way of an adversarial
proceeding, recordation of satisfaction. Absent a statutory provision for such a process, how-
ever, authority on point is scant. See, e.g., Manowitz v. Kanov, 107 N.J.L. 523, 54 A. 326
(1931) (debtor entitled to have judgment cancelled).
1108. MD. R.P. 2-626(b).
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attorneys' fees. On the other hand, if the debtor's motion is made in bad
faith or without substantial justification, the court may order the debtor
to pay the creditor's costs, including attorneys' fees.'
10 9
Rule 2-631-Enforcement Procedures Available
The value of a judgment depends upon the judgment creditor's
ability to enforce it; failure to execute a judgment properly will elimi-
nate its value. Because of the overlap between statute, rule, and com-
mon law, and because of the complexity of their interplay, practitioners
have in the past needed the services of specialists in the law of enforce-
ment. New Rules 2-631 through 2-651 establish the exclusive proce-
dures for enforcing judgments in Maryland;' 0 Rule 2-631 abolishes all
other procedures for enforcement."" A simple and comprehensive sys-
tem governing the enforcement of all judgments replaces a variety of
existing procedures includingferifacias, replevin, ejectment, and attach-
ment on judgment. The new procedures, patterned in part after the
federal rules' 1 1 2 and the more effective aspects of previous practice,
cover all types of property presently subject to enforcement
proceedings. 1,13
Rule 2-632--Stay of Enforcement
Rule 2-632 provides for two types of stays of enforcement-auto-
matic and discretionary. Generally, the enforcement of a judgment is
automatically stayed for ten days."' 4 During this period, the parties
may file any of several post-trial motions available under the trial
rules."' 5 The ten-day limit, which correlates with the time allowed for
1109. MD. R.P. 2-626(c).
1110. MD. R.P. 2-631.
1111. Id. The rule is necessitated by MD. R.P. 1-201, which states that the rules do not
repeal common law or statute except as expressly provided. Committee discussions indicate
the concern that the enforcement rules should be interpreted as replacing all common law
methods of enforcement. Minutes, Mar. 12, 1982, at 3; Minutes, Feb. 12, 1982, at 6-7. Never-
theless, MD. R.P. 2-631 should not affect creditors' remedies outside of the enforcement of
judgments. The availability of actions such as foreclosure by secured parties, or self-help
under MD. COM. LAW. CODE ANN. § 9-503 (1975), remains unchanged.
1112. FED. R. Civ. P. 62, 64, 65.1, 67, 69 & 70.
1113. See Minutes, Feb. 12, 1982, at 8. Generally, creditors may reach all of a debtor's
property, subject to certain statutory exemptions. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 11-504 (1984)(listing exemptions).
1114. MD. R.P. 2-632(a). Under FED. R. Civ. P. 62(a), an execution of a judgment that is
obtained before the expiration of the ten-day automatic stay period may be set aside. In re
Saez, 13 Bankr. 605, 607 (D.P.R. 1981).
1115. A party may file for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (MD. R.P. 2-532), move
for a new trial (MD. R.P. 2-533), move to alter or amend a judgment (MD. R.P. 2-534), or
move to revise a judgment (MD. R.P. 2-535).
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filing most post-trial motions, is a compromise between the interests of
both parties. 16 Judgment debtors are allowed time to file permissible
motions but the time is limited to prevent any "unnecessary head start"
over judgment creditors. 1 17
The automatic stay provision does not apply to all judgments.
First, the court, at its discretion and to protect the security of an adverse
party, may stay the enforcement of a judgment pending the disposition
of motions for new trial, to alter or amend a judgment, to revise a judg-
ment, or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Second, section (a)
of Rule 2-632 excepts from the automatic stay provision orders granting
injunctions and appointing receivers. Although the court may order a
stay of enforcement, the rules do not provide guidelines for determining
when such an order is appropriate. Although prior practice permitted a
court to stay perpetually a judgment, the new rules do not provide any
authority to enter a qualified judgment.' Finally, some rules, such as
Rule 2-611 (Confessed Judgment) contain specific stay provisions.
Rule 2-632(c), governing stays of enforcement in multiple claims
suits, preserves almost verbatim Former Rule 607. The rule permits a
court to stay the enforcement of a judgment pending the entry of subse-
quent judgments in a case involving multiple claims. Initially, the
Judgments Subcommittee opposed this rule because Rule 2-602 enables
a court to delay entry of a judgment that does not resolve all the parties'
claims until entry of a subsequent judgment.' " 9 But the Subcommittee
ultimately recognized that justification for staying enforcement of a
judgment, while not delaying the establishment of a lien, may exist in
1116. The ten-day limit is equal to the time permitted for filing motions for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, new trial, and to alter or amend the judgment. See supra note
914. But under MD. R.P. 2-535, any party may file a motion to revise a judgment or for a
new trial within 30 days of entry of judgment. Thus, a court may revise a judgment after a
judgment creditor has begun enforcement proceedings. The exigent nature of the facts that
allow a court to exercise its revisory powers justifies the longer period for filing under Rule 2-
535; those factors are not applicable to the stay of enforcement of a judgment. See supra text
accompanying notes 932-37 (discussing requirements of Rule 2-535).
1117. Explanatory Note, Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 12-13.
1118. Relying on MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 14 (1904) (repealed and re-enacted as MD.
ANN. CODE art. 26, § 15 (1957), repealed by Acts of 1957, ch. 399, § 1), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland stated that a court may grant a perpetual stay of execution "when there appears to
be a good reason for a qualified judgment." Kendrick & Roberts, Inc. v. Warren Bros. Co.,
110 Md. 47, 73, 72 A. 461, 465 (1909). Although this statute was repealed in 1957 when
Maryland recodified many statutes, the language of article 26, § 15 was reenacted as a rule of
procedure by the Court of Appeals. See Former Md. R.P. 641. The new rules do not provide
for entry of a perpetual stay. Considering the exclusive nature of the enforcement rules (see
supra text accompanying notes 1110-11) and the intention of the Committee to simplify Mary-
land procedure, the court's authority to stay enforcement should be limited to that for which
the rules expressly provide.
1119. Explanatory Note, Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 12.
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some cases." 20 For example, if judgment is entered upon a claim and a
counterclaim remains undecided, enforcement of the judgment would
be premature, because disposition of the counterclaim may create a set-
off. Nevertheless, the judgment debtor on the original claim should not
be given an opportunity to thwart subsequent enforcement of the judg-
ment by disposing of his property during the pendency of the
counterclaim.
Rules 1016 through 1021 continue to govern any stay pending ap-
peal except an appeal taken from an order or judgment involving in-
junctive relief. 1 2 1 When a party appeals from an order or judgment
involving injunctive relief, the trial court has broad discretion to protect
the appellee by suspending, modifying, restoring, or granting an injunc-
tion, by requiring a bond, or otherwise." 1 22 Similarly, section (f) of Rule
2-632 explicitly states that the rule does not limit the power of an appel-
late court to take protective action, while an appeal is pending, to pre-
serve the status quo or the effectiveness of the subsequent final
judgment." 123
Rule 2-633--Discovegy in Aid of Enforcement
Rule 2-633 consolidates Former Rules 627 and 628.' 124 The new
rule addresses a perceived ambiguity in prior practice. The Judgment
Subcommittee felt that Former Rule 627 could be interpreted to permit
the use of interrogatories and requests for production of documents
against non-parties despite a cross-reference prohibiting the use of those
devices. 1125 To eliminate any confusion in the new rule, the words "any
1120. Comments of Mr. Bowen, id. at 13.
1121. MD. R.P. 2-632(d). With the exception of six specific types of appeal (appeals from
the board of liquor license commissioners, orphan's court, orders affecting building, savings
and loan, and homestead associations, the insurance commissioner, tax assessments or classifi-
cations, and the sheriff's failure to turn over fees), an appellant may stay execution during
appeal by filing a supersedeas bond. See MD. R.P. 1017 e; see also Creative Dev. Corp. v.
Bond, 34 Md. App. 279, 282-84, 367 A.2d 566, 568-69 (1976) (MD. R.P. 1017 e provides that
a trial court may direct the terms upon which a supersedeas bond will stay execution or
prevent entirely stay by filing of supersedeas bond.).
1122. MD. R.P. 2-632(e). This authority is identical to the power of the court to limit the
effect of a supersedes bond. See MD. R.P. 1017 e, discussed at supra note 1121.
1123. The Court of Special Appeals "may increase or decrease the amount of the superse-
deas bond or pass such order as to the surety on such bond as may be proper." This action
may be taken only after the trial court has ruled upon the complainant's objections to the
bond. See MD. R.P. 1017 c, d.
1124. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Nov. 20-21, 1981, at 26.
1125. Former Md. R.P. 627 limited the use of interrogatories and requests for production of
documents "as provided in the Rules relating to... Discovery, Rules 417 to 419, inclusive,
and Rule 422." Former Md. R.P. 417 and 419 provided that interrogatories and requests for
documents could be served by "[a]ny party [upon] any other party." Former Md. R.P. 417 a
1,419.
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person" are eliminated from Rule 2-633. But the cross-reference to the
rules controlling the use of interrogatories and requests for document
production also were eliminated. Nevertheless, the Committee intended
that Rules 2-421(a) and 2-422(a), which prevent a party from serving
interrogatories or requests upon non-parties, control Rule 2-633. '126
Rule 2-633 changes some practices permitted under Former Rule
628. Under prior practice, a judge could permit the examination of a
judgment debtor or other person meeting the criteria of the rule, if the
judgment creditor established that the debtor was evading, or was at-
tempting to evade enforcement. Rule 2-633(b), however, prohibits the
filing of examination requests for thirty days after entry of judgment,
regardless of the basis for that request. Thus, the rule grants a judgment
debtor an opportunity to pay the judgment, to appeal, or to file post-
trial motions.
Rule 2-633 also changes prior practice by expanding the court's dis-
cretion to refuse an examination request. Former Rule 628 required the
court to order an examination if one of the two conditions described
above was met.'' 27 Section (b) now provides that the court "may" issue
such an order. According to the Committee, this change permits the
court to deny the request for examination "when, in the court's judg-
ment, the procedure is being used to harass the judgment debtor."' 12
The Committee also eliminated section (d) of Former Rule 628 because
Rules 2-641 through 2-649 enable the court to grant relief by appointing
receivers, granting injunctions, or taking other actions."1 29
Rule 2-641-Writ of Execution-Issuance and Content
Rules 2-641, 2-642, 2-643 and 2-644 establish a new system gov-
erning the enforcement of money judgments through levy upon the
judgment debtor's real or personal property. Rule 2-641 modifies the
former methods regarding the issuance of writs of execution. Rule 2-642
expands Former Rule G46 by treating separately and in greater detail
1126. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Nov. 20-21, 1981, at 26. An earlier version of MD. R.P.
2-633 expressly cross-referenced to MD. R.P. 2-421 (a) and 2-422(a), but apparently the Com-
mittee felt that this was unnecessary.
1127. The former rule stated that upon satisfactory proof the court "shall" order an exami-
nation. See Former Md. R.P. 628 a, b.
1128. Minutes, Nov. 20-21, 1981, at 27.
1129. Explanatory Note, i. at 26. Sections (c) and (e) of Former Md. R.P. 628 have also
been eliminated. Section (c) has been replaced by a cross reference to MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-119 (1984). Section (e) empowers the court to punish those who
wilfully or negligently disobey orders for discovery in aid of enforcement. As such, it is redun-
dant, since any order of court carries with it the threat of punishment inherent in the court's
contempt powers.
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levies on real property, personal property, and property in the hands of
third parties. Rule 2-643 substantially alters the existing scheme for re-
lease from levy. Finally, Rule 2-644 sets forth the first comprehensive
guidelines for sheriffs' sales.
Under Rule 2-641(a), the judgment creditor initiates the levy by
filing a written request for a writ of execution with the clerk of the court
of rendition of the judgment. The rule also formalizes the requirments
for instructions to the sheriff concerning the property to be levied upon
and the manner of the levy. Both the written request and the specifics
required for the sheriff represent a departure from prior practice, under
which neither is mandatory."1 30 Although the rule does not expressly
empower the clerk to reject a request for a writ, such power is implicit in
the language of section (a). Thus the clerk may refuse to issue a writ
that either lacks the requisite specificity or fails to contain the minimum
information set forth in the rule."
3
'
Section (c) indicates that the clerk is responsible for transmitting
the writ and instructions to the sheriff. This is intended to change the
former practice of delivering writs to parties or counsel." 32 Moreover,
the new mechanism is designed to protect the rights of creditors when
multiple creditors levy upon the same property. Since the clerk is re-
quired to deliver the writ and instructions immediately upon the credi-
tor's request, a writ is deemed effective from the time the sheriff receives
it, instead of from the time the sheriff serves it on the debtor. Therefore,
priority conflicts among competing creditors will no longer be resolved
by race to obtain service.' 133
Section (c) also requires the sheriff to record the date and hour of
receipt of the writ. The Committee did not intend the failure of the
sheriff to record receipt properly to form the basis of a judgment
debtor's attack on the validity of the levy. But a creditor injured by the
1130. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Mar. 12, 1982, at 6. Former Md. R.P. G42 d merely
required the sheriff to be given instructions as to the identity and location of the property.
1131. Section (a) states that the writ "shall" contain notices of the availability of exemp-
tions and of the right to release, and "shall" be accompanied by specific instrLctions to the
sheriff. MD. R.P. 1-201(a) explains that the word "shall" mandates conduct, and that where
the consequences of noncompliance are not prescribed, the court may determine those conse-
quences in light of the circumstances and purpose of the rule. While the Committee did not
expressly incorporate the clerk's power into the rule, such authority is consistent with the
concern for clear instructions that the rule embodies. See Minutes, Feb. 12, 1982, at 11.
1132. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Mar. 12, 1982, at 6.
1133. This has been referred to as the rule of the "writ in the mitt" rather than the rule of
the "race to the swiftest." According to the Committee, the "writ in the mitt" rule removes
the incentive for creditors to bribe a sheriff to serve one writ before another. Minutes, Feb.
12, 1982, at 11-12.
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sheriff's failure may have a cause of action against the sheriff.' 13 4
Section (a) allows the creditor to select among three alternative in-
structions to the sheriff as to the method of carrying out the levy. These
are to levy and leave the property where found; to exclude others from
access to it; or to remove it from the premises.' 135 The creditor in choos-
ing should bear in mind the nature of the judgment debtor's interest in
the property to be levied upon. If the interest is undivided, any of the
methods would be appropriate. If the judgment debtor's interest is only
partial, the creditor should so instruct the sheriff in order to protect the
interests of third parties. For example, if the subject property is a vacant
building wholly owned by the debtor, the judgment creditor might wish
to instruct the sheriff to seal the building so as to deny others access to it.
On the other hand, if the building is leased to third parties, the sheriff
should be instructed to "levy and leave" the property, so as not to inter-
fere with the tenants' possessory interests. Given this process, the bur-
den of determining the precise nature of the judgment debtor's interest
rests upon the judgment creditor. If, at the behest of the creditor, the
sheriff interferes with the rightful possession of a third party, the credi-
tor, not the sheriff, will be held liable."3 6
In view of the choices permitted, section (c) authorizes the sheriff to
require the judgment creditor to post bond if the sheriff is instructed to
remove property or to exclude others from access to it. The purpose of
the bond is to cover costs associated with the levy, such as moving or
storage expenses." 3 7 This practice may have been informally observed
in some jurisdictions, but the rule codifies it." 3 The creditor's bond is
not intended to apply to damages caused by the sheriffs wrongful tak-
ing. The Committee rejected an earlier version of rule, which would
have provided for such coverage, after extensive discussion during which
members expressed concern that such bonds would become prohibi-
tively expensive and difficult to obtain."13 9
Section (a) also entitles the judgment creditor to file such "addi-
tional instructions as are necessary and appropriate" to supplement the
1134. Id.
1135. MD. R.P. 2-641(a).
1136. Minutes, Apr. 16, 1982, at 8.
1137. Minutes, Mar. 12, 1982, at 8-10. The Committee also intended that the bond be
backed by security other than surety. See id. at 8; MD. R.P. 2-641(c). See also MD. R.P. 1-
402(e) (authorizing bond other than surety).
1138. Minutes, Mar. 12, 1982, at 9. Former Md. R.P. G42 e did not require such bond in
all cases.
1139. See Minutes, Mar. 12, 1982 at 4 (MD. R.P. 2-622(b) requiring payment of any dam-
ages and costs); id. at 9-10 (discussion regarding bond for damages). MD. CTS. & JUD. PROc.
CODE ANN. § 2-105 (1984) requires the sheriff to post bond for the faithful performance of his
duties.
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original instructions.' 4 For example, a creditor who had first in-
structed the sheriff to "levy and leave" certain property may later decide
to have the sheriff remove the property because the judgment debtor has
not satisfied the judgment. This supplemental instruction may be for-
warded directly to the sheriff, without requesting the issuance of a new
writ.14 The language of the rule permits the creditor to "file" the ad-
ditional instructions and to "deliver a copy to the sheriff." That differs
from the requirement, expressed earlier in the rule, that the clerk deliver
the original instruction to the sheriff."4 2 If the property has been levied
upon, there is no compelling reason why the creditor's additional in-
structions must be transmitted to the sheriff by the clerk. If the sheriff
has made the return without completing delivery, however, the creditor
should have a new writ issued and have the new instructions delivered
by the clerk.'
143
The rule also permits the creditor seeking to levy upon property in
another county the option of recording the judgment in that county and
then requesting a writ.'' 44 Alternatively, the creditor may merely re-
quest the clerk of the court of rendition of the judgment to issue a writ
and instructions to the sheriff of the other county. The latter procedure
is codified in section (b), which incorporates Former Rule 622 h. The
writ and instructions, together with a copy of the judgment, must be
transmitted to the sheriff through the clerk of the other county. The
receiving clerk will file the instructions and record the judgment. The
return may then be recorded in the records of both counties, thus keep-
ing all records current. If a judgment is satisfied or reversed, the clerk of
one county will then notify the clerk of the other county accordingly." 141
Rule 2-642- Writ of Execution-Levy
Rule 2-642 expands Former Rule G46 a by establishing in greater
detail the procedures to be followed in levying upon real or personal
1140. MD. R.P. 2-641(a).
1141. Id.
1142. See supra note 1132 and accompanying text.
1143. Committee discussions concerning these points are unenlightening. See Minutes, Apr.
16, 1982, at 17-18. Arguably the language of the rule should be interpreted to mean exactly
what it says: Additional instructions are to be filed with the clerk and delivered to the sheriff.
1144. The first sentence of MD. R.P. 2-641(a) implicitly incorporates the scheme established
for transmittal and recording of judgments. See supra notes 1093-97 and accompanying text
(discussing MD. R.P. 2-622 and 2-623). MD. R.P. 2 -641(a) states that the writ of execution
shall be issued by the clerk "where the judgment was entered or is recorded." (emphasis added).
A clerk who enrolls an out-of-county judgment must so notify the clerk of the court of rendi-
tion of the judgment. See MD. R.P. 2-623. This system preserves the integrity of judgment
records.
1145. Minutes, Apr. 16, 1982, at 10.
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property and dispenses with the artificial distinction between fwrifacas
and attachment on judgment.' 146 The rule also relaxes the traditional
requirement that the sheriff actually seize personal property to effectu-
ate the levy. Finally, sections (c) and (b) differ from the former rule by
stating that the sheriff shall levy "[ejxcept as otherwise provided by
law."' 147  This proviso incorporates current and future statutory
exemptions. ""
A levy on personal property raises more issues than does a levy on
real property. Although the sheriff must cause either type of property to
be appraised,1 49 thereafter the methods of levy diverge. Rule 2-642(a),
covering real property, merely requires the sheriff to enter on a schedule
a description of the property and post a copy of the writ and schedule in
a prominent place on the property. Section (b), pertaining to personal
property, is more complex. It begins by recognizing that certain prop-
erty is entirely exempt from levy or must be levied upon in accordance
with particular governing statutes. 1 50 Section (b) then authorizes the
sheriff to effect the levy by obtaining a view of the property, entering a
description on the schedule, and posting the writ and schedule. The
sheriff may also remove the property from the premises, but levy may be
perfected without removal. Thus, the rule eases the strict requirement
of Former Rule G46 a, under which the sheriff had to "seize" the prop-
erty either by removing it or by preventing access to it, in order to com-
plete the levy. 15 The policy change is intended to reward the creditor
diligent enough to locate the judgment debtor's property, instead of per-
mitting the enforcement of a judgment to be hindered by the debtor's
acts or by fortuitous circumstances.152
In addition to dispensing with the seizure requirement, the rule oc-
casionally may obviate the need for the sheriff to affix labels to every
1146. For a discussion of the differences, see C. BROWN, supra note 4, at 198-202.
1147. MD. R.P. 2-642(a), (b).
1148. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-504 (1984) (containing the "homestead"
exemptions). The exemptions do not apply to vendor's purchase money liens, tax liens, mort-
gages, deeds of trust, or other security interests. Id. § 11-507. The minutes do not contain any
discussion of the exemption. However, MD. R.P. 2-643(c) sets forth as one of the defenses to
levy the exemption of the subject property. For a discussion of the exemption process and the
role of the sheriffs appraisal, see infra notes 1166-67 and accompanying text.
1149. By Acts of 1983, chs. 175, § 554, MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-504 was
revised to provide for an election of exemption after levy of execution, and a court review,
upon request, of the sheriffs appraisal. The appraisal is mandatory. Id. § 11-504(c)(1).
1150. Various sections in the Commercial Law Article authorize specialized methods of lev-
ying upon certain types of commercial documents. See, e.g., MD. COM. LAW. CODE ANN. § 4-
303 (1975) (bank deposits); id. § 6-111 (bulk transfers); id. § 7-607 (documents of title); id. § 8-
317 (investment securities). See also 4 J. POE, supra note 136, § 504.
1151. Former Md. R.P. G46 a.
1152. Minutes, Mar. 12, 1982, at 17.
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item levied upon. When it is possible, yet impractical, for the sheriff to
label each item, the levy may be completed by posting a copy of the writ
and the schedule in a conspicuous place in the immediate vicinity of the
property. The procedure will simplify levying upon a large quantity of
similar objects located in a single place, such as thousands of similar
cartons of merchandise in a warehouse.'
1 53
The language of section (b) was apparently not intended to cover
situations in which the sheriff can see the property but cannot affix la-
bels to it because access to the property is barred.' 5 ' For example, the
sheriff might be able to see an automobile through the windows of a
locked garage or through a fenced lot. Whether a levy upon the auto-
mobile should be considered effective if the sheriff affixes the writ and
schedule to the outside of the garage is uncertain. ' 55 Such a practice
would be consistent with the reason for allowing the sheriff to complete
a levy without exericising physical domain over the property: Chance
or a recalcitrant debtor should not be able to thwart the effectuation of
a diligently prosecuted levy. Furthermore, the purpose of requiring that
the writ or label be affixed to the property is to provide notice to all
parties that the property has been levied upon; affixing the writ to a
locked door in most instances will serve that function. But posting may
not provide sufficient notice if there are many cars in a large garage or
lot, and the car that is under levy cannot be specified adequately on the
schedule. Arguably, then, if the sheriff cannot complete the levy, the
creditor should take further steps to effectuate the levy, such as those
ancillary enforcement measures provided in Rule 2-651.
Section (c) addresses situations in which the judgment creditor has
instructed the sheriff to remove the property or exclude others from ac-
cess to it but finds the property in the hands of a third party who claims
possessory rights. The Committee debated whether the sheriff should
have the discretion to remove the property. One alternative was to re-
quire the sheriff to follow the creditor's instructions, and to remove the
property (or deny access to it) over the third party's objections." 56
Mandatory compliance would relieve the sheriff of responsibility for
wrongful seizure, because the creditor would ultimately be liable for
1153. Minutes, Feb. 12, 1982, at 15.
1154. Id. at 15-16.
1155. Although authority on point is scant, the rule in the past has been that an officer
bearing a writ of execution may forcibly enter any enclosure other than a dwelling in order to
levy execution on judgment. If a garage were not part of a dwelling, presumably the creditor
could instruct the sheriff to break in. See Annot., 57 A.L.R. 209, 210-21 (1928); Trainer v.
Saunders, 270 Pa. 451, 113 A. 681 (1921). While forcible entry may make the sheriff liable as
a trespasser, it does not invalidate the levy. 2 J. POE, supra note 136, at 671.
1156. Minutes, Apr. 16, 1982, at 14-15.
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having supplied the defective instructions.' 15' The creditor's liability
was a necessary consequence of this scheme, because under Rule 2-641
the sheriff may not require a bond for damages arising out of wrongful
levy.' 158
This alternative was not adopted, and the sheriff is expected to ex-
ercise discretion in levying upon property in the hands of third parties.
Hence section (c) states that the sheriff "may levy and leave the prop-
erty where found," even if the creditor's instructions call for removal or
barring of access.' 5' This "levy and leave" is a perfectly valid levy
which goes a long way towards satisfying the creditor's judgment. Inas-
much as the sheriff is allowed some discretion, the sheriff faces a degree
of exposure for wrongful seizure. The sheriff may therefore be expected
to err on the side of caution by levying and leaving the property.
Section (d), which governs notice of levy, changes the current rules
by explicitly placing upon the sheriff the burden of furnishing notice to
any person in possession of the property and to the judgment debtor. If
the possessor and the debtor are not the same person, the sheriff must
send a copy of the writ and schedule to the debtor's last known ad-
dress.'16 The rule specifies no remedy if the sheriff fails to give proper
notice.
Rule 2-643--Release of Property from Levy
Rule 2-643 sets forth for the first time a comprehensive system for
freeing property from levy. It combines, with major changes, the sub-
stance of Former Rules G57 and G58, as well as significant new mate-
rial. Some provisions strengthen the creditor's position, while others
seek to balance the interests of creditors, debtors, and third parties. Sec-
tions (a) and (b) contain the provisions for mandatory release; sections
(c), (d), and (e) provide for the situations in which the court may exer-
cise discretion.
Section (a) accords with prior practice in providing that the entry
of satisfaction and the payment of enforcement costs cause property to
be released. 1 6 ' The costs of enforcement proceedings include post-judg-
ment costs and interest but do not include attorneys' fees, unless other-
wise agreed between the parties."1 6 2 The judgment debtor has the
1157. Id. Conversely, the sheriff could not refuse to levy, since to do so would constitute a
breach of duty, for which the sheriff would be liable to the judgment creditor.
1158. See supra notes 1137-38 and accompanying text.
1159. Mo. R.P. 2-642(c).
1160. Id. (d).
1161. MD. R.P. 2-643(a).
1162. Minutes, Feb. 12, 1982, at 21.
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option of paying the creditor directly or of making payment through the
sheriff.1 163 When the creditor receives payment, the creditor must file
with the clerk a notice of satisfaction."
1 6 4
Section (b) changes the practice of Former Rule G57, under which
the judgment debtor could obtain release of the property by posting
bond in an amount equal to the value of the property. The new rule
prescribes the filing of bond sufficient to satisfy the judgment and en-
forcement costs regardless of whether the property would satisfy the
judgment. That eliminates the possibility of a defective appraisal result-
ing in the release of property on an inadequate bond. The requirement
also avoids the possibility that released property will be subject to a sub-
sequent levy if the full amount of the judgment and costs is not covered
by the bond and other unreleased property.' 165
Although the procedures provided for in section (c) are derived
from the former rules, the section codifies a variety of new principles
which allow the debtor, upon motion to the court, to obtain partial or
full release from levy. In effect, the section provides the court a means of
overseeing the enforcement process. Particularly noteworthy are subsec-
tions (c)(3), (5), and (6). Subsection (c)(3) allows release of the levy if
the judgment creditor fails to comply with the rules of procedure or
violates a court order. Subsection (c)(5) allows the debtor to substitute
other property for the property levied upon, if the levy causes the debtor
undue hardship. Under subsection (c)(6), property may be released if
120 days pass without sale of the property. That is intended to curtail
delay by the creditor's attorney." 1 66 Finally, section (c) also provides for
judicial review of the sheriff's appraisal, upon the request of either the
debtor or the creditor.
Section (d), also entirely new, responds to the 1983 change in sec-
tion 11-504 of the Maryland Code, Courts Article, which altered the
statutory exemptions from execution." 67 The section allows the judg-
ment debtor to elect to have released from execution property equal in
value to the maximum allowed under statutory exemptions. The court
must order the release of those items selected by the debtor to the extent
the items or their cumulative value are legally exempt from execution.
Section (e), replacing Former Rules G58 and G51, deals with the
1163. Minutes, Mar. 12, 1982, at 20-21.
1164. MD. R.P. 2- 6 2 6 (a).
1165. Minutes, Mar. 12, 1982, at 21.
1166. Id. at 22.
1167. 1983 Md. Laws ch. 175, § 554 (codified at MD. CTS. &JJUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-
504 (1984)). These revisions reduced the bankruptcy debtor's "additional exemption," ex-
pressly permitted the judgment debtor to exempt cash from execution, and modified the ap-
praisal procedure.
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release of property upon motion of a third party. Either the creditor,
the debtor, or both may respond to a motion by an interested third
party. While the rule does not specify what grounds the claimant must
assert in order to have the property released, earlier drafts of the rule
and Committee discussions indicate that the property is to be released
upon a showing that the third party's claim is valid." 6 8 Hence, the fail-
ure of both the creditor and the debtor to respond to the motion will not
justify automatic release of the property.
Any three-way dispute envisioned by section (e) would have at its
core the question of who has paramount title to the property. The rule
does not specify whether a determination made under this section could
later have collateral estoppel effect on the judgment debtor, should the
debtor fail to contest the third-party claim. The rule calls for service of
the third party's motion on the judgment debtor "if reasonably feasi-
ble," or the filing of an affidavit showing that efforts have been made to
provide such notice. 116 9 Thus, it represents an attempt to provide an
expedited procedure for resolving all the rights of the innocent party
whose property has been seized. 17 ° On the other hand, the only notice
of the levy that the judgment debtor is entitled to receive is the posting
of the writ and schedule and a mailing to the debtor's last known ad-
dress. 17 1 Some Committee members argued that unless the debtor is
actually present, resolution of the claim should settle only the issue of
entitlement between creditor and third party."17 2 Nevertheless, the rule
permits the court to require further efforts to contact the debtor, which
lends weight to the argument that this adjudication may be treated sim-
ilarly to any other default judgment. The decision should always be
binding on the creditor, however, regardless of whether the creditor con-
tests the third party claim.' 1 73
Rule 2-644--Sale of Property Under Levy
By Acts of 1983, section 11-501 of the Maryland Code, Courts Arti-
cle was revised to authorize the promulgation of rules for sheriffs'
1168. Minutes, Mar. 12, 1982, at 19-25.
1169. MD. R.P. 2-643(e).
1170. If a determination of rights between the innocent party and an absconding debtor
must await return of service on the debtor, the innocent party might be faced with a lengthy
deprivation of his property.
1171. MD. R.P. 2-642.
1172. Minutes, Mar. 12, 1982, at 23.
1173. Id. at 23-25. The creditor cannot seriously maintain a claim of lack of an opportunity
to be heard, or that the adjudication was not on the merits. The creditor institutes the levy
and the creditor's address is of record.
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sales.1174 Rule 2-644 lays down comprehensive guidelines for execution
sales. The rule generally follows prior practices, but it also embodies
some minor modifications and a major change in execution sales of real
property.
Section (a) codifies the long-standing practice that the sheriff con-
ducts sales at the request of the judgment creditor. It further prescribes
a stay of sale pending the debtor's election to exempt various items, pur-
suant to section 11-504 of the Maryland Code, Courts Article" 175 and
Rule 2-643(d). The rule also attempts to dispel the confusion over ex-
actly what property interest the sheriff can convey title to, by defining
the interest subject to sale as "all legal and equitable interests of a
debtor in the property at the time the judgment became a lien on the
property." This is an attempt to codify the rule that the purchaser takes
subject to any title or right of possession which antedates judgment
upon which execution is issued. 117 6 The language of the rule produces
different results for real and personal property in that Rule 2-621, which
creates a lien at the time judgment is entered, applies to real property
only. A lien does not arise on personal property until an actual levy is
made." 7 7 Moreover, although the Committee discussed the issue, the
rule makes no provision for affording protection to lienholders junior to
the judgment creditor."178
Section (b) closely follows the Maryland Code, Courts Article sec-
tion 11-502 and requires notice by publication and posting. The only
change to the statutory procedure is that therule authorizes the sheriff
to dispense with the prescribed notice in undertaking a sale of perisha-
bles that have been levied upon.'179
Section (c) governs the details of the sheriff's sale by codifying the
holding of McCartney v. Frosi,"8 in which the Court of Appeals reaf-
firmed the long-established rule that the sheriff may refuse to accept the
highest offer, if the offer is unconscionably low and operates as a sacri-
fice of the property." 8' 1 Section (c) also adds a new provision enabling
1174. 1983 Md. Laws ch. 224 (codified at MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-501
(1984)).
1175. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-504 (1984).
1176. See Minutes, Mar. 12, 1982, at 30-31, (discussing Deakins v. Rex, 60 Md. 593 (1883)
and cases cited in MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-509 annot. (1984)).
1177. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-403 (1984).
1178. Minutes, Mar. 12, 1982, at 30-31. A junior lienholder may of course apply to court
for distribution of any surplus to him. Leonard v. Groome, 47 Md. 499, 505 (1878).
1179. Currently the law is that while the need to sell perishables may obviate the require-
ment of notice, the sheriff should still apply for leave of court to make an immediate sale. See
Arnold v. Fowler, 94 Md. 497, 509, 51 A. 299, 301 (1902).
1180. 282 Md. 631, 386 A.2d 784 (1978).
1181. Id. at 636-40, 386 A.2d at 787-89. The case illustrates that the sheriff ought not to
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the debtor to direct the sheriff as to the order in which property is of-
fered for sale. The debtor may direct the sheriff only in the event that
both real and personal property have been levied upon under the same
judgment.' 1182
Section (d), governing the transfer of title of real property after a
sheriff's sale, represents a major departure from prior practice. Hereto-
fore the law has been that sheriffs sales are not judicial sales. The latter
are subject to ratification by the court, because the court is in essence
the vendor.1 83 The new rule changes that by incorporating Former
Rule BR6 into the sheriffs sale procedure. Thus, sales of real property
invoke the publication requirements of Former Rule BR6 b 2, and all
sales are conditioned upon judicial approval and ratification. The
change will result in increased cost, because under prior practice neither
publication nor court involvement was necessary to effectuate a sheriffs
sale. Moreover, purchasers will face delays in obtaining title and posses-
sion, since the sheriff may neither execute a deed nor place the pur-
chaser in possession until after judicial ratification. 1 8 4  This is
potentially serious in that a disgruntled debtor may easily file exceptions
and disrupt the finality of the sale. On the other hand, the court's in-
volvement will also benefit purchasers. The issue of the validity of the
sale will, after ratification, be res judicata, thus foreclosing the possibil-
ity of collateral attack.""8 5 In contrast to section (d), section (e), which
governs the conclusion of sales of personal property, does not involve
judicial ratification. Hence prior practice is unchanged in that area.
Both sections (d) and (e) incorporate the statutory requirement
contained in section 11-509 of the Maryland Code, Courts Article that
refuse to consummate the sale merely because the price is inadequate. The sheriff's duty is to
be fair and impartial, and to protect the interests of the debtor as well as the creditor. This
protection would not appear to extend to the sheriffs secondsale, if he refused all offers at the
first. See id. at 637, 386 A.2d at 787 (citing with approval 2 J. POE, PLEADING AND PRACTICE,
§ 661, at 623 (H. Tiffany 5th ed. 1925), stating that the sheriff can not justify repeated refus-
als to let the property go). See also Buckeye Dev. Corp. v. Brown & Shilling, Inc., 243 Md.
224, 220 A.2d 922 (1966). MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-503 (1984) also permits
the sheriff to employ a professional auctioneer and charge the costs of the sale to the debtor.
1182. MD. R.P. 2-643(c).
1183. See McCartne, 282 Md. at 635-36, 386 A.2d at 786-87 (construing Former Md. R.P.
BRI and McCann v. McGinnis, 257 Md. 499, 505, 263 A.2d 536, 539 (1970)). As explained
by McCartney, the sheriff conducting an execution sale is merely the ministerial officer of the
law. He is not an agent of the court, and the court does not direct how the sale should be
made. Consequently a sheriffs sale is unconditional. AMcCartney, 282 Md. at 635-36, 386 A.2d
at 787.
1184. MD. R.P. 2-644(d).
1185. Ed Jacobsen Jr., Inc. v. Barrick, 252 Md. 507, 511, 250 A.2d 646, 648 (1969) (apply-
ing MD. R.P. BR6 to a foreclosure proceeding, as required by MD. R.P. W74 e).
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the sheriff place the purchaser in possession of the property.I, 6
Although the statute is not new, the rule expressly authorizes the sheriff
to transfer physical possession of the property. Therefore, purchasers of
real property no longer must comply with the writ of possession proce-
dures under Former Rule 637."17 Thus, the new rule simplifies transfer
of title when a debtor who remains in possession of the property refuses
to relinquish his interest.
Section (f) prescribes the order of disposition of the proceeds of sale.
After reimbursement of sheriffs fees and expenses,' 188 the balance is ap-
plied to satisfy the judgment and its enforcement costs. Any excess is
paid to the debtor. Various Committee members expressed dissatisfac-
tion regarding the distribution of surplus funds to the debtor, because
the rule provided no protection for junior lienholders."8 9 Moreover,
sections 11-510 and 11-511 of the Maryland Code, Courts Article do not
provide any remedies for junior lienholders; neither the court nor any
third party is expressly empowered to intervene in the distribution."'
Thus, junior lienholders must protect themselves by diligently policing
the debtor and soliciting the support of prior lienholders.
Rule 2-645-- Garnishment of Property- Generally
The garnishment provisions of the Former F and G rules have been
restructured. Rule 2-645 governs garnishment of all property other than
wages and partnership interests. It changes present practice as to what
may be garnished, how garnishment is effectuated, and how the gar-
nishee's response affects the proceeding. It further revises the sanctions
available in the event the garnishee fails to answer interrogatories. By
contrast, Rule 2-646, covering garnishment of wages, incorporates essen-
tially the same procedures formerly embodied in Rule F6.
Section (a) of Rule 2-645 has been drafted to permit the maximum
flexibility concerning what property may be garnished." 9' Creditors
typically garnish intangible property; tangible property is usually levied
upon and rarely garnished." 9 After lengthy consideration, however,
1186. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROc. CODE ANN. § 11-509 (1984).
1187. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Mar. 12, 1982, at 28.
1188. For a schedule of statutory fees, see MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 7-402
(1984). Moreover, § 11-503 authorizes the sheriff to employ the services of professional auc-
tioneers at the debtor's expense.
1189. Minutes, Feb. 12, 1982, at 27; Minutes, Mar. 12, 1982, at 30-31.
1190. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-510, -511 (1984). According to the Com-
mittee, the court may not intervene on its own motion. The statute merely permits the sheriff
to seek the court's assistance should a problem arise. Minutes, Mar. 12, 1982, at 31.
1191. Minutes, Apr. 16, 1982, at 23.
1192. Id. MD. R.P. 2-641 and 2-642 contemplate the levy of the debtor's property in the
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the Committee decided to make garnishment applicable to all property
other than wages."
93
Thus section (a) was designed to broaden the extent of property
subject to garnishment. The rule expressly covers contingent debts,
which could not be garnished under prior practice.' 19 4 Among the other
hands of a third party. Arguably, garnishment is unnecessary to enable the judgment credi-
tor to learn what property of the judgment debtor is in the hands of third parties, since Rule 2-
633 permits the creditor to obtain discovery in aid of enforcement. See Comments of the
Reporter, Minutes, Apr. 16, 1982, at 22. However, garnishment and discovery operate differ-
ently. Service of the writ of garnishment creates an inchoate lien binding the debtor's prop-
erty in the hands of the garnishee, which then remains effective until a final judgment is
entered. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. William G. Wetherall, Inc., 267 Md. 378, 384, 298
A.2d 1, 6 (1972). Discovery affords no such protection to the creditor. Moreover, MD. R.P. 2-
645 does not require the creditor to specify the property subject to garnishment. The onus is
on the garnishee to come forward and reveal the nature of the judgment debtor's property in
the garnishee's hands. By contrast, a levy under MD. R.P. 2-641 presupposes knowledge of
specific property in the hands of a third party. Hence garnishment may be a practical rem-
edy for a creditor uninformed as to the nature and extent of the debtor's property.
1193. See Minutes, Apr. 16, 1982, at 21-26. A partnership interest subject to a charging
order may not be garnished. See incfa notes 1244-45 and accompanying text (discussing MD.
R.P. 2-649).
1194. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Independent Brewing Ass'n, 127 Md. 463, 468, 96 A. 617,
619 (1916); C. BROWN, supra note 4, at 200; cf. Fico, Inc. v. Ghinger, 287 Md. 150, 163, 411
A.2d 430, 436 (1980) (debt uncertain as to amount or existence cannot be garnished). The
scope of the contingency intended to be covered is hazy. First, Former Md. R.P. G45 a stated
that unmatured debts may be attached. MD. R.P. 2-645(a) expands this to include "unma-
tured" or "contingent" debts. A contingent debt is one in which the obligation is not pres-
ently fixed, but which may or may not become so in the future upon the occurrence of some
uncertain event. Belcher v. GEICO, 282 Md. 718, 723, 387 A.2d 770, 773 (1978); cf. Ghinger,
287 Md. at 163, 411 A.2d at 436 (a fund the existence of which is uncertain may not be
condemned in garnishment). Hence the literal meaning of contingent debt includes those
which may be incapable of collection. One Committee member exemplified this by hypothe-
sizing a judgment debtor who is also a plaintiff in a personal injury case. The judgment
creditor could theoretically lay the garnishment in the hands of.the defendant's insurance car-
rier. Comments of Mr. Lombardi, Minutes, Apr. 16, 1982, at 22-23. This is an extreme
example in that until a judgment has been rendered in favor of the plaintiff-debtor, the gar-
nished interest is purely speculative. See Belcher, 282 Md. at 724, 387 A.2d at 774 (Court of
Appeals rejecting precisely this theory, which first appeared in Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d I11,
216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966)).
On the other hand, another Committee member suggested that "contingent" debts
are those for which the amount is ascertainable, but the due date is not. Comments of Mr.
Sykes, Minutes, Apr. 16, 1982, at 22. This is also an unorthodox construction, although an
argument can be advanced in support of it. Presumably an "unmatured" debt is one which
has a maturity date that has not yet arrived; therefore, to extend the coverage of the rule to
encompass debts without definite due dates requires a new word. But this interpretation is
problematic in that a debt is either "due" on demand or at a fixed date; otherwise, it is not
due at all (because it is contingent and may never be payable). There are no other alterna-
tives. In view of Belcher and the latent ambiguity of MD. R.P. 2-645(a), further clarification
may be expected in the future.
For a recent Court of Appeals discussion of what "credits" may be garnished, see
Hoffman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Washington County Nat'l Say. Bank, 297 Md. 691, 696-702, 467
A.2d 758, 761-64 (1983) (unindorsed check payable to debtor not garnishable).
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types of property intended to be included are a beneficiary's interest in a
trust,"195 and tangible or intangible property already levied upon as a
result of a different judgment. 1 96
Sections (b) and (c) incorporate, with significant modifications,
Former Rules 623, G47 b, G48, and BT4, together with substantial new
material. Section (b) enables the judgment creditor to obtain issuance
of the writ of garnishment upon filing a sufficiently specific request,' 197
which may be exparte." 98 Section (c) dictates the content of the writ
and requires that the writ notify the garnishee of the risk of the entry of
judgment by default. This equates roughly to Former Rule G47 b,
which compelled the garnishee to answer or risk a judgment of condem-
nation absolute, pursuant to Former Rule G55. Subsections (c)(4) and
(c) (5) require the writ to contain notice to the judgment debtor of the
availability of exemptions and of the right to contest. This is to enable
the judgment debtor to receive expedited notice of the proceeding." 99
Committee discussions indicated that the requisite notice could be ac-
complished by general statements, rather than by a comprehensive list-
ing stating each exemption or defense. 121
Section (d), governing service, incorporates the substance of Former
Rule 104 a 4. The writ may be served inside or outside the forum
county.' 20 ' Section (d) also prescribes the manner in which the judg-
ment debtor is sent notice of the proceeding and is intended to respond
to constitutional concerns arising out of federal cases from other districts
1195. Minutes, Apr. 16, 1982, at 23. Maryland case law, however, exempts various forms of
trust interest from attachment proceedings. See, e.g., Jackson Square Loan & Sav. Ass'n v.
Bartlett, 95 Md. 661, 663-65, 53 A. 426, 427 (1902) (spendthrift trust instrument restricts the
ability of beneficiary to pledge or encumber trust assets).
1196. Minutes, Apr. 16, 1982, at 24. This situation might arise when the value of the prop-
erty is greater than the amount due on the first levy, so that the surplus value can be gar-
nished to satisfy the garnishment.
1197. MD. R.P. 2-645(b).
1198. See MD. R.P. 1-321(c) (exempting requests to the clerk from the requirements of
service).
1199. See inqfa notes 1202-03 and accompanying text.
1200. Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 30-31.
1201. MD. R.P. 2-645(d). This is consistent with prior practice. See Minutes, Apr. 16, 1982,
at 24. Garnishment may be served anywhere in the state because, according to one Commit-
tee member, unlike the sheriff's levy, it poses no threat of breach of the peace. Id
One issue not addressed by the rule concerns the recording of the lien of garnishment
in the county in which the writ is served. The levy provisions of MD. R.P. 2-641 ensure that a
judgment from another county will be recorded in the county where the levy takes place.
The garnishment rules do not. This is inconsistent with permitting real or tangible property
to be garnished. See supra notes 1191-92 and accompanying text. On the other hand, the
garnishor may not know which items, if any, of the debtor's property are to be garnished. See
id. Nevertheless, the failure to furnish a means of recording outside the county of rendition of
the judgment creates a potential hazard for creditors other than the judgment creditor.
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or circuits in which garnishment statutes that did not provide for proper
notice were struck down. 2 °" For practical reasons, notice to the debtor
is delayed until service on the garnishee has been effectuated.
20 3
The Committee considered who should be responsible for notifying
the judgment debtor and what method should be employed. Despite
some sentiment in favor of placing the responsibility on the clerk, and
despite the understanding that private process servers have little stake in
the proceedings, the Committee ultimately determined that the person
making service should mail notice to the debtor. 120 4 By incorporating
the proof-of-mailing requirements of Rule 2-126, section (d) balances
the interests of both parties. Although Rule 2-126(a) requires the use of
certified mail and a signed return receipt, Rule 2-126(g) states that fail-
ure to make proof of service does not invalidate service.120 5 A mailing to
the debtor's last-known address will satisfy Rule 2-645(d); thus, the cred-
itor is not burdened with the requirement of actual service on an ab-
sconding debtor.
Sections (e) and () attempt to protect both the interests of the judg-
ment creditor (garnishor) and those of the garnishee. The two sections
contain elements of Former Rules F2, F3, F4, G52, and G54, but the
concept of condemnation nisi has been discarded. Section (e), covering
the garnishee's answer, requires the garnishee to admit or deny the exist-
ence of a debt or the possession of property. The garnishee must de-
scribe anything subject to garnishment and specify the amount of any
debt. 120 6 The garnishee may raise any defenses to garnishment, includ-
ing those of the judgment debtor. The garnishee may also disgorge the
debtor's property by paying garnished indebtedness into court, or by
delivering property to the sheriff.120 7 Disgorgement does not end the
garnishee's liability, because the garnishee remains answerable, under
1202. Explanatory Note, Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 28. The Legal Aid Bureau brought
to the Committee's attention the existence of three federal cases striking down garnishment
proceedings similar to that under Former Md. R.P. F6. Se Deary v. Guardian Loan Co. 563
F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Simler v. Jennings, 50 U.S.L.W. 2470 (S.D. Ohio, January 18,
1982); Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1980). Although the Committee was reluc-
tant to reshape the garnishment rules upon the basis of these cases, and in the absence of
Supreme Court precedent, see Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 30, several of the recommenda-
tions were adopted.
1203. Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 31.
1204. Id. at 31-33. One member noted that the creditor, who stands to lose the most should
notice be challenged successfully, has the option of verifying that notice has been made.
1205. MD. R.P. 2-126.
1206. See supra notes 1191-96 and accompanying text.
1207. MD. R.P. 2-645(e). The property is then treated as if levied upon by the sheriff, and
may be sold pursuant to MD. R.P. 2-644. See also inqfa note 1215 and accompanying text
(garnishee's answer conclusive if creditor fails to contest). The levy is mandatory. See Min-
utes Mar. 12, 1982, at 34.
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sections (f) and (g), for any of the debtor's property acquired prior to
judgment. 2 °8 Moreover, the garnishee may not convert the proceeding
into a species of interpleader by disgorging an excessive amount of the
debtor's property. The garnishee may only pay into court an amount
up to the limit of the garnishment. 2 9
The provisions of Former Rule G51 covering motions to quash the
garnishment proceeding have been discarded. Such a procedure is no
longer needed, because under the new rules the garnishee may employ
any pleading or motion, including a Motion to Dismiss, under Rule
2-322(a), or a Motion for Summary Judgment under Rule 2-501.1210
Section (f) governs the garnishee's failure to answer and modifies
the current two-step process only slightly. Condemnation ntis under
Former Rule G54 and condemnation absolute under Former Rule G55
are replaced by a general default judgment pursuant to Rule 2-613.121,
In addition to a change in nomenclature, the new rule may lengthen the
time interval between garnishment and the entry of judgment. Section
(e) prescribes the time limit for the garnishee's answer by incorporating
Rule 2-321. The latter allows at least thirty days for an answer.' 2 12 The
failure to answer then authorizes the garnishor to invoke Rule 2-613,
governing default. Under Rule 2-613(e), the garnishor may request en-
try of judgment by default after the running of the time period in which
the garnishee may move to vacate default. That period is also thirty
days. 2 13 Hence the shortest period in which judgment may be obtained
is sixty days.
Former Rule G54 b permitted the entry of judgment of condemna-
tion nzis fifteen days after the return day following service of the writ.
The period so defined could be as brief as sixteen days. 12 14 Former Rule
G55 b then permitted the garnishor to move at once for judgment abso-
lute.12 5 Hence the service of a writ of garnishment near the end of a
1208. Minutes, Apr. 16, 1982, at 22. This is consistent with case law. See, e.g., Northwestern
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. William G. Wetherall, Inc., 267 Md. 378, 384, 298 A.2d 1, 6 (1972).
1209. Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 34.
1210. See MD. R.P. 2-645(g), which states that if the garnishee contests, "the matter shall
proceed as if an original action . . . governed by the rules applicable to civil actions."
1211. The creditor may obtain default upon request, but the request must be served on the
other parties. See MD. R.P. 1-32 1.
1212. MD. R.P. 2-321(a).
1213. MD. R.P. 2-613(c). Any motion filed under MD. R.P. 2-322 would further extend the
time period.
1214. See supra note 1133 and accompanying text.
1215. Former Md. R.P. G55 b. The garnishor had to prove his claim pursuant to Former
Md. R.P. 648. See also Kaplan v. Bach, 36 Md. App. 152, 155, 373 A.2d 71, 74 (1977) (no
notice required under Former Md. R.P. 648).
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month could, under the old system, result in a much shorter time inter-
val for entry of judgment upon the garnishee's failure to answer.
Section (g) applies to uncontested proceedings in which the gar-
nishee files a timely answer. The rule protects the garnishee, who needs
to know what his responsibility is and when it ends, by terminating the
creditor-garnishor's right to contest the answer thirty days after the gar-
nishee files it.12 16 The rule also enables the garnishee (as well as the
creditor or the debtor) to obtain the entry of judgment if the creditor
does not reply to the answer. The Committee added those provisions to
spare the cooperating garnishee the inconvenience and expense of fur-
ther proceedings. Although some members referred to the entry of judg-
ment as automatic, the clerk is not directed to act, even if the garnishee's
answer is conclusive and the result is beyond dispute. 12 17 The garnishee
must still request judgment, and the court's action is discretionary. In
order to hasten the process, the garnishee may file the request at the
same time as the answer. In that manner the garnishee can best assure
that the continuing liability for subsequently acquired assets ends.
Section (g) also governs contested cases. Committee members ex-
pressed the opinion that these are rare; in most cases the garnishee con-
fesses and disgorges. 12 " The rule adopts the stratagem of treating
everything as part of the original proceeding unless and until the gar-
nishee contests or the creditor disputes the garnishee's answer. Any dis-
pute arising between those parties is to be docketed and tried as if a new
case. If the creditor serves multiple garnishees and only one contests the
writ, only the action between the creditor and that one garnishee need
be docketed. 12
1 9
The Committee eliminated the provision of Former Rule G52 c,
which permitted the garnishee to recover attorneys' fees upon prevailing
in a contest with the judgment creditor. The Committee justified the
omission by explaining that because the garnishee would not be entitled
to attorneys' fees in a dispute with the debtor, the garnishee likewise
ought not be entitled to attorneys' fees with respect to the creditor. 1220
Section (h) permits the judgment creditor to propound interrogato-
ries to the garnishee, in accordance with Rule 2-421. This is similar to
Former Rule G56, except that the rule changes the sanctions for failure
1216. This would be equally true whether the garnishee answered nulla bona, confessed and
disgorged, or raised a defense. See Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 34.
1217. Id. at 35.
1218. Minutes, Mar. 12, 1982, at 38.
1219. Id. at 38-39, 48-50.
1220. This is based on the rationale that the attaching creditor is subrogated to the rights of
the debtor. See Messall v. Suburban Trust Co., 244 Md. 502, 506-07, 224 A.2d 419, 421
(1966).
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to answer. Under the former rule, the court could enter judgment in the
full amount of the creditor's claim-even if that amount exceeded the
value of the debtor's assets in the garnishee's hands. 122' Failure to an-
swer interrogatories does not warrant so severe a sanction. After some
study, the Committee included both contempt and attorneys' fees and
costs as potential sanctions.'
2 2 2
Section (i) incorporates by reference Rule 2-643 governing release
of property from levy. This became necessary after the Committee de-
cided to include tangible property within the scope of the garnishment
procedure.
Section (j), limiting judgments against garnishees to the value of
the garnished property, is consistent with prior practice. First, regard-
less of whether the creditor's claim is contested or uncontested, a judg-
ment against the garnishee is in personam.' 22 3 Second, the amount of
the judgment is controlled by both the statutory requirement that the
garnishee's recovery not exceed the amount owed by the judgment
debtor, 122 4 and by the further limitation of the judgment to the specific
property proven to be in the garnishee's hands.' 2 25 This is intended to
address the problem of establishing the limit of the garnishee's liability.
Hence proof of value is an element of the creditor's case, just as it was
under Former Rule G55. The language of the rule protects the gar-
nishee from "proof" of value of property which exceeds fair value.
Rule 2-616-Garnishment of Wages
Rule 2-646 closely tracks Former Rule F6 and is patterned after
Rule 2-645, governing garnishment of other property. Former Rule F6
became effective in 1979 and is considered to have worked well.'
2 26
Consequently, modifications have been slight, and the garnishment of
wages is largely unchanged.
Sections (b) and (c) formalize the requisites for issuance and con-
tent of the writ. Section (b) sets forth the information to be supplied in
1221. See Explanatory Note, Minutes, Mar. 12, 1982, at 36. See also id. at 37-38. This result,
however, would perhaps conflict with MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-602 (1984),
which limits execution against the garnishee to the amount shown "to be the value of the
property and credits attached ....
1222. Either sanction is available under MD. R.P. 2-433, governing compliance with discov-
ery. Early drafts of MD. R.P. 2-645 made only contempt available. Committee members
expressed concern that courts would be reluctant to impose contempt, thus leaving judgment
creditors no recourse. Minutes, Apr. 16, 1982, at 29-30. Attorneys' fees were not added to
section (h) until September, 1983.
1223. Minutes, Mar. 12, 1982, at 48.
1224. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-602 (1984).
1225. MD. R.P. 2-645(j); Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 34.
1226. Minutes, Mar. 12, 1982, at 50.
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the creditor's written request to the clerk. Former Rule F6 b's provisions
for a blank answer form for the garnishee and for a warning of the risk
of contempt are preserved. 1227  Section (c), similar to Rule 2-645(c),
prescribes the content of the writ, with the intent of furnishing adequate
notice to the debtor. 1228
Section (d), governing service, deviates from Former Rule F6 c by
requiring that a copy of the writ be mailed to the judgment debtor's last
known address. 1229 Rule 2-645, governing property other than wages,
includes the same requirement, but Rule 2-646(d) fails to make the
mailing the responsibility of the same person who has served the
writ. 12 30 There appears to be no reason for this curious omission, since
the considerations applicable to the mailing apply equally to wage and
non-wage garnishment. 123 1 Section (d) further parallels Rule 2-645 by
expressly authorizing the service of the writ outside the forum
county. 12
32
Section (e) differs from Former Rule F6 d by incorporating Rule 2-
32 1's time limits for the garnishee's answer. The former rule furnished a
flat thirty-day period for response. 12 33 Section (e) also incorporates For-
mer Rule F6 k, which permitted the debtor to interpose a defense or
objection.
Section (f) is virtually identical to the former rule. It departs from
Rule 2-645(0, governing non-wage property, by imposing different sanc-
tions upon the garnishee who fails to answer. Section (f) provides that
the garnishee may be held in contempt, and required to pay attorneys'
fees and costs. Rule 2-645(o merely permits the creditor to request an
order of default. While the minutes do not disclose the reason for this
distinction, the explanation may lie in the nature of wage garnishment,
which is largely self-effectuating. Both Former Rule F6 h and new Rule
1227. This contrasts with MD. R.P. 2-645, which contains no such provisions.
1228. See supra notes 1199-1200 and accompanying text.
1229. MD. R.P. 2-646(d).
1230. See id. which states "the person making service shall mail a copy of the writ to the
judgment debtor's last known address."
1231. See supra note 1204 and accompanying text.
1232. Former Md. R.P. 622 f by implication permits garnishment under Former Md. R.P.
F6 to be served outside the forum county. The concern for notice to creditors, which inheres
in the transmittal of judgment procedures of MD. R.P. 2-622, 2-623 and 2-641, has little
bearing on the garnishment of wages. The garnishment of nonwage property outside the
forum county could raise the notice issue, see supra note 1201, because nonwage property may
be subject to imminent disposal by the garnishee. The income stream of wages is more likely
to be of continuing availability. Therefore, the notice arising from the recording of the judg-
ment from outside the garnishee's county is less likely to be important.
1233. In some situations under MD. R.P. 2-321, the time period for response exceeds 30
days. See MD. R.P. 2-321, discussed at supra pp. 748-50.
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2-646(i) provide that while the lien is in force the garnishee must with-
hold wages and remit to the creditor. Hence in all uncontested cases the
creditor does not need to reduce the garnishment to a formal final order
of court in order to receive the garnished wages. On the other hand, the
garnishee's failure to respond to the writ raises the inference that the
garnishee is attempting to frustrate the creditor and to defy the court's
authority. Because the self-effectuating nature of the process is defeated
by uncooperative garnishees, severe sanctions are appropriate to compel
the garnishee's acknowledgment.
Section (g), like the former rule, requires dismissal of the lien if the
creditor fails to request a hearing within fifteen days of the garnishee's
answer denying employment. It differs both from the former rule and
from Rule 2-645(g) by providing that the hearing be held "promptly" if
the answer asserts any other defense, or if the debtor moves in opposi-
tion. 2 34 Again, the minutes do not indicate the reason for the depar-
ture, but it may be due to concern for the potentially serious impact of
wage garnishment upon the judgment debtor.
Section (i), governing the withholding and remitting of wages, dif-
fers significantly from Former Rule F6 h. The new rule provides that if
the garnishee or the debtor opposes the garnishment, the garnishee must
remit the withheld wages to the court pending resolution of the proceed-
ing. In all other respects the section does not change prior practice and
requires the garnishee to pay over wages and file periodic reports.
Section (j), governing the duties of the creditor, repeats the lan-
guage of the former rule, except for minor stylistic changes. Former
Rule F6 j 3 appears to have been eliminated but in fact it was not. Rule
2-626(a) imposes upon the creditor the same duty to record satisfaction
as the former rule. Section (k) incorporates Former Rule F6 i almost
verbatim, and section (h) incorporates by reference Rule 2-645(h), gov-
erning interrogatories.
Rule 2-647-Enforcement ofJudgment Awardtng Possession
Rule 2-647 has no precise counterpart in the former rules, although
in substance it resembles Former Rule 637, and BQ50.12 35 Very simply,
1234. MD. R.P. 2-646(g).
1235. The Committee initially contemplated that the rule was to follow ejectment proce-
dures for real property and replevin procedure for tangible property. See Minutes, Feb. 12,
1982, at 27-28. This would have been unnecessary and undesirable, since these procedures
are original actions and do not provide for enforcement. Moreover, the replevin rules were
repealed when in 1973 the legislature transferred all replevin actions to district court jurisdic-
tion. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROc. CODE ANN. § 4-401; MD. DIST. R. BQ40-BQ50. As
presented, the new rule more nearly approximates Former Md. R.P. 637 b than anything else.
See Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 19-20; see also MD. R.P. 2-648.
[VOL. 43:669
MARYLAND RULES
it permits the judgment creditor to obtain upon request the services of
the sheriff in taking possession of real or personal property. The new
rule is necessary because the levy provisons of Rules 2-641 through 2-644
only prescribe methods by which the debtor's property may be sold. In
addition, Rule 2-647 incorporates the substance of the writ of copias in
withemam, providing for a levy upon alternative property if the specified
property cannot be found. 123 6 In accord with prior practice, the new
rule makes no reference to private repossession, leaving intact the self-
help remedies prescribed by the Uniform Commercial Code. 1 23 7 Fur-
thermore, it has no bearing on summary ejectment, which continues to
be governed by the District Rules. 1238
Rule 2-648--Enforcement ofJudgment Prohibiting or Mandating Action
Rule 2-648 roughly parallels Former Rule 685, although in style it
more closely resembles Federal Rule 70. The new rule is intended to
grant to the court the broadest possible power in the area of enforce-
ment. The absence of an enumeration of powers is intended to avoid an
unintentional limitation through failure to itemize exhaustively. 1239
The judgment holder may obtain relief upon showing that the person
alleged to be in contempt has actual knowledge of the judgment.12 40
The new rule specifically provides for seizure or sequestration of the
property of the non-complying party, but changes the language of For-
mer Rule 685 a ("as may be necessary to satisfy the said decree,. . .") to
"the extent necessary to compel compliance .... ,,l24' The change ac-
cords with the scope of the respective rules. The former rule was em-
ployed to enforce monetary awards pursuant to equity decrees, while the
new rule is solely concerned with injunctive relief.124 2 The rule, like
1236. Under the former parlance, when the writ of replevin (or levy) was returned
"eloigned," a writ of capias in withemam might be obtained. In other words, if the sheriff could
not find the property (and the creditor possessed a judgment awarding in the alternative
money or property, or both), the creditor could have had execution on the debtor's other
property without resort to another levy upon specified property. See Former Md. R.P. BQ50.
1237. Eg., MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. §§ 7-502, 9-503 (1975).
1238. MD. DIST. R. 1 (b). The "writ of restitution" procedure used in landlord-tenant cases
is not intended to be altered. See Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 20-21.
1239. Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 22-24. This does not mean that the old common law or
equity writs are still available. See MD. R.P. 2-631.
1240. Minutes, May 21-22, 1982, at 23.
1241. MD. R.P. 2-648.
1242. There is some question as to whether "sequestration" is redundant, since the new rule
expressly authorizes "seizure" of property. To the extent "sequestration" governs intangibles
or places in custoda legis property that is held by third parties, it represents a useful and
intended extension of scope. For various applications of sequestration, see Oles Envelope
Corp. v. Oles, 193 Md. 79, 86-94, 65 A.2d 899, 904-06 (1948). "Sequestration" of property in
order to compel the appearance of a party is governed by MD. R.P. 2-115.
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Federal Rule 70, also provides for the court to order an appointed per-
son to perform, at the non-complying party's expense, acts that the non-
complying party has previously been ordered to do.
2 4 3
Rule 2-649-Charging Order
Rule 2-649 prescribes for the first time in the Maryland Rules a
method of obtaining satisfaction of a monetary judgment by the mecha-
nism of a judicial order against a debtor's partnership interest. The
remedy itself is not new, having long been provided in the Maryland
Code, Corporations and Associations Article and its predecessors. 124 4 A
charging order is analogous to garnishment, in that the judgment credi-
tor may seek and obtain an order compelling the partnership to pay
over to the creditor the debtor's income stream, as well as any capital
distributions which would have been made to the debtor. The court
may also order foreclosure of the partnership interest itself, making the
creditor entitled to all the judgment debtor's economic (but not man-
agement) rights.' 24 5
Rule 2-651-Ancillay Relief in Aid of Enforcement
The purpose of Rule 2-651 is to give the court "broad authority to
issue mandatory and prohibitive injunctions when necessary to aid in
the enforcement of the judgment. ' ') 2 4 6 The rule is a synthesis of ele-
ments of Former Rules 627, 628 d, 636, and 685. To safeguard against
potential abuse, ancillary relief can not be obtained except upon motion
and proof of service. Because judgment debtors may not be represented
by counsel at this stage of the proceedings, the new rule requires service
of process in the same manner as process to obtain personal jurisdiction,
and not mere service upon counsel of record. 24 7 The scope of relief
available under the new rule is limited to "regarding property subject to
the enforcement of the judgment.' ' 248 The rule thus should not be con-
strued as authorizing the court to order the debtor to pay, and to hold
the debtor in contempt for failure to comply.'
2 49
1243. MD. R.P. 2-648. Unlike FED. R. Civ. P. 70, the new rule does not state that an "act
when so done has like effect as if done by the party," but that meaning is inherent in the rule.
1244. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 9-505, 10-121 (1978).
1245. See id. The courts have not yet determined the scope of a charging order in Mary-
land, because the issue has not yet been presented. See Bank of Bethesda v. Koch, 44 Md.
App. 350, 353-56, 408 A.2d 767, 769-70 (1979).
1246. Explanatory Note, Minutes, Mar. 12, 1982, at 51. It is intended to accomplish di-
rectly what is currently accomplished by use of supplementary proceedings. 1d. at 52.
1247. See MD. R.P. 2-651; Minutes, Mar. 12, 1982, at 52-53.
1248. MD. R.P. 2-651.
1249. Minutes, Apr. 16, 1982, at 34.
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